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INTRODUCTION

On September 9, 1994, The American University Law Review and the
Law and Government Program of The Washington College of Law cohosted a conference addressing voting rights, with an emphasis on
recent Supreme Courtjurisprudence, and Shaw v. Reno in particular.
The conference brought together many of the leading scholars and
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practitioners involved in this area of the law.* The day's events
included four panel discussions and a luncheon speech by Julian
Bond, the transcripts of which the Law Review is honored to publish.**
I. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND VOTING RIGHTS

PROFESSOR RASKIN (MODERATOR): Good morning, everyone.
Thank you all for getting up at such an early hour to kick off the day
with us. I want to welcome you to the Washington College of Law
and American University.
This conference promises to be an extraordinary event, and it is
cosponsored by the Program on Law and Government at the
Washington College of Law and the American University Law Review,
which has been the catalyst behind this conference. I would like to
start by saluting the AU Law Review and Tom Goldstein, its
editor-in-chief, for coming up with the idea for this conference.
My name isJamin Raskin. I am the codirector of our Program on
Law and Government. I will be our moderator today, although my
colleagues will tell you that I pretty much take the word "moderate"
out of "moderator." But I will do my best to give everybody a fair
shot and to lead an exciting exchange of ideas.
We have got an extremely ambitious agenda, posing four clusters
of questions, each of which could constitute a conference of its own,
but we have created four panel discussions on them.
Since we have gathered so much raw talent and knowledge in one
room, there will be many voices struggling to be heard. We have set
the meeting up purposefully as a dialogue and not as a set of papers,
each of which would fly off in its own direction. We want the
panelists to interact with one another to improve, enlarge and
elaborate upon one another's ideas and to challenge views which you
might think are mistaken or complacent. Our hope is that the result
will be a series of discussions that will be illuminating and exciting to
participate in, to witness today, and finally to read in the pages of the
AU Law Review when it is published as a special symposium issue.
So let us start now with our first panel discussion. The theme is:
The Rehnquist Court and voting rights: Where is the Court headed
now?

Brief biographies of the participants are set out in Appendix I, at page 118.
The participants and Law Review staff made minor editorial changes to the transcripts
where necessary for clarity.
*

**
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Let me start by posing this question, and we will throw it open to
you:
Judge Phillips, writing for the Eastern District Court in North
Carolina on August 1, several weeks ago, returned the Supreme
Court's serve in Shaw v. Reno1 with a 147-page tour de force opinion
which found that the majority African-American districts in North
Carolina passed the new strict scrutiny standard.2 The decision ends
like this:
"The question in the end is whether a deliberately race-based
districting plan enacted by an overwhelmingly white legislature in one
of the former Confederate States in order to comply with its
understanding of the commands of national law enacted to enforce
the guarantees of the 14th and 15th Amendments shall be declared
unconstitutional at the behest of five white voters whose voting rights
have been in no legally cognizable way harmed by the plan."
Now, my question is: Do you think that the Supreme Court
ultimately will be willing to accept this judgment, or do its holdings
in Shaw and Johnson v. DeGrand? now require it to reject this kind of
conclusion?
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Well, I think that the Supreme Court had
no real idea when it decided Shaw about the level of litigation that it
was going to have to see over the next couple of years. It has six cases
that will be up there by the end of this year, and that doesn't even
count the likelihood that there will be additional cases brought up as
people start to try to apply Shaw to districting for state legislatures or
local bodies.
I find it hard to believe that the Supreme Court isn't going to try
and move back somewhat from Shaw, at least to cut down on the
amount of litigation. The thing that is most fascinating about the
North Carolina opinion in Shaw II, coming back on remand, it seems
to me, is that the district court has to strain so hard to uphold the
districts because the legal standard of Shaw is just so likely to provoke
litigation.
The point thatJudge Phillips is making at the end there, that there
has been no denial of any cognizable voting right of any of the
plaintiffs, seems to me something the Supreme Court had not
addressed in Shaw I and may address, in order to cut back on the

1.
2.
3.

113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (Shawl).
Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw 1), 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (2-1 decision).
114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
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amount of litigation, when Shaw and the other five cases get back up
there: the legal question of standing for the white plaintiffs.
MODERATOR. So you think that the Supreme Court will retreat
somewhat from Shaw v. Reno and tolerate lower courts like the North
Carolina court going in their own directions in interpreting the new
standard?
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Yes. What we may ultimately see, maybe
not in this round of cases but in the next, is something like what we
saw in the pornography cases in the 1960s. There was a period of
time where the Supreme Court took every pornography case, watched
the movie, and decided whether they knew it when they saw it.
Ultimately, in Miller v. California,4 the Supreme Court retreated from
that and said, "We're going to allow local standards to govern." And
I think they may retreat here and start allowing state legislatures and
the justice Department to control the districting a little more because
otherwise the Supreme Court is going to spend five years out of every
ten hearing all of the challenges to districts that some person or
another just doesn't like.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I disagree. I think that the majority of the
Court that decided Shaw v. Reno is also going to decide that Shaw II
is also wrongly decided, and I don't think they're going to conclude
that this is ultimately a voting case at all, but rather a case about racial
classification and that they are going to conclude that segregated
voting districts are no more constitutional than segregated schools or
segregated drinking fountains.
MS. WRIGHT: You raised the question in your initial statement of,
in light ofJohnson v. DeGrandy,where do we think the Supreme Court
is headed? And I would have to say that if you look at Johnson v.
DeGrandy, which is a voting rights case handed down on the last day
of this year's term, I'would have to agree with Pam Karlan that the
Supreme Court appears to be moving toward stepping back somewhat
from the brink that it approached in Shaw v. Reno.
In Shaw, what you saw injustice O'Connor's majority opinion was
an almost totally pejorative description and discussion of majorityminority election districts. Very harsh rhetoric was used to describe
these districts. The term segregation, which was used by Professor
Butler, was used by the Supreme Court as well.
When you look atJohnson v. DeGrandy,whatjumps out at you is that
all of that is missing. And it is especially conspicuous in its absence
injustice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Johnson. In the Johnson

4.

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

1994]

VOTING RIGHTS CONFERENCE

case, the Supreme Court, while it rejected the claims of the particular
minority voters in front of it, articulated some standards that certainly
recognized the continuing role of majority-minority election districts
in providing some measure of political opportunity for minority voters
in situations where voting is polarized along racial lines, which is
something that we see in many states in this Nation to this day. And
certainly North Carolina is one of those states.
And if you look at Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Johnson,it is very striking that instead of repeating all of this pejorative
rhetoric about majority-minority election districts, she makes
statements such as, in looking at a state legislative redistricting plan,
"Lack of proportionality [for minorities] is probative evidence of vote
dilution." In all cases, she believes that lack of proportionality is
relevant in proving vote dilution. She doesn't believe that proportionality is the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a plan satisfies
the Voting Rights Act, but she says that lack of proportionality is
always probative evidence of vote dilution. None of the pejorative
rhetoric was repeated there. I think that is very significant in looking
at where the Court is headed ultimately on this question.
MODERATOR: But you think that in Johnson v. DeGrandy the Court
has already begun to soften somewhat its stance in Shaw v. Reno. In
Shaw, the Court appeared to be headed in the direction that Professor
Butler was suggesting. It could be seen as an initial move to
dismantle many of the majority-black and Hispanic districts, perhaps
even all race-conscious districting. And it seems as if Professor Butler
is taking the position that the Court may still be headed there.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I wanted to respond to that because I think
one of the problems with these discussions is that the issues quickly
get raised to very broad levels of political conflict, such as whether
black districts are ever permissible or, in Professor Butler's phrase,
whether creating segregated districts is ever permissible.
And in a sense that is whatJudge Phillips also does in that sentence
you quote at the end of his opinion. He raises the issue to the level
of the general question can these districts ever be created?
I don't think that that is what Shaw v. Reno was about. Shaw
concerns a much narrower set of circumstances and Judge Phillips
doesn't actually address those more specific circumstances in that last
sentence. Shaw addresses districts that are intentionally designed to
have a minority in control but which are so geographically contorted
that they depart from all familiar principles of districting.
Many of the initial reactions to Shaw responded to the decision as
if it were a sweeping attack on race-conscious districting. That is not
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the way I read the opinion. I don't think that is what Shaw is about.
Instead, it addresses oddly shaped districts and those districts alone.
As a result, I am not sure thatJudge Phillips's opinion really addresses
that question as directly as it needs to be addressed to be persuasive
when the case comes back to the Supreme Court.
MODERATOR: Well, perhaps then the Texas5 and Louisiana6
courts had a better understanding of what the Supreme Court meant.
However, in Louisiana and in Texas the district courts struck down
oddly shaped minority districts.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: I think it is important to note that
in Shaw the Court had a majority for striking down not only the
excesses of race-conscious districting, but also for moving against the
Voting Rights Act if it wished. The Court had a tool available to it,
which was simply to say that you cannot take race into account in
districting. And it did not exercise that tool.
I think that the problem with Shaw is revealed by analogy to the
pornography cases under the First Amendment. In each context, the
Court is trying to identify a constitutional doctrine of "Don't do it to
excess in a way that is offensive," without defining a substantive
underlying principle. So what you have in Shaw is an irresolute
standard under which a districting plan may violate something called
traditional notions of districting, but in which the contours of the new
principle are neither explicated in the opinion nor are they intuitively
obvious from American political experience.
The problem arises when the Court wants to walk a middle line.
Despite the harsh rhetoric in Shaw, I think the Court wants to find a
balance in which promoting minority representation is allowable, as
in Johnson v. DeGrandy, but in which it doesn't come to dominate all
politics as we know it. And that is a hard line to implement and a
hard line to constitutionalize.
I think the North Carolina district court on remand in Shaw took
the Supreme Court at its literal word. The district court's opinion on
remand read as if to say, "Okay, if we find these technical requirements for meeting what is a compelling state interest and what are
narrowly tailored responses, then we can justify this district." I think
they probably got it wrong. I think the Supreme Court is holding out
the snake-like district in North Carolina as an example of something

5. Vera v. Richards, C.A. No. H-94-0277, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368 (Aug. 17, 1994),
order, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12334 (S.D. Tx. Sept. 2, 1994).
6. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993) (Hays ]), vacatedand remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2731, on remand, No. 92-1522, 1994 WL 477159 (W.D. La. July 29, 1994) (Hays 11), stay
granted, 115 S. Ct. 31 (1994).
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which the Court is not prepared to tolerate. The same five votes are
still there on the Supreme Court and I would tend to doubt that the
North Carolina district will survive.
MODERATOR: Don Verrilli, you have practiced a lot before the
Supreme Court. What is your sense about where the Court is headed
here? Do they indeed want to treat racial gerrymanders like political
pornography, i.e., "they know it when they see it"? Are they willing
to take up dozens of these cases in order to pick and choose which
are okay and which are not?
MR. VERRILLI: Well, I think it's hard to talk about "the Court"
here. I think the question really is what does Justice O'Connor want
to do. And we now know more than we did at the time Shaw v. Reno
was decided.
If, by some fortuity, you had attended oral arguments about Voting
Rights Act cases that term, the 1992-93 term, Shaw wouldn't have
come as such a surprise. Although the Voinovich v. Quiltei case
ended up being a fairly solid affirmance of the basic approach to
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the oral argument in Voinovich was
dominated by the question of when, if ever, race-conscious districting
is permissible. There was an extraordinary amount of hostility from
the Bench during that argument about that proposition, and lo and
behold probable jurisdiction was noted in Shaw I a week later.
So you had that kind of evolution, I think, going on at the time of
Shaw, but now more has happened. You now have Justice Thomas'
opinion in Holder v. Hall' joined by Justice Scalia.
MODERATOR- Would you describe that just a little bit for us?
MR. VERRILLI: That was really a fairly amazing opinion in which
Justice Thomas on the one hand offered a plainly implausible reading
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the 1982 amended section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, to exclude claims of vote dilution, but then
offered a very powerful critique of the whole idea of race-conscious
districting and of where this process was heading, in his view, the sort
of unstoppable internal logic of taking race into account. So you've
got that piece now.
You also have a vote by Justice Scalia against staying the decision in
Louisiana.
So it seems to me there is an entrenched right-wing that is quite
hostile to the idea of race-consciousness.

7.
8.

113 S. C. 1149 (1993).
114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
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Justice Kennedy has given signals in that direction in separate
opinions in Voting Rights Act cases.
What the Chief Justice will do on this is unclear. His pattern of
voting in this area is not entirely consistent.
But it seems to me it comes down to Justice O'Connor. It's
certainly true thatJustice O'Connor in the DeGrandy case backed off
the harsh rhetoric, and it is certainly true that she has a record of
being an incrementalist in virtually every area that is important to her.
So, what I would suspect we will see, if the North Carolina case is
the case they really focus on, would be a ruling striking down that
district 5-to-4 without reaching the broad question of the permissibility
of race-conscious districting. I think the odds are high they'll say we
don't need to reach that question, this is what we were talking about
in Shaw I, nothing that happened in the record justifies the creation
of this extreme a district.
But I think it will be harder if the Louisiana case is decided in
tandem with Shaw or even before Shaw, because there the State
moved from a more egregiously misshapen district to a less misshapen
district, posing the race-consciousness issue in a stronger way.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: Let me make clear that I am not saying
that under no circumstances can districts be drawn that are raceconscious. My remarks were that you cannot, with no justification,
simply decide that you are going to create a district, the only criterion
of which is asking "How many black people can we put in that
district?"
That is what the State of North Carolina did. Now, they certainly
attempted to justify it. I don't think that that justification is going to
fly, because those districts are not required by the Voting Rights Act,
and then you have to ask the question, "May they voluntarily use race
with no justification?" And I come back to the answer "no."
DeGrandywas simply a different case. DeCrandywas a Voting Rights
Act case. It was a Voting Rights Act challenge. It was a case in which
if the Court had concluded that there had been a Voting Rights Act
violation, presumably, they would have concluded there had been
discrimination based on race, in which case a remedy based on race
would have been appropriate and absolutely consistent with existing
jurisprudence.
What the Supreme Court concluded in DeGrandywas that there was
no violation of the Voting Rights Act. The Court specifically did not
reach any issues that might have been presented because Florida quite
obviously had consciously created minority districts. What Florida had
not done in the districts that were challenged was to create districts
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that had no function other than to group together people of various
races.
So I think they were just quite different situations and that what
happened in DeGrandyis not going to be terribly helpful in predicting
how these districts that are created solely on the basis of race are
likely to fare.
MODERATOR: So are you comfortable if the Court rests with the
doctrine that a State may not use race in order to create majorityblack or Hispanic districts only in the context in which you have a
district which is extremely contorted or odd in configuration?
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I am comfortable with the proposition that
a State may realize that it has an obligation under the Voting Rights
Act not to dilute minority voting strength and that they may take
reasonable precautions to see to it that they don't expose themselves
to challenge under the Voting Rights Act. And if I were advising a
State, my advice to it would be to employ standard districting criteria
throughout the state and, when it's possible following those criteria,
to create districts that are in fact majority-minority districts, that is a
safe course of action.
When the State goes beyond that, however, then it runs into the
constitutional problem. The line, the narrow path the State must
follow is between going too far and violating the Constitution and not
going far enough and having someone sue you under the Voting
Rights Act.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Well, the point at which Professor Butler
ended is part of what I wanted to say, which is that, for a State like
North Carolina, whenever it creates districts it will face a lawsuit. If
it draws a second majority-black district, it will face a lawsuit from
white voters who don't like the shape of the district; if it doesn't draw
a second majority-black district, it will face a lawsuit from black voters
who claim that the State could have drawn one.
MODERATOR: DoesJohnson v. DeGrandyforeclose that second suit
by minority voters?
PROFESSOR KARLAN: No, it doesn't foreclose the suit. It may
foreclose winning some of those suits.
But there are two different questions here. One question is: Are
we going to force states to litigate every decision they make about
districting because someone will have standing to challenge it? The
other question is: At what point in the process will a State be allowed
to draw the districts it wants?
A lot of the reason that Judge Phillips's opinion on remand is so
long is because he spends a lot of time talking about the precise
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districts in North Carolina and talking about the North Carolina 12th
District. If you read the Supreme Court opinion, you would think this
was a balkanized, bantustan district. If, instead, what you did was look
at who was in the district, it's in fact the most racially integrated
district in North Carolina.
MODERATOR: In the history of North Carolina.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: In the history of North Carolina. And it
is one of the really profound tragedies of American politics that
drawing a district that is fifty-five percent black is viewed as racially
segregated apartheid or balkanization. No one says that a district is
fifty-five percent white is a balkanized, apartheid-driven racially
created district.
It is also the only urban district in North Carolina, which I think is
important to point out. When you look at Judge Phillips's opinion,
he talks about the characteristics that the people in the district share.
Although the district strings these people together along 1-85, this is
not a contorted district if what we are talking about is representing
voters as opposed to representing trees and pieces of land.
MODERATOR: Professor Kairys, let me ask you a question. Do
you think that the Supreme Court has found that unless a district is
a perfect square or triangle or circle, white people have a constitutional right to be in the majority, and how would you read this decision
in the context of other race cases that the Court has handed down
recently?
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I am very concerned about the differences
between the approach the Court has taken when whites are disadvantaged or appear to be disadvantaged and the approach the Court has
taken when blacks or other minorities appear to be disadvantaged.
This cuts across various discrimination issues; it isn't only a question
of voting.
In a recent article, 9 I compare three cases. In Memphis v. Greene,"0
a traffic barrier was put up in the City of Memphis between a white
community and a predominantly black neighborhood. The white
community that initiated and requested the barrier was founded as a
segregated white community, and it's still exclusively white within a
city that now is about half black. The Court approved the barrier
without even requiring a specific explanation from the city, on the
ground that the black plaintiffs had not met the burden of proving
purposeful discrimination, despite the lack of a legitimate or sufficient

9.
10.

David Kairys, Race Trlogy, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1994).
451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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government interest and the similarities to traditional patterns of
discrimination.
When you compare that to the assumptions and the moral and
legal basis of City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co." and Shaw v. Reno,
particularly, the disparity is really startling. I have come to the
conclusion that there is now a dual system of equality rules. Led by
the more recent conservative judges-who are now usually called
"moderate," and sometimes are, but not on racial equality issues-the
Court has drastically different rules and approaches in cases where
whites are disadvantaged and cases where minorities are disadvantaged. Let me summarize it briefly.
In cases where blacks or other minorities or women are disadvantaged, there are three basic characteristics to the Court's approach.
First, there is an inordinate burden to prove purposeful action and a
tendency to ignore the appearance of discrimination or stereotyping
or even strong circumstantial proof. One of the instances of that is
Memphis v. Greene.
Second, judicial restraint, articulated as a highest-level, general
principle.
Third, a moral skepticism that doubts that whites discriminate
anymore and questions the credibility and motives of challengers who
claim otherwise.
When you look at cases where measures are viewed as
disadvantaging whites, the approach is different. In Shaw v. Reno I
think it's hard to say there was really any disadvantage, but it's
perceived that way in the majority opinion. There is no disadvantage
in the sense that there is the same number of voters in every district
and the proportion overall of majority-white districts is actually greater
than the white proportion of the State.
If you look, though, at those cases, there is, first, a minimal burden
satisfied by circumstantial evidence. The appearance of discrimination or stereotyping is conclusive of at least a prima facie case, and a
remedial or affirmative purpose is sufficient even if it is a clearly goodfaith response to conceded discrimination.
Second, there is judicial activism with no discussion or mention of
judicial restraint.
And third, moral repudiation, drawing on the history and symbols
of the worst forms of racism.

11.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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An easy summary of the Court's approach in Memphis v. Greene,
Washington v. Davis,2 and the whole line of minority claims of
discrimination since the early 1970s, is moral skepticism and judicial
restraint.
On the other hand, in cases like Shaw v. Reno and the other cases
we're talking about today, and beyond the voting context, it seems to
me we're talking aboutjudicial activism and moral repudiation. The
question becomes "smoking out racism" 3 in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., and "political apartheid" 4 in Shaw v. Reno. Surely, the
symbolic question of apartheid would seem to be much more present
in Memphis v. Greene than Shaw v. Reno.
MODERATOR: Just to follow up on that point, in the Texas
remand case, the court said that racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional but it is also morally wrong, inconsistent with our founding
traditions and Martin Luther King's vision.
To what extent have the symbols and ideas of the civil rights
movement been appropriated and corrupted by a conservative
majority targeting the success of the Voting Rights Act?
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: The problem is that if you ask
people in the street what is the symbolic message of the civil rights
movement, the answer will be each person should be judged
independent of color, race, creed, or any other such characteristic.
That language of formal equality is easily appropriated in decisions
that want to call into question what the courts see as excesses in State
use of racial classifications.
I think that the problem that the Court will run into with the next
generation of Shaw cases is that Shaw went up to this point of looking
hard at this question and then never answered it. As many people
here have commented, the rhetorical level of Shaw is high; its
analytical level and doctrinal contribution is low. And I think that
there was a sense in the Court that an opinion which stood simply as
an admonition against certain kinds of excesses could suffice. The
Court demanded that States not allow their politics to look like
apartheid, that they not make it look it like political choices are
simply driven by race in this society, even if they may in fact be driven
by race.
The Court thought that this admonition would be enough, that it
would terminate the inquiry and then everyone would proceed. And

12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
14. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
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now they are going to get back a handful of these cases. We don't
know how many they are going to note probable jurisdiction on, but
they have to take Louisiana and Georgia, 5 presumably they have to
take North Carolina, they may sweep Texas up as well.
And when they go back, they now have to confront what Don
Verrilli identified, Justice Thomas' opinion in Holder v. Hall, which
raised the stakes in these cases dramatically because of his challenge,
'You thought you could avoid the ultimate question by refusing to
address whether use of racial classifications per se is unconstitutional.
Well, I say it is. And now I have got two votes that are going to push
that issue hard and those are two votes that constituted part of the
five-vote majority in Shaw."
So I think that the next round of cases doesn't have the easy
"doctrinal out" that was available in Shaw. After all, the Shaw holding
was simply that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action which could
survive a motion to dismiss. It had been perfectly obvious since
Gomillion v. Lightfoot 6 that if you challenge line-drawing on racial
grounds, it states a cause of action. That is hardly noteworthy.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I wanted to make a couple of points here.
One is that we focus very much on the Court and what its stance is
toward the Voting Rights Act. But I think it is important to go back
to what Congress did in 1982, or really what it didn't do, because I
think an enormous amount of the tentativeness and the uncertainty
that we are now seeing on the Court in the voting rights field is a
reaction to the lack of clear resolution in the '82 amendments from
Congress of how these issues should be dealt with.
The '82 amendments to the Voting Rights Act were absolutely
major civil rights policy developments. And Justice Thomas I think
is quite clearly wrong in not believing that those amendments were
designed to make vote dilution illegal.
But precisely what vote dilution was, how to recognize it, how to
define it, were questions Congress refused to confront. And a lot of
the questions that are now being addressed in the courts are ones that
were posed to Congress at the time and that Congress failed to
resolve clearly. That is one of the important variables to the context
here.
Second, in terms of debates about gerrymandering, I think it's
important to keep two things in mind. First, many of these extremely
contorted districts that we have been talking about here are not

15. Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13043 (S.D. Ga.Sept 12, 1994).
16. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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necessary to create a majority-black district in the states involved.
There are findings to that effect in the North Carolina case and in
the Louisiana case, although, as Don Verrilli has pointed out,
Louisiana has now become somewhat more complicated since the
legislature tried to respond by drawing a more compact district.
But the point is we still don't know how many minority seats are
actually threatened by a principle which would rule out of bounds the
most extreme contortions in the use of district boundary lines to
achieve minority control of districts.
Finally, when you look at the data, at least the data I have been able
to collect covering the last 20 years, there is no question that
districting has become a much more gamesman-like process involving
more distorted district shapes in the last round of redistricting than
in previous years. And that is clear in many of the states that are now
being challenged. So I think it's a mistake to assume that districts
have always had these sort of bizarre shapes and suddenly they have
become a constitutional problem at this particular moment when they
are used to benefit minority voters.
In fact, what is going on is that we do have much more distorted
districts being drawn both to benefit minority voters and for other
political purposes.
MODERATOR: And part of that has to do with the development
of computer technology that allows much easier manipulation of the
district lines. But do you think that the Court eventually has to
confront the issue that contorted districts are okay for the purposes
of incumbent protection, and most incumbents are still white, but not
okay for the purposes of facilitating majorities of blacks or Hispanics?
PROFESSOR PILDES: The districting process is a very complicated
game involving a mixture of formal rules and implicit norms. Part of
what has happened with the Voting Rights Act in the last round of
redistricting is that, as more and more distorted districts become
legitimate means of creating minority districts, that process also has
legitimated more and more distorted districts for other purposes.
These developments are linked. If you look at a state like North
Carolina, for example, and ask how many districts in the 1980s fell
below a certain measurable standard of compactness, the answer was
none. At that same standard in the 1990s eight districts in North
Carolina-not just the two challenged in Shaw-fail to meet it and
hence might be considered "bizarre." And I think you can't see these
as disconnected developments.
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So if some constitutional principle were to emerge which constrained the shapes the districts could take, I suspect it would have
radiating effects on the districting process in general.
MODERATOR: Even though strict scrutiny is not to be applied?
PROFESSOR PILDES: Even if as a formal constitutional matter that
principle didn't apply when the district shapes were distorted for
partisan reasons or incumbency protection reasons.
MODERATOR: Is it troubling that the Court tolerates redistricting
to protect incumbents and partisan majorities? Will this become a
cutting issue?
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: Yes. I think that is the key issue
here because the record is clear in Texas, and I believe it's clear in
North Carolina as well, that if you took incumbency protection out of
the picture, you could get minority districts that were traditionally
configured. One enters the realm of creative line drawing often
where incumbents have the first bite at the apple and then minorities,
who have had less power traditionally, are left to try to cobble
together a district out of the leavings of more powerful political
actors.
You have a number of factors that come together. First of all, in
the 1980s the Republican Party, under Lee Atwater, made a concerted
effort to go after the redistricting process, which they had basically
not touched much beforehand. Second, the 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act gave a formal mechanism for direct court review of
the substantive decisions of redistricting that was really not that
present in the 1980 round of redistricting and was not really present
at all in the 1970 round of redistricting. Third, the computer
technology means you can do things that only bizarre geniuses such
as Phil Burton could do in the last round of redistricting; that is, in
your mind configure a 365-sided district. There are few people who
can do that. Now anyone can do that with the computer technology.
The result is that you are getting these districting forms that lose
the illusion of being neutral in any way. And right now, because of
the weakness of the political gerrymandering doctrine under Davis v.
Bandemer,17 the only way to get them into the court substantively is
through the question of minority representation. So all the pressure
is being put under the Voting Rights Act and under the equal
protection clause.

17.

478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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And Pam Karlan, in an article in the Texas Law Review,18 and
another one in the Supreme Court Review, 9 I think demonstrates
that the Voting Rights Act and the equal protection cases are often
times just a pretext for a second round of partisan fighting over what
the nature of redistricting will be.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I just want to add one piece of factual
information to the previous two comments. And that is the importance of the change in the format of the census data. I think even
more important than the improved computer technology is the fact
that now the census reports populations for every closed polygon. In
the past, even with the use of computers, gerrymandering was limited
by the fact that the pieces of geography were fairly large and it wasn't
possible, unless you could get the census to actually split enumeration
districts or census blocks, to create districts that were no wider than
the interstate. You simply couldn't sort out the population.
More than anything else, the new format of the census has
produced these problems, and of course the Census Bureau had no
idea it was going to produce these kinds of problems. They thought
they were saving themselves work because they were forever being
asked to split these larger units into smaller sections.
MR. VERRILLI: Kay Butler and Brenda Wright and I were all in
the courthouse in Tallahassee for the trial that led to the eventual
decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. DeGrandy, and one
impression that I came away from that trial with, something that I
think validates what you are hearing from a lot of people this
morning, is that the panel, the three-judge panel deciding Johnson v.
DeGrandy in the district court, thought that the legislative plan stunk
to high heaven. They thought it was an outrageous effort to
manipulate lines for partisan reasons, to protect incumbents; districts
would be drawn with these little blips in them to make sure that the
incumbent's residence was inside the district, and things like that.
And that delegitimated the whole enterprise, I thought, in the eyes
of the court and made it much more vulnerable ultimately to the
Voting Rights Act challenge. There was a sense that this plan wasn't
entitled to any real deference as an exercise of democratic politics,
that this thing stunk and of course it was a partisan gerrymander and
they weren't going to let you use the Voting Rights Act in this way.

18. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some PessimismAbout Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705
(1993).
19. Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, in 1993 SUP.
Cr. REV. 245.
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It was, I thought, a very strange and extra-legal dynamic, but one
that explained a lot about what happened in the district court. They
just thought, "We're not going to listen to your Voting Rights Act
defenses. This was all a partisan game, and we know it and we're not
going to pay any attention to you."
MS. WRIGHT: To follow up on that, I think there is a lot of truth
to what Don Verrilli just said. And I think that the issue of shape of
a district, if the Supreme Court is going to treat that as a matter of
independent constitutional significance, I think we are going to see
how much trouble that this issue is going to get the Court into.
I think a lot of the comments here this morning have sort of hinted
at this issue, but the issue of shape, as the Court itself recognized in
Shaw, doesn't really have any independent constitutional status.
There is no constitutional provision that says districts have to be
compact.
MODERATOR: Or even that there have to be districts at all.
MS. WRIGHT: Or even necessarily that there have to be districts
at all. That is correct.
The Court is, I think, searching for a way to say that you can be
race-conscious but you can't be overly race-conscious. And the great
difficulty of drawing that line has led the Court to seize on the issue
of shape as a possible neutral way of determining when a district is
permissible and when it's not.
The problem is that if you start down that path, the Court is going
to find that it is creating a very unfair double-standard that works to
the great disadvantage of minorities and yet leaves intact many very
oddly shaped districts with majority-white populations where States will
be able to come in and say, "Well, we didn't really do it for racial
reasons. We just did it to protect the incumbent."
You could look at a district such as the 4th Congressional District
in Tennessee, which I happen to have a map of here. And I don't
know how well the audience can see this. But this district has been
described as a district that is 300 miles long, it touches the borders of
four different states, it crosses a time zone, and it's a district that has
essentially existed in this form in Tennessee for quite some time. It
wasn't just a creation of computer technology that became available
in 1990.
This district is an overwhelmingly white district that happens to be
represented by Representative Jim Cooper in Tennessee. And I am
not picking on him in any way.
But what I am suggesting is that the Supreme Court I think is going
to have a great deal of difficulty in applying a standard that says shape
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is the real issue here, shape is the dividing line that separates
constitutional from unconstitutional districts, because if it does that,
it is going to have to take a much harder look at all sorts of districts,
not just districts drawn forMODERATOR:
Are you taking issue with Professor Pildes's
characterization that there is something radically new about the socalled racially gerrymandered districts? After all, gerrymanders were
a creation of the 19th century, not the 20th century. We have had
the language around for a long time.
MS. WRIGHT: Well, I am certainly not disputing the fact that the
number of districts that are dramatically irregular in shape has
increased greatly as a result of the 1990 census and the computer
technology that has become available. I don't think I am disputing
that at all.
But you can point out two things. One is that these very oddly
shaped, elongated districts are not a sole creation of the 1990
redistricting.
And also, the timing is not really necessarily the important thing,
because if the Court is moving toward a principle that says there is no
strict scrutiny that applies to an oddly-shaped majority-white district
drawn to protect a white incumbent, then all of the very strangely
shaped districts that are majority-white in population, whether they
were drawn in 1990 for the first time or not, are still going to have a
special protection that is not available for the majority-black districts,
leading to a standard that disadvantages the groups that probably
need the most protection in the redistricting process.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I wanted to make a comment on the
relationship of politics to race in this area, which is what you raised
by asking about the role of incumbency protection or the pursuit of
partisan political advantage.
One way you can understand the story here is that politicians are
cynically manipulating the Voting Rights Act for these other purposes.
And in contexts where these distorted, bizarre districts are not
necessary to achieve a minority-controlled district, they nonetheless
get created in order to preserve incumbents' bases or to pursue
partisan political advantage. And then politicians hide behind the
Voting Rights Act and say, "We had to do this. The Justice Department requires it. The Voting Rights Act requires it." But in fact, the
goals of the Voting Rights Act can be met with districts that are more
traditional.
Of course, the problem with creating those districts would be that
the people in control of the process think their side will be disadvan-
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taged if they are constrained to draw minority districts that respect
traditional districting principles.
And so, rather than seeing some of these constitutional developments as an attack on race-conscious districting or race-conscious
districting in the context of extremely distorted districts, there is a way
you can look at this as bringing some integrity to the process and
establishing what the Voting Rights Act really does require.
MODERATOR. You are suggesting that white politicians are hiding
behind the Voting Rights Act in order to produce other electoral
outcomes through the districting process?
PROFESSOR PILDES: It's clear from the factual record in some of
these cases, particularly North Carolina, that that is exactly what
happened in the districting process. When North Carolina was told
by the Justice Department that it had an obligation under the Voting
Rights Act to create a second minority district, it decided to draw the
district that is now subject to litigation in the way it did, not because
that was the most compact minority district that could be created, not
because the Justice Department had suggested that's where the
district should be drawn, but because powerful Democratic incumbents in control of the process in North Carolina thought they would
do much better with the minority district being drawn in this highly
contorted way. And I think that is quite clear from the record.
MODERATOR: You are thus undermining the idea that these
minority districts are being drawn oddly for a racial purpose, you're
saying, at best, that this motivation is a component of it but there are
really partisan and even individual careerist ambitions that may be
driving the legislative calculation.
PROFESSOR PILDES: And I think that is something everybody on
the panel has acknowledged. These forces are all at work in the
intensely conflictual process of zero-sum politics that redistricting
involves.
These forces-parisan politics, incumbency protection-are often
the primary forces, not behind the creation of the minority district
itself, but behind the drawing of its boundaries in the particular ways
in which these districts have been drawn in some places.
MODERATOR: Do I take you to say then that there is some
constitutional basis for finding that certain shapes are so outlandish
or extravagant that they cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny?
PROFESSOR PILDES: I think that most people, as you said, from
the 19th century on are sort of revulsed at the extremely distorted
districts that politicians have attempted to create at various points in
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the past. Whether that revulsion should-or can be-translated into
administrable constitutional doctrine is a far more difficult question.
MODERATOR: But people are pretty complacent about it. After
all, when you live in a district, you are not living in a map, you don't
really know what it looks like. Are not the vast majority of House
districts odd-looking to someone?
PROFESSOR PILDES: I think if you look at the editorials in
newspapers in these various parts of the country, if you look at the
stories that are being run in North Carolina, Florida, Texas, Illinois,
you will find dozens and dozens of stories where local newspapers at
least view this as a major public issue. They express outrage not just
when highly contorted districts are minority districts but when
politicians look like they are taking over the process and deciding who
they want as their constituents instead of their constituents deciding
who they want in office.
MODERATOR: You have candidates choosing voters rather than
voters choosing candidates.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I agree with the observation that the
Voting Rights Act is being used by all sides for partisan advantage. A
recent reapportionment case in South Carolina, a room full of
lawyers-I can't even tell you how many parties were involved-and
everyone was touting their plan as the plan that was best for blacks.
In fact, of course, all these plans were best for their own individual
interest.
But I do disagree on one point with most of the commentators. I
have been involved with States at the level at which they begin to draw
the districts. My experience is there is a tendency to draw the
majority-black districts first.
Now, in the case of North Carolina, I certainly don't know, but my
suspicion is if there really were another nice, compact majority-black
district in North Carolina, we would have seen it somewhere. And I
have not seen it.
My experience in South Carolina was that they drew the black
district and then they protected the incumbents. Now, not to say for
a minute that they don't protect the incumbents. They certainly do.
The only decisions then turn out to be who are we going to sacrifice?
And, again, my experience is just in South Carolina, but unfortunately for the State and, I think, also for minority groups within the
state, the people who have been sacrificed in order to create
additional majority-black districts have tended to be our most
progressive legislators and in fact those who were most sympathetic to
black concerns. In part, that was just because they happened to have
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more black voters and their districts were the ones that had to be
taken away to create the majority-black districts.
I also want to make sure that we are talking about the same
districts. Now, I agree that there are lots of districts in the country
that are not lovely, but let me just point out for the benefit of the
audience the district that was actually challenged in North Carolina.
It is this pencil district here that you are not sure isn't just another
line on the map. There it is. (Map shown).
This particular district is a Florida district that was drawn not by the
Florida Legislature, but by a federal court. (Map shown). The Court
found no violation of the Voting Rights Act, but nevertheless
concluded that it was required to create districts in which blacks were
in a majority.
While I agree that it would certainly be better if we didn't have any
of these districts, I think the Court will treat differently districts that
are drawn irregularly to protect incumbents. Part of the reason for
the difference in treatment is that there districts tend to be
self-correcting. The voters themselves become upset with irregular
districts. The Districts are self-correcting in that the next census, you
can't keep them together anymore, they're so distorted. Shifts in
population require gerrymandered incumbents' districts to be
redrawn, whereas once racial districts are created, they're there
forever and are not self-correcting.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: It seems to me that what has really been
confronted-and the Court is uncomfortable confronting this, and
everyone else is-is the problem that Rick Pildes has pointed to and
Sam Issacharoff in one of his articles has pointed to, which is that the
redistricting process involves legislators picking their constituents.
And it confronts us with the fact that although the rhetoric and the
ideology of American voting is that it is an individual behavior, each
of us going in dignity and in secret into a booth and selecting who
will govern us, in fact it is a group-oriented process.
The question then becomes whether districting is the proper way
of representing groups of voters, because the entire point of
districting has always been minority representation in the sense that
it changes the electoral consequences. If, for example, in California
you elected all forty-five congressional representatives statewide, you
might find that there would be forty-five Democrats or forty-five whites
or forty-five people who all represent Southern California.
The purpose of districting is to change that outcome by allowing
groups that are not a majority of the electorate to be the majority in
a smaller area.
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Now that we have started to confront the fact that race is one of the
group characteristics people share that is quite determinative of what
their politics will be, we have to ask whether districting at all is the
way of representing racial groups. That discomfort is what animates
Justice Thomas' extraordinary opinion in Holder v. Hall in which he
keeps claiming voting is just about individuals going into a voting
booth and pulling a lever.
MODERATOR: So this issue is not just for the Supreme Court to
struggle with, but for all of us. What is the best method of electing
people to Congress or to the state legislatures?
PROFESSOR KAiRLAN: Well, for right now, the best method of
electing people to Congress is to follow what is the statutory command, although not a constitutional command, and that is to elect
from single-member districts. That is correct. I don't think a State
can really start debating that issue at great length because Congress
has told States to elect from single-member districts.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I think what we are getting to now is really
the most hopeful and positive thing that could come out of these
cases, because I don't think any progress is going to come out of this
Court or the judiciary in this period. We are kidding ourselves or
deluding ourselves if we think that.
Right now, disenfranchisement of blacks is constitutionally
preferable to remedial action. That is just where the law is. But I
think particularly since we are in a context when theMODERATOR: I'm sorry. When you say disenfranchisement, you
don't mean denying the actual right to go cast a ballot?
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: No. Zero black members to Congress from
North Carolina is constitutionally preferable to drawing lines that do
something about that.
MODERATOR: That may be the Court's approach here?
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Yes, I think that's the central approach.
And it is by the "moderate," "centrist"justices. So it's here to stay for
quite some time.
But I think the question it really raises-and it comes in this
context when the population generally is questioning the political
process; most people today think the political process is part of the
problem rather than a source of a solution-is do we want these
single-member districts?
We are relatively isolated in the democratic world by having these
single-member plurality districts.
The trend has been toward
proportional representation. A recent example is South Africa. The
whites and blacks in that reformulation of their system very clearly
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chose proportional representation. This would allow representation
of various viewpoints in the proportion they have in the population,
rather than people coming from particular geographic areas and
having to do redistricting. Redistricting is always political; it is always
purposeful and instrumental; and in any place where there are
substantial racial minorities, it is always racial. This, I think, is more
the subject of the fourth panel.
MODERATOR: Yes. And we will certainly get to what I call by
shorthand the Lani Guinier question: Are we using the wrong system
altogether?
MS. WRIGHT: I wanted to follow up a little bit on some of the
points that were being made earlier about the political nature of the
redistricting process and the political uses of the Voting Rights Act.
I think we have to complete that picture in order to make it
accurate, because I think it is accurate to say that after the 1990
census, in a lot of the voting rights litigation that went on, all sorts of
partisan groups were trying to rely on the Voting Rights Act to
convince courts to enact plans that would be favorable to them.
But the other side of the coin is that you really can't take the
politics out by imposing constitutional limits on the creation of
majority-minority districts. What you will see in the constitutional
challenges that have been brought challenging these majority-black
and majority-Hispanic districts is that those, by and large, are also
driven by politics.
In many of these cases, what we are seeing is defeated white
candidates who ran or wanted to run in these majority-black or
Hispanic districts saying, "Gee, I've got Shaw v. Reno now. I can go in
and challenge the district and get the Court to redraw it so that I can
win."
So you simply cannot, I think, realistically say that the way to
eliminate the political uses of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution is by cutting back on the protections and the ability to create
majority-minority districts.
MODERATOR: Because there is no such thing as a neutral
redistricting or a neutral outcome from redistricting.
MS. WRIGHT: That's right. And I think that that is one of the
facts that the Supreme Court is really going to have to confront. I
think that the cases that are coming up this term are going to require
the Court to look at that issue more closely and to think about
whether it can really impose on the state legislatures a vision of this
sort of apolitical process that is guided only by good government
principles, the common cause values of nice compact districts and
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following political jurisdiction lines, or whether in fact the Court is
really, by preventing the States from drawing non-compact districts,
setting up an unnecessary and really intolerable conflict between the
States' goals of protecting incumbents and protecting political
advantage and partisan advantage on the one hand, and the goal of
including minorities who have been excluded for so long on the other
hand. And to place too much emphasis on compactness to the
exclusion of all other values, I think the Court is going to have to see
that that conflict is only going to be intensified by that approach.
MR. VERRILLI: My threshold of revulsion may be higher than
most of the public or most of the panelists, but my experience with
this, which is perhaps more limited than some others here, has led
me to have a less cynical view about it.
I think that Rick Pildes is absolutely right that there is a public
perception that this is an extremely cynical manipulation, and that's
all it is, by partisan political forces.
I think, in truth, it is much more complicated than that. The
process of drawing a map doesn't, at least in my experience, amount
to drawing incumbent protection districts first, minority districts
second, and then sort of figuring everything else out third. Nor is it
minority districts first and incumbent protection districts second.
It is a process of moving forward with many different and sometimes conflicting objectives, and in my experience, in that mix one of
the objectives generally is trying to abide by'what we are now calling
sound districting criteria. Maps are generated and then a process of
negotiation will often begin within the legislative process. Of course,
that is a partisan process. But that is what we have.
The question to confront here is, "Well, what are the alternatives?"
One is to try to make a dramatic move to nongeographic-based
districting. But if that is not where we end up, I fear that instead we
end up with courts drawing all these maps because what you now have
is a situation where, as others on the panel have pointed out, any map
is vulnerable to a lawsuit by a white majority or a minority population
or both, and courts are extremely skeptical about the deference due
the product of a legislative action, and the odds are very high that
courts take it away from the legislative process for one or the other
reason. And then what happens? Well, the legislature gets an
opportunity to draw a new map at the remedial stage, but the same
kinds of conflicts and compromises that made it so difficult in the first
instance to create a map are exacerbated in the limited time frame of
a remedial stage.
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So what you then have is what is still a political process transferred
to the remedial stage of a court, in which every interest group
imaginable is running in with an alternative map and making neutral
arguments for why this avowedly partisan map ought to be adopted
by the court pursuant to judicial order.
I have to say, with those two options, my preference would be to
structure a world where that was happening in the legislative process
rather than the judicial process because you are going to have bad
decisions made by judges who don't have the time or the resources
to think these issues through, to see through partisan manipulations
of this process at the remedial stage.
That was certainly the way in which I experienced the remedial
process in the Florida case. That process was driven entirely by the
Republican National Committee from a suite of hotel rooms across
the street from the courthouse. Is that really where we want io end
up in this process? I think not.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: I think one point that comes out of what
Don Verrilli was saying is that we have to recognize that the courts
that are in this process are just as political as the legislatures. It is no
accident that Republican-dominated courts strike down plans in which
the Democrats in the state legislature have managed to do exactly
what Rick Pildes, Sam Issacharoff and Kay were talking about, which
is to draw a plan in which they create majority-black or majorityHispanic districts to satisfy the Voting Rights Act and the Justice
Department and gerrymander the hell out of everything else to keep
as many Democratic incumbents in as they can.
The courts are equally political, and in a case that was decided the
same year as Shaw, a case called Growe v. Emison,2 ° the Supreme
Court gave a green light to state courts to get into the business and
do the reapportionment before the federal courts can. So the idea
that allowing courts to draw the plans will depoliticize the process in
any way is just an illusion. The courts will be just as partisan. These
judges came out of the political system, and a lot of them are still
involved in it. Indeed, in Texas, in the first round of cases, a judge
had to be censured for calling up a Republican legislator and asking
him where he wanted his district drawn.
MODERATOR: Is that what we call judicial activism?
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Yes. It's called constituent service when it's
done by a legislator.

20.
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(Laughter)
The other problem is an historical
PROFESSOR KARLAN:
problem which goes back as far as Baker v. Carr.21 The Supreme
Court keeps thinking that it can police the political process by coming
out with a rule that any idiot can apply or, as Justice Fortas referred
to it, a rule that someone with fifth-grade math skills can do. And so
Chief Justice Warren, after Reynolds v. Sims" comes down-the "one
person, one vote" case-says, "This, not Brown v. Board of Education,2 3
is the most important case I decided in my time on the Court because
this case assures that the public interest will be represented properly
in the legislatures." We all know "one person, one vote" has no
public interest constraint really at all. It doesn't create good districts.
In fact it allows all sorts of gerrymandering.
So then the Supreme Court tries to come up with some other kind
of rule, and again it starts in Thornburg v. Gingles,24 saying "Well, let's
have a three-part test," and in Davis v. Bandemer, "Well, let's have a
rule that requires some sort of fairness." But that rule generates all
sorts of distortions in the process too.
It looked in Johnson v. DeGrandy as if the Supreme Court was going
to try to do something with proportionality. And what they did was
to create a weak proportionality constraint saying, "Well, a minority
that is proportionally represented will normally not be able to
establish a Voting Rights Act violation. Although we are not saying it
is an absolute, it is quite relevant."
Compactness may be the next way of going at this. This is
something that Rick Pildes and Richard Niemi did in their article,
which was try and talk about what sort of mathematical constraints
you can have. That is one option-to try and come up with some
mathematical constraint, which we all know will be just another futile
attempt to ensure the public interest, whatever that might be, in
redistricting.
So it's really an intractable problem, and the idea that the courts
are going to solve it either by coming up with a formula or by doing
the redistricting themselves seems to me to just postpone for another
cycle the same problem we have already had.
MODERATOR: I am hoping we can pick up on Pam Karlan's last
point. If I could get a brief answer from everybody to this question:

21.
22.
23.
24.

369
377
347
478

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

186 (1962).
533 (1963).
483 (1954).
30 (1986).
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Is it a hopeless mess; is there no way out of this dilemma short of
scrapping the districting system?
I would like each panelist to respond because, asJustice O'Connor
said, appearances do matter and I want to make sure everybody gets
a chance to have a last word here.
PROFESSOR BUTLER- I think there is a solution, but compelling
that solution is more problematic, and the solution is to insist that we
do indeed employ those standard districting criteria that most of us
would recognize if we didn't have some other concerns that were
driving us.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF:
I agree that this problem is
intractable when the solutions that come down from the Supreme
Court provide no concrete direction to the lower courts.
So, as soon as you start having Supreme Court doctrines that speak
of political fairness, systematic degradation of political interests or of
something like traditional notions of districting, without giving any
content to these constitutional principles, what you invite is a second
round of political agitation except this time in the federal courts.
The result is a degradation not just of political processes but of the
judicial process as well.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I think we have to avoid too much cynicism
in discussing the judicial role in the districting process. After all, no
one believed, I think, that just adopting a "one person, one vote"
principle would magically transform the districting process into
something wholesome.
But I also think there is little question that we are better off with
the "one person, one vote" principle than we were beforehand. I
think representative bodies have been more fairly constituted as a
result, not perfectly, but more fairly. And I think that is the kind of
incremental process that courts might contribute to productively.
But it is also important to remember that judicial doctrines put
pressures on legislatures that can make them change in other ways.
For example, one recent development is that bipartisan commissions
and other administrative bodies have begun to play more of a role in
districting. That is one other option that may come to the fore here
as more intensive judicial review makes legislatures more uncomfortable about how courts are going to respond to partisan, legislativelydrawn plans.
MS. WRIGHT: Well, I think that it's certainly highly unlikely that
the Supreme Court will ever come up with a set of neutral criteria
that courts can apply, or that legislatures can apply that is going to
resolve the intensely political problems and remove politics and all of
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the intense pressures on the redistricting process that we are going to
face after every census.
I think that one of the key questions that the Court is going to have
to deal with is how are we going to assure that the very, very recent
achievement of diversity in Congress and in the state legislatures and
in local elected bodies is not completely reversed in the name of
adopting neutral principles that really cannot be enforced in any
manner other than perpetual federal judicial supervision over the
redistricting process.
MR. VERRILLI: I think it's a mess, but all I think that means is
that we have to live with a fairly high level of conflict, and I think
that's because we hold some contradictory values at the same time, as
a society.
And my view, I guess, is that we are probably better off admitting
that and living with that and trying to work through this mess as best
we can. And recognizing that, there have been substantial achievements in making the political process more inclusive than it used to
be. Is it perfect? No. Is it marred by the most crass forms of partisan
manipulation? Yes. But is it better than it used to be in terms of
inclusiveness? I think it is. So I guess my view is that it is a tolerable
mess.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I think the only way would be a recognition
that the districting process or redistricting process is always political
and is always racial, and that race-consciousness in that process is the
rule rather than an exception. Then, there would have to be a
recognition that political equality and diversity are positive social
values to be furthered, as Congress has said, and as is the predominant mandate of the amendments to the Constitution since the Bill
of Rights, which include more and more people who were excluded
earlier. I don't think there is a chance in the world that this Court
or any currently foreseeable Court would do anything like this.
MODERATOR: Very good. A tremendously promising first session.
II. UNDERSTANDING SHAW V. RENO

MODERATOR: We will start our second session. The question is:
what exactly did the Shaw Court hold and, more specifically, how is
the case working itself out on remand in the various district courts
that have had to deal with it?
Let us start now with this general theme: What are the key
doctrinal battlefields in the district courts dealing with Shaw?
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Here are my first questions: When is strict scrutiny triggered? How
is the compelling state interest which Shaw requires States to show
being defined in these courts? What is a compelling state interest
that would justify the creation of a bizarrely shaped majority-black or
Hispanic district?
MR. JEROME: On the first issue, when you say key battlefields, the
first question that you come to in a Shaw v. Reno-type situation or
claim is whether you even get to strict scrutiny and whether the State
needs to come forward with a compelling state interest.
And I think a lot of the dispute and legal wrangling over these cases
will be what is the threshold that a plaintiff needs to prove in order
to push the plan into strict scrutiny? And the higher that threshold,
the fewer cases are going to get to court and have to go to trial. And
if you have a broad rule that says any racial-conscious redistricting or
awareness and use of race in redistricting prompts strict scrutiny, then
you are going to have practically every redistricting in which there is
a majority-minority district subject to strict scrutiny.
MODERATOR: So what is it that provokes strict scrutiny? Is it the
combination of having a majority-black or Hispanic district and a
bizarre contour on the map?
MR. JEROME: Well, I think you have got two very different views,
and if you look at what happened in Shaw, in the remand in Shaw and
Hays, and then compare that to what happened in Texas and in a
California case, DeWitt v. Wilson,25 you have two different views on
that.
In DeWitt, and also in the Texas case, the Court found that simply
drawing minority-majority districts does not subject the plan to strict
scrutiny, particularly if at the same time the redistricting authority is
taking into account some of the other nonracial factors: incumbency,
compactness, traditional districting principles, however you define
that.
Whereas the Shaw and the Hays courts came up with a very broad
rule that said that any significant use of race in redistricting, even if
you have compact districts, subjects the plan to strict scrutiny. And
then the difference between the result in Shaw and in Hays was on
whether or not there was a compelling state interest.
MODERATOR: So do other people agree that Shaw v. Reno can be
interpreted very broadly at the lower court level to endanger all
districts that are majority-black or Hispanic regardless of what the map
looks like?

25.

856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
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PROFESSOR KARLAN: I don't think if you tried to read Shaw I
honestly that you can say that because that would make Shaw I, which
was written by Justice O'Connor, completely inconsistent with her
earlier opinion in Voinovich v. Quilter.
If you are really asking what did Justice O'Connor mean and what
did she have a majority for in Shaw I, it was not that any raceconscious districting requires strict scrutiny, because the way that she
delineates the claim is to hold that a plaintiff will state a cause of
action if he or she can show that the district was so bizarre or
irregular so as to give the impression that there was nothing but race
involved in the decision to draw the district that way.
Justice O'Connor can't possibly be suggesting, for example, that
Charles Rangel's district, which is Central Harlem, is subject to strict
scrutiny. She can't possibly be suggesting that Maxine Waters' district
is subject to strict scrutiny or that the other district in Louisiana, the
Orleans Parish district that BillJefferson represents, is subject to strict
scrutiny. I don't believe she meant that.
I think that the Hays decision was an extraordinarily dishonest
decision in saying that all districts require strict scrutiny. The remand
decision in Shaw is constrained by Shaw L Judge Phillips is essentially
compelled to say, "Look, we can see the handwriting on the wall. The
Supreme Court wants us to apply strict scrutiny to Mel Watt's district.
So we will find that this district is bizarre, because if we go back to the
Supreme Court saying, 'We don't think it meets the first prong of
Shaw,' we will have our opinion reversed, whereas if we take the
Supreme Court's opinion and say, 'Yes, it's bizarre,' but explain why
it's justified, we have a chance of getting our holding sustained."
MODERATOR: So let's go with the North Carolina district court
and assume strict scrutiny applies. Now a State has to come forward
and show that in order to create one of these districts it needs a
compelling state interest.
What is a compelling state interest?
MS. HAIR: In the Texas case, which is the one that I litigated, we
contended the compliance with section 2 and section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act is clearly a compelling interest.
But I think you have to look at what that means in the context of
these cases. And when I look at what the doctrinal battlefields are
and really looking atJustice O'Connor and her pivotal position on the
Supreme Court, I think you have to go back to her section 2 opinions
and particularly her opinion in Gingles where she seemed to be
searching for a definition of vote dilution.
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In the situation where you have racially polarized voting, and you
have a population sufficient to allow creation of, say, an AfricanAmerican district, she was looking for some limit short of proportional representation on what the definition of vote dilution is.
What she seemed to come up with is a definition that focuses on
whether reasonably compact majority-minority districts can be drawn.
And I think she viewed that as somehow a definition of vote dilution
that was rooted in traditional practice and almost defined a
race-neutral way of figuring out what the status quo would be in the
absence of the factors that have led you to apply the Voting Rights
Act to this situation.
What she was doing in Shaw v. Reno was saying, "I don't think that
this 12th Congressional District in North Carolina meets the definition of reasonably compact and therefore, it probably wasn't required
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and, therefore, perhaps we
should strike it down under the Constitution or at least we should
consider striking it down under the Constitution because if it's not
required by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, then where does the
compelling interest come from?"
There are other arguments about section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
In Texas the districts are irregular, but it's not just the majorityblack and majority-Hispanic districts that are irregular. The majoritywhite districts are, if anything, more irregular. What we showed in
Texas is that compact, reasonably compact, pretty, majority-minority
districts could have been drawn and were not drawn because of
politics and incumbency protection.
So our theory was that, yes, race was taken into account because
they had to; they would have been subject to section 2 liability and
therefore there is a compelling interest here to draw a majorityminority district. But the State doesn't have to do it in the most
pretty way, particularly if the State's overall pattern is to value some
other goal ahead of pretty, compact districts and it applies that
uniformly.
The Texas court disagreed with us on that theory on one issue,
which is narrow tailoring. They said that the shape has to be pretty
or it's not narrowly tailored. And that is probably the issue that we
are going to take to the Supreme Court and attempt to convince
Justice O'Connor that the Texas court is wrong about that, and try to
explain to her why the State should have discretion to draw its
districts according to its own values, and if pretty districts are not a
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State value, you shouldn't impose that because it's a majority-minority
district.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: Well, I think there are a couple of
ways to approach the question. One is to go back to this business of
objective historic standards and to initially admit that the implication
of Shaw I was that such things exist and that departure from them
raises some suspicions about what you're doing.
So, in one sense, then the first way of dealing with that is to say that
the State has to follow the law and that such standards, in fact, are the
law, or at least it is the historic way of doing things.
I don't agree with that. I think that if you look specifically at the
state of North Carolina, if anything, you find a history and tradition
of irregular districts that are as odd and bizarre as anything else that
you would want to see. It has been much more of a part of the
State's history, from my understanding.
So I think that is one way to look at it. And if left with that
interpretation of Shaw, then a compelling state interest would be to
follow such standards.
I, of course, look at it differently. I think that you have got a
couple of issues here. One, after the Department ofJustice sent back
their objection letter, the state of North Carolina had to understand
the law to mean that they had to create another district. So compliance with federal law and the federal Voting Rights Act, in our
opinion, was a justifiable state interest.
Secondly, I will offer to you that of all states, this one, and such
states like this in the old bi-racial South, should be commended for
such efforts. I am very pleased to see them assert racial fairness for
once, that racial fairness can come out of these state legislatures as a
goal and as an interest that the State has.
After all, we have had to fight them on this issue for generations.
So I think that I would offer that.
They, of course, also offer the issue of incumbency. They put a
certain twist on that, though, different a little bit from the way it was
discussed in the prior panel, suggesting that the State is trying to
protect its interest inside the federal system and the status of its
particular people in Congress has a larger meaning that secures a
larger public good for the State. So they argue that incumbency is a
special interest.
Finally, in these states, probably in most American states but
certainly the old bi-racial states and section 5 states, you do in fact
have interesting sub-state regional variations that are historically
present and that predate either the Voting Rights Act or all of the
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voting rights stuff that we are dealing with now, and in North
Carolina that is pretty clear, in our opinion, and efforts to recognize
and district, as it were, around those areas is in fact a legitimate way
of doing things.
So I think that the State in this particular case can identify some
compelling interests that, in my opinion, are rational and justifiable.
MODERATOR. Professor Lichtman, you have been a frequent
expert witness in these cases. I was reading through some of the
district court litigation and throughout the footnotes you are a
ubiquitous presence.
But often what is happening is it seems as if the judges in Texas
and Louisiana say in effect, "Well, Professor Lichtman has given us
some very strong testimony about what other compelling interest
there might be for creating these districts for example, to keep
together certain urban areas or rural areas or people with common
socioeconomic characteristics." But then they say it is all irrelevant
because race is such an overriding component in what has gone on
that the districts must fall. Will it be impossible to demonstrate, at
least to the more conservative courts, that there is an alternative
compelling state interest?
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: You know, I am wrestling with the
fundamental question, would I rather be right or relevant? And it
seems to depend upon the forum in which these arguments are
presented.
Let me address-I will get to that question specifically, but I want
to make a few comments about the broader issue of strict scrutiny and
compelling state interests.
I believe clearly at the heart of this is the issue which has broadly
been defined as compactness, whether it's defined strictly geographically in terms of the shape of the district, or more broadly in terms of
things such as keeping counties or municipalities together, this issue
of compactness is at the heart of both the legal and political
controversies in Shaw v. Reno. And I have a number of things to say
about that that relates to my testimony and to broader analysis.
First, I think a terrible misconception has come out of the last
panel. And that misconception is that in states like Texas and North
Carolina, the admittedly unusual shape of the district is somehow
evidence that the Democratically-controlled legislatures in these states
are using the Voting Rights Act for partisan political purposes.
In fact, precisely the opposite is true. These are defensive actions
being taken by these States because the Voting Rights Act, by
concentrating minorities, the most loyal of Democratic voters, poses
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an enormous constraint and difficulty upon any kind of goal of
incumbency protection.
Take the state of Texas. If, in drawing the districts in the Dallas
County area, the Democrats simply could have spread the blacks
evenly among the Democratic districts, there would have been
absolutely no problem in preserving the incumbencies of
Congresspersons such as Martin Frost and John Bryant.
The difficulty in fact arose because of the necessity under the
Voting Rights Act to create an effective African-American district and
in many states from the pressure coming from the Republicans to
maximally concentrate minorities in such a way as to dilute Democratic voting strength outside majority-minority districts.
So I think it is a terrible misconception to say that North Carolina
or Texas or these other states are examples of utilizing the Voting
Rights Act for partisan purposes. Quite the contrary.
MODERATOR: Allan Lichtman, to rise to the hypothetical defense
of some other panelists, let me pose a question about this. I
understood them to be saying that there was a command from the
Federal Government to create such districts and, at that. point, it
became a very important political imperative to create them in such
a way as to protect the white incumbents, which is why the maps got
so jumbled-looking.
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: That is no more political than you
would have if you didn't have a command of the Voting Rights Act.
They would still have been creating the districts in a political fashion.
To implicate the Voting Rights Act in incumbency protection or
political line-drawing I think is the great mistake.
I think there is a huge problem with the whole issue of compactness, much of which was quite correctly laid out in the earlier session,
the enormous difficulties of, A) defining it in some coherent way,
which no court has done, and, B) even if you could define it in some
coherent way, measuring it.
I think in terms of what is happening in the lower court, and what
is happening with the expert witness testimony, is we are getting a
conflation of compactness which serves double duty, unfortunately,
for the courts.
On the one hand, compactness, however you define it, is a signal
that districts are sufficiently bizarrely drawn so you've got to subject
it to strict scrutiny. And I agree with Pam Karlan that that is the only
reasonable read of Shaw v. Reno, not that anytime you create a
minority district you are subject to strict scrutiny. But then compactness then also seems to trump strict scrutiny. That is, when you get
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to strict scrutiny, the very standards of compactness that triggered
strict scrutiny in the first place then become the rationale of the
Court to say, "Well, these districts are therefore not narrowly tailored."
And I do think narrow tailoring is the key issue.
I argued exactly the same thing as an expert witness in the Hays
case where it was rejected, and in the Shaw v. Hunt case where it was
accepted. Essentially, what we were able to show, and the court
accepted it in North Carolina, was that compactness is not the critical
factor in terms of districting, that in fact there were other legitimate
state interests aside from anything political that was at play here, such
as putting together individuals who shared common political and
socioeconomic characteristics independent of race.
You can draw lines and circles if you like, but that is no way a
guarantee that you are going to unite people of common interests.
There had never been in either Louisiana or North Carolina, for
example, districts that united the less-affluent. The less-affluent had
been merged in other districts and their interests were pretty well
disregarded.
We were also able to show that these districts, despite their shape,
were among the most homogeneous in terms of politics and
socioeconomics independent of race in the state and that they had no
adverse impact whatever on voting or representation.
So I think if we can get away from this conflation of compactness
both as triggering strict scrutiny and then as an argument to show
there isn't a compelling state interest and focusing on a broader view
of districting and focusing on whether.these districts indeed are doing
harm or good, I do think there are answers to the riddle of Shaw v.
Reno.
PROFESSOR MILLER: Just to follow up on Allan Lichtman's and
Pam Karlan's comments, whatever we might think about the sort of
uselessness of a distinction about districting that has to do with the
shape of the district, I think the real message for people litigating
voting rights cases these days and for jurisdictions drawing those
districts is to draw districts that look as "normal" as they possibly can
because the real concern is that the more bizarre a district is shaped,
the more race-conscious it will appear.
And of course, there is an obvious irony to that because all of us
who have done these cases and have studied the field know that you
can do a lot of racially-conscious things without ever drawing a district
that looks funny, and you can draw funny districts that have purposes
that are not racial but are political and are gerrymandered for other
reasons.
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But the real pressure at the bottom level, at the places where the
cases are being generated and at the places where the plans are being
drawn, is to draw nice, neat, pretty districts that comply with whatever
the Supreme Court might think of as traditional districting principles.
Although there never have been traditional districting principles,
allegiance to the Court's vision of these principles will at least to some
extent protect districts from challenge.
And I suspect that has some possible implications. I suspect that it
means that it may be harder to draw districts with as high a percentage of minority voters, so jurisdictions will opt for districts that may
be closer to fifty-fifty districts or fifty-five-forty-five districts, although
certainly that didn't save the district in Shaw from challenge.
I think those are some of the implications we can look for as the
courts and lawyers on both sides struggle with how to comply with a
standard where the Court gave almost no guidance on what that
standard is, or how to draw districts that avoid litigation.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: Well, I should say first that I did testify or
at least wrote reports in both North Carolina and Texas.
I want to go back to the original Shaw v. Reno opinion to try to put
these succeeding cases in context. One of the things that strikes you
most if you look at Shaw v. Reno is how few facts they had. It was a
case that had been dismissed, and the question was whether there was
a cause of action at all. And there are almost no facts in it, and most
of the ones that are there are wrong.
For example, the only mention of the degree of "segregation" in
the districts is in a footnote injustice White's dissent in which he says
the 12th District is 54.71% black. And they didn't have any evidence
at all about the historical nature of redistricting in North Carolina.
In the plaintiff's brief before the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno,
it says, "There has never been a racial gerrymander in North Carolina
before. Just look at the shapes of the districts."
Now, he knew that that was incorrect. In fact, in 1981 there was a
six-month deadlock in the state legislature because they wanted to
draw a district to protect a very conservative white incumbent, and
they wanted to draw it to exclude Durham, which is where all these
people who were plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno came from. They wanted
to exclude Durham because they didn't want to draw a district that a
black had a fair chance to get elected in.
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That was overturned by the Justice Department, a section 5
objection. That was surely on record. But the Supreme Court didn't
take any of this into account.
It seems to me that Shaw v. Reno ought to be seen as an intent case,
and it ought to be seen as an intent case that goes back on remand
to the lower courts, and it says, "All right, on the face of it, it would
look like this district was drawn only because of race. But we want
more evidence on this. Is this the only thing?"
And Justice O'Connor again and again in her opinion says this is
the only reason why the districts were drawn.
Kay Butler, in her previous remarks, uses the same terms. And yet
we all know that that is not true. We know that this district, if you
look at it, the 12th District in North Carolina or the districts in Dallas
or Houston, were drawn in the particular shape they were in and
would have the particular compactness score that they have because
of a whole variety of reasons.
Lots of things go into districting: incumbent protection, partisanship, where a certain legislative assistant lives, where a Congressman
lives. All sorts of things go into districting, and that is what results in
the shapes of districts.
So it seems to me that what we ought to do in seeing the remand
cases is to say that the Supreme Court is asking for more evidence on
these sorts of questions: What is the nature of the districting process?
Is there any historical discrimination in the process of redistricting
itself-a specific thing, not general societal redistricting-to be
alleviated here? And then we should ask whether the lower courts
have done a very good job in answering what seems to me to be the
focus of the questions by the Supreme Court. And I think the answer
to that is "no." And unfortunately, I think that is true in Judge
Phillips's opinion as well as the bizarre opinion in Hays v. Louisiana
and the less bizarre but still strange opinion in Vera v. Richards, the
Texas case.
I think that the best way to get at those sorts of questions is to look
at a huge array of specific evidence. That evidence was presented in
Shaw v. Reno; it was presented in great detail in Vera v. Richards. But
the district court judges basically ignored it-in Vera v. Richards in
particular.
And I think one of the things that is likely to happen in the
Supreme Court is that either that evidence is going to be presented
or they are going to assume that it isn't in existence or they're going
to ask for more evidence, as far as you could interpret the Hays
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vacating of the opinion as asking for more evidence or looking at
further empirical evidence. .
So it seems to me that there are a whole series of empirical
questions which are raised by Shaw v. Reno, which are not settled, and
which the district court cases ought to settle.
MODERATOR: How can they settle them? If they take the
broad-minded reading that you suggest, it would be clear that all of
these districts would pass the strict scrutiny hurdle. So, for Shaw v.
Reno to have any of its guts left, you would have to read Justice
O'Connor as saying that as long as race is a substantial factor at all,
the districts have to fall. Isn't that right?
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I am not sure. That's not what she says.
She says "sole factor." One of the questions when it goes up again is
did she mean that? If she says it means substantial factor, then the
Supreme Court or a set of district courts is going to have to lay out
some principles by which we can decide whether there was a racial
intent in the gerrymandering. How substantial does substantial have
to be? That question certainly has not been addressed so far.
And it certainly can't be addressed within the mechanical compactness standard. It's going to have to be addressed in a much more
fact-laden, empirical framework. And district courts ought to be very
good at that, at dealing with the huge amount of evidence. But they
haven't been, so far.
MODERATOR. Anita Hodgkiss, let me come to you. You have
been a lawyer in the Shaw v. Reno case on remand. Why did the
district court there say that there was a sufficient compelling interest,
and in what ways was the solution of creating the two minority
districts narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose?
MS. HODGKISS: I actually think thatJudge Phillips did a good job
on both those questions. He said that there were three compelling
state interests.
The first was compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
and he said that earlier plans that had been presented to the North
Carolina legislature as well as the very plan that the Republican
intervenor plaintiffs in the litigation presented to the Court both
showed that it was possible to draw two compact majority-black
districts in North Carolina, thereby meeting the Gingles threshold
requirement.
And once you do that, the state legislature then has the discretion
to draw the districts in whatever portion of the state they want to and
to have whatever shape they want to, in line with all the other
considerations that the legislature needs to take into account.
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So he found that compliance with section 2 was a compelling state
interest and that, in fact, the North Carolina legislature was very much
concerned about section 2 liability when they passed the second plan.
He also found that compliance with section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act was a compelling state interest, and in language that really gave
weight to what the Voting Rights Act is all about, he said, "Look, this
is about the legitimacy of our government and the ability of minorities
to participate in that government."
If the Justice Department sends back a plan saying that the state of
North Carolina has failed through an administrative process to prove
that there is a lack of discriminatory purpose in the plan that it has
passed, and North Carolina then decides, "Well, we're going to go
back and try to draw up a plan that doesn't have discriminatory
purpose," they have a compelling state interest in doing that. So he
found that under section 5 there is a compelling state interest.
He also said that a State could have a compelling state interest in
remedying the effects of past discrimination even if it's not a section
5 jurisdiction and perhaps there is not section 2 liability because of
compactness problems, if you have a situation where minorities have
repeatedly and continuously been excluded from congressional
elections and all the other factors that you're supposed to look at in
evaluating the totality of circumstances and looking at vote dilution
are present, that if you have all those circumstances, remedying past
discrimination is a compelling state interest.
MODERATOR: What about narrow tailoring?
MS. HODGKISS: When they got to narrowly tailoring, what he said
was that, "Let's go back to the affirmative action precedents and look
at the five factors in those cases, like United States v. Paradise26 or
Croson or Fullilove v. Klutznice 7 and apply those to the voting rights
context." And he sets out initially some reasons why that is difficult,
but he says you look at the efficacy of alternative remedies, whether
the program imposes a rigid quota or a goal, the planned duration of
the program, the relationship between the goal and the percentage
of minorities in the relevant pool, and the impact of the program on
the rights of third parties.
None of those factors involve compactness. I mean it just doesn't-it's not involved in any of those.

26.
27.

480 U.S. 149 (1987).
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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MODERATOR: Well, would you take one second and just tell us
how he does apply those factors to show how the districts created in
North Carolina were narrowly tailored?
MS. HODGKISS: Some of them are sort of obvious. The planned
duration of the program, the legislature has to redistrict in ten years,
so there is another chance to go back and see whether you still need
a race-conscious remedy.
MODERATOR: So there is a built-in clock there?
MS. HODGKISS: Right.
On whether it's a quota or a goal, he says it's clearly not a quota.
The voters in those districts can elect a white, you don't have to have
a black candidate who is elected. And he points to majority-black
legislative districts in North Carolina that have elected white candidates.
MODERATOR: So any person can run for office, black or white,
in the districts.
MS. HODGKISS: Right.
On the question of the relationship between the goal and the
percentage of minorities, he says the North Carolina black population
is roughly 20 percent and having two out of 12 districts is not overlyMODERATOR: It's only sixteen percent.
MS. HODGKISS: Right. The real interesting factor is the impact
of the program on the rights of third parties. And I think that in fact
Justice Phillips didn't ignore all of our evidence about all the other
factors that went into the drawing of these plans, because what he
said was that when you look at the impact on the rights of third
parties, these other factors, such as urban-rural, the 12th District
being an urban district, the first being a rural district, the evidence
about the communities of interest among the Piedmont Crescent,
among the rural coastal plain in North Carolina, and the desire to
protect incumbents for the reasons that that is good.
I mean there are some reasons why protecting incumbents benefits
the people of the state. He says all of those things demonstrate that
the burden on the third parties, the white voters in the state, is not
unreasonable.
And he reminds us that what we are talking about when we talk
about minority participation in the electoral process is a right of
constitutional dimensions and that if you are looking at the impact on
third parties, you focus first on those constitutional questions, is there
one person, one vote, is there any vote dilution? And in North
Carolina this plan doesn't have those problems for other parties.
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MODERATOR: If he is right, doesn't that mean that every district
which is challenged under Shaw v. Reno can really withstand the
scrutiny that Shaw v. Reno requires?
Attorney General Reno has created a voting rights protection task
force. We have two attorneys from the Justice Department here. Let
me turn to Robert Kengle, who is one of those lawyers.
In other words, is there really a compelling state interest, narrowly
tailored, in all cases, the interest being to comply with the Voting
Rights Act to overcome the history of racial discrimination? And are
not all of them narrowly tailored because they will only last for the
duration of the decade before the next redistricting and because the
white voters who live in the district can run and vote like anyone else?
Doesn't the solution that Judge Phillips came up with in North
Carolina provide a key to overcoming the Supreme Court's hostility
to some minority districts?
MR. KENGLE: Well, that may be the case. I think if you look at
the history of discrimination in many of the jurisdictions in the
country, you are going to find a history of discrimination that
legitimately should form the basis for the State to undertake remedial
action.
It has been a long, hard process to try to get the States to try to do
that. It may be the case that there are some jurisdictions where you
won't find that type of history. And if that is the case, then perhaps
plaintiffs would be able to make their case out.
But it certainly seems to be a legitimate approach to take that into
account and to give it substantial weight in arriving at a decision. The
Vera decision in Texas didn't place very much weight on that type of
approach and didn't factor very much into its decision in terms of the
State's response to the history of discrimination, which in Texas has
pretty much gone without saying.
MODERATOR:
Which arguments is the Justice Department
mobilizing to try to defend these districts?
MR. JEROME: Well, I think one thing is important, and that is to
note that each of these situations in each case is very fact-intensive.
And Shaw v. Reno, as noted before, was decided without a record.
And now it is up to the district courts to really evaluate the process of
adoption of these plans and whether these plans are rational or not,
why they were adopted, what nonracial factors were involved.
And it is very interesting because in each case to some extent the
strategies are slightly different, and I think there are very strong
arguments for defending these plans in each case.
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In Georgia, I think the initial issue that comes up is, is this district
a bizarre district? And the Justice Department took the position that
no, it really isn't. It has a geographic core, it may have some oddities
on the margin, but that in itself does not make it a racial gerrymander.
MODERATOR. So you stopped at the first point and said strict
scrutiny doesn't even apply because the district isn't bizarre?
MR. JEROME: Well, I think in all of these cases, as a defendant
you have to try to approach all the issues and take them all on. In
Georgia, I think you have a very clear case of a compelling interest
under section 5, where the Justice Department interposed two
objections to the congressional plan before the State went ahead and
adopted a plan that fairly recognized minority voting patterns.
MODERATOR: Well, let me ask you about that. To the extent that
a State relies on justice Department intervention or rejection of plans
as the basis for a compelling state interest, to what extent does that
lure the Court into looking at whether the Voting Rights Act, or at
least the way it is being interpreted, itself violates the Constitution?
Are you afraid that you are going to overextend on that argument?
And at least you get a hint of this from Justice Thomas. Is he going
to turn around and say, 'Well, the Voting Rights Act, or the way it's
being implemented now, itself is inconsistent with equal protection."
MR. JEROME: Well, I think the Voting Rights Act, and the Justice
Department's interpretation of it, has been an ongoing process for 25
years that has consistently been upheld by the Supreme Court. And
I think that was an important aspect of Shaw v. Hunt and Judge
Phillips's decision, which points out that the justice Department does
have a unique perspective and responsibility and history in evaluating
these plans, and that deference to that process has to be given where
there is an objection.
Under the Voting Rights Act the local district courts really do not
have the jurisdiction and authority to review the process of the
Attorney General and the objection itself. But I think it is important
to point out that the section 5 process has been consistently upheld
in the past and we expect it to continue.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER A couple of straws in the wind, since
Justice Thomas' opinion was talked about here. One, it wasn't noted
in the earlier panel that Johnson v. DeGrandy in Justice Souter's
opinion does not cite Shaw at all. It is really quite bizarre that that
should be so, in some sense. It is cited injustice Kennedy's concurrence quite heavily, but it is not cited in Justice Souter's opinion at
all.
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In the strange dissent by Justice Thomas in Holder, there is an
almost desperate quality about it which seems to be responsible for
part of its strangeness. If he really thought that the Shaw majority-in
the extreme interpretations of Shaw-were very secure, then it would
not be necessary to rewrite the history of the Voting Rights Act and
of Congress for the past 25 years to say that minority vote dilution was
not covered at all, that the Allen28 decision in 1969 was wrongly
decided and that the Congress for three times after the Allen decision
renewed the Voting Rights Act with a strong consciousness that it had
been held by the Supreme Court to relate to minority vote dilution
and didn't challenge that at all.
So, it seems to me that if you're looking for straws in the wind
about what the Supreme C6urt is going to do when we get these cases
back, some other straws in the wind seem to be coming from either
the majority-Justice O'Connor went along and Justice Rehnquist
went along in Johnson v. DeGrandy-orthe minority injustice Thomas'
strange dissent in Holder v. Hall.
MR. KENGLE: In terms of the constitutional validity of the
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the court in the Georgia
litigation, which has not yet of course entered its decision, I would
expect is going to have a very strong focus on the Attorney General's
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
What I thought was remarkable about that case was that the court
permitted an extraordinary degree of discovery into the section 5
administrative process in terms of orders from the court for the
Justice Department to produce certain classes of materials that
previously had been held subject to some type of privilege, including
some communications with contacts that had been considered
privileged in the past.
If that is a practice that continues in other cases, that degree of
focus on the internal processes, I, at least, have a concern about the
viability of our ability to enforce the Voting Rights Act, due to local
persons in jurisdictions being unwilling to talk with us under
confidential circumstances.
MODERATOR. That the court might turn its attention to the
Justice Department and how it decides how to enforce the Voting
Rights Act in particular states?
MR. KENGLE: Correct. If the courts get into the Voting Rights
Act's constitutionality, as in this particular case's mode of analysis,
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then you have district courts in essence reviewing the review process
that may have occasioned the districts that are being challenged.
MODERATOR: And those courts may even be searching for
improper political influence in the Justice Department?
MR. KENGLE: It's not clear exactly what they would be searching
for. I think one could expect that different courts would be searching
for different things.
MODERATOR: Let me turn to another question, which is the
question of injury. Judge Phillips in the Eastern District of North
Carolina I think cast some very suspicious glances on the whole
question of injury and basically said he wondered whether there was
any injury at all, but since the Supreme Court assumed in Shaw v.
Reno that white voters were injured somehow by the creation of these
districts, he would for the sake of argument assume it as well.
How is this question of injury working itself out in the various
district courts? How is this injury being defined?
PROFESSOR KARLAN: The whole question of standing has to be
addressed by the Supreme Court when it takes one of these cases back
up. There is something extraordinary about the response the Court
has had here, and I think David Kairys got into this a little bit in the
previous panel.
If you look at whatJustice Scalia in his scholarly career and on the
Supreme Court thinks about who has the right to sue and what sorts
of injuries confer standing, you will see it is extraordinarily narrow.
You have to show that you suffered some sort of concrete injury,
not an injury that you share with every other person in the jurisdiction.
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion for the Supreme Court in a case
called Allen v. WighP9 that involved a challenge by black parents to
the Internal Revenue Service's policy of not denying tax exemptions
to segregation academies.
And Justice O'Connor said in that case the black parents had no
standing to challenge the IRS's decision to grant the exemptions
because whatever stigma they suffered or whatever discomfort they
suffered at the idea that the Government was approving racial
discrimination by other parties just wasn't enough to give them the
right to come into court and sue.
MODERATOR: It was too generalized and too diffuse.
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PROFESSOR KARLAN: Too generalized an injury-everyone
suffered it, and therefore no one suffered it. The remedy for that is
to go through the political process, not to go through the courts.
Now we come to Shaw v. Reno, and lo and behold you have five
white people with standing. And when you take this in conjunction
with the NortheasternFlorida Contractors" case that was decided earlier
in the 1992. Term, what you have is what I have sometimes started
referring to as "universal white persons' standing," which means that
white people have standing to challenge anything the Government
does that they don't like involving issues of iacial justice.
What is so fascinating in Shaw v. Reno is that several plaintiffs don't
live in the district they're challenging. In fact they live in other
districts. So, their right to vote hasn't been infringed in any way;
their ability to elect the candidate of their choice hasn't been
infringed.
I think probably Anita Hodgkiss can talk to this in much more
detail than I can, but in the discovery process in Shaw, when the
plaintiffs were asked, 'Vhat is your injury; how have you been
disadvantaged? How have you been injured by the districts you are
challenging?," their answers were unresponsive or unpersuasive. If
this weren't a case involving majority-black districts, their litigation
would have been tossed out of court for lack of standing.
So I think one thing that the Court will have to confront when the
case gets back up there is this technical, legal doctrine which has
always been used to keep out of the courts arguments about generalized injuries to the citizenry as a whole, and which Judge Phillips
confronted in a kind of backhanded way by writing that he didn't
think there was standing here but obviously the Supreme Court
wanted him to reach the merits, so he would.
MODERATOR. Symbolic injuries.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Yes. Symbolic injuries.
MODERATOR: Stigmatic injuries.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Stigmatic injuries or arguments about how
the political system should be doing its job, which is what Richard
Jerome was talking about. You know, the Justice Department is not
supposed to be reviewed by local district courts, it's supposed to be
reviewed by the District Court for the District of Columbia and by the
Supreme Court hearing appeals there, not by any of this other
process.
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MODERATOR. It's hard to fathom what the injury might be that
the Court has in mind. You picture a white kid being teased at school
because he lives in an oddly shaped majority-black district as the
stigmatic injury here.
Where is the injury? How is this working out in the federal district
courts? How is injury being proved, or is it simply being assumed?
MS. HODGKISS: Well, not only in depositions but in the trial
testimony, Professor Melvin Shimm addressed how he was injured.
He is one of the two plaintiffs that lives in District 12. His answer was
that his injury consisted of being represented by a black Congressman
who wouldn't take into account his interests.
That was his injury.
I think that we put on a lot of evidence about how the shape of the
district does not impact effective and fair representation, that voters
do figure out who they're supposed to vote for, they get to the polls,
and there was very strong evidence that Allan Lichtman can talk about
more, of looking at roll-off, when you look at a Presidential election
year, how many voters voted for President but didn't vote for the
lower offices or the congressional offices. And what we found in
North Carolina was that whether a county had been split or not didn't
impact the number of people who were able to vote for their
Congressperson and that the state, as a whole, had lower roll-off than
in all the surrounding states.
So the lack of compactness of these districts did not affect the
crucial thing we are talking about here, which is people going to the
polls. They went to the polls.
The second thing that we were able to show it did not affect is the
ability of the Representatives from those districts to effectively
represent their constituents.
The fact that the district looks funny didn't have any negative
impact on Eva Clayton or Mel Watt's ability to represent the people
who live in their districts. They are accessible.
We genuinely tried to address the question of harm and say, "Well,
how might people be harmed?" and I think we had a lot of evidence
that there wasn't any harm. But I also think it affects not only
standing but the question of whether or not the plan unfairly impacts
the rights of white voters.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: Let me make a couple of points.
First of all, no whites are denied any participation in these
particular systems. Whites vote. Whites can run for office. Whites
can be elected to office. So there are no real restrictions on what
they can in fact do.
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Secondly, black elected officials from these particular districts are
not racially isolated or in other ways insensitive to these white citizens
in these particular communities.
In my opinion, if such an argument is to be made, it ought to be
stated explicitly and then evaluated according to the particular
evidence brought forth.
My sense is that as I look at districts that have been created, that
have in fact elected black men and women, those men and women
have been, frankly, in some cases, more open to their white constituencies because of the history of participation and that sort of thing
than to the black community.
So I think it is bad to pinpoint them and pigeonhole them into that
little stereotype. They function as politicians just as well as any white
person can.
Also, there is a special place that must be maintained in our minds
as we think about this, because of the historic economic advantages
that the white community has accumulated, in part because of racial
discrimination, that continue to operate.
Just having the money to make campaign contributions, for
example, enables them to have access to the new black elected
officials. And that should be kept in mind.
Additionally, there are numerous places where we have districts
where the race that is a majority is represented by the other race.
In some cases, you have majority-black districts where whites have
been in fact elected. And references were made here to North
Carolina.
I might also point out that in most of these states, black citizens
spend most of their time voting not for black officials but for white
officials. But that is the only option. But you have numerous places
where you in fact have that situation.
Also, I think that what we have in North Carolina in particular is a
little too playful of an attempt, in my opinion, on the part of the
white plaintiffs to provoke a constitutional argument. I mean what
probably should have been worked out on the pages of the academic
journals or something turns out to have gotten into the court. And
I always thought, and I still do, that that was probably not an
appropriate use of the legal system.
And I think that constitutional argument is dangerous if it, without
regard to the formal court proceedings, enters the larger discourse in
the Nation in a negative way where it implies that minorities have
some sort of pernicious scheme in mind when they look for these
particular districts.
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So I am bothered about that.
Finally, in the partisan cases, particularly the one out in Indiana,
the judges argued that-and I agree with this--,that when we think
about the districting process we ought to keep in mind a distinction
between sort of a "context of election" where race is a major
priority-where partisanship is a major priority-for campaign
purposes and a "context of governance," where the person, now
elected, is understood to represent all of the people.
Such a distinction calls attention to the differing responsibilities
that are involved between the time that you are running for office
where people of your own skin color are important to your chances,
particularly in these sort of states, and the process of governance
where your responsibility, according to the very words used by the
judge, is to represent, as it were, all the people.
So I offer those comments at least on that injury question.
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: I will leave aside the question of
standing and let the lawyers debate that. But I do think the question
of injury is critical, and what I believe to be the whole pivot point of
Shaw v. Reno, and that is the issue of narrow tailoring.
I think it also goes to your question, ifJudge Phillips is right, does
that mean that the defendants always win? I think the answer is
absolutely no.
Judge Phillips's five criteria do not of themselves compel a victory
for either side, because they have to be empirically determined.
MODERATOR: Give me a case that you think would not withstand
scrutiny under his analysis.
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: I will get to that.
I think I will give a preliminary discussion of what I am talking
about before I jump to that point.
The action is really in No. 5. Yes, 1 to 4 are probably fairly easily
met, although in Georgia, for example, the plaintiffs argued that in
fact, minorities had gone beyond proportionality that really did
represent the racial quota. But leaving that aside, it seems to me, the
key one is No. 5, impact on the rights of innocent third parties.
And there is an extraordinary development in the Shaw v. Reno
case. If you read the deposition of their key political science
expert-and they only had one, Professor Timothy O'Rourke-it is
filled with rhetoric about creating dysfunctional districts, that when
you violate compactness to this degree, when you split localities and
counties, you create districts that don't work.
And when asked what a key indicator of this would be, he said,
"Well, in North Carolina, what I want to look at is this question of
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falloff. Are we getting people not participating in congressional
elections who are participating in Presidential elections because the
plan is so noncompact, it so violates traditional districting principles
that we are sowing vast voter confusion?" And, he said, "One thing
I want to look at is falloff in 1992 under this bizarre plan as compared
with falloff in 1988 under the old plan."
Mr. O'Rourke testifies not a word, not word one, about this voter
confusion, this falloff.
Why?
Because the evidence is devastatingly in the other direction. It
shows, in fact, falloff is far less in 1992 than it was in 1988.
MODERATOR: But, Allan Lichtman, couldn't Justice O'Connor
come back and say the reason you have greater voter participation
than you did before is precisely because the white voters feel so
victimized or marginalized in the district that they turn out in higher
numbers?
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: This is true across the board in North
Carolina. It doesn't focus just on the district, it focuses across the
board on the entire state, which had the lowest compactness score,
and vastly lower scores in terms of compactness and splitting
municipalities than previously.
And there was just a devastating cross examination of this witness
which went to his own evidence which showed none of this rhetoric
about dysfunctional districts applies to North Carolina.
Moreover, our analysis went way beyond falloff. We did a survey, we
did a study of representation, which showed that there was no lack of
linkage between the representative and the represented in these
districts, and it didn't follow racial lines.
MODERATOR: How did you show that?
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: By looking at constituent service,
contact between the representative and the constituents.
MODERATOR. So white voters were at least as likely to contact a
black Representative?
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: They were more likely. They were
more likely to contact their Representative than black voters, even in
the black district. And, in fact, the falloff of blacks contacting versus
whites was greater in the white districts than in the black districts.
And we didn't stop there. We also showed that these districts had
among the most significantly unified communities of interest of any
districts in the state, that if you believe communities of interest,
people sharing political views and socioeconomic status, that that is
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important-and there is a whole political science literature on
this-then indeed these districts did conform.
We showed that the North Carolina plan was more distinctive than
any previous plan, that the districts as a whole better represented,
independent of race, the diversity of districts in the State. In other
words, we compiled a whole series of empirical demonstrations
showing that indeed there was no impact on innocent third parties
and that, in fact, these so-called dysfunctional districts functioned
better than more traditionally compact districts.
Now, would that hold elsewhere? Would you find those same
characteristics? The answer is we don't know. There certainly, for
example, in Texas, was not evidence that the districts in the urban
areas shared the same kind of socioeconomic homogeneity of the
districts in North Carolina, and that argument was not made in the
State of Texas.
So by no means are these things determined. And once we get
away from this narrow fixation with compactness and look at the real
issues of whether districts function or not, I think there are reasonable standards for judging these districts.
MODERATOR: Let's go back to two words in Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Shaw v. Reno: "political apartheid." To what extent is
there a symbolic injury in being forced to live in a district or a state
where certain voters have obviously been "corralled," in the language
of some of the lower courts, into particular areas because of their
race? Is this something that is being litigated? Is this something
where evidence is being taken at the lower courts about whether there
is such a symbolic or even emotional injury?
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I should point out that the first racial
gerrymandering congressional districts in North Carolina came in
1871-72. There was a district called the Black 2nd. It is the only
district in the South during the 19th century that has a biography
written about it.
The State was approximately one-third black, and it was the only
majority-black congressional district drawn in the state, and it was
drawn in a very self-conscious manner. So if there is a symbolic injury
from racial gerrymanders, it is a symbolic injury that black people
have had to be putting up with since very shortly after the promulgation of the Fifteenth Amendment, and it is strange that the Supreme
Court should decide it now and that it is something that only white
people get a chance to talk about.
There was an inevitable conflict between two conceptions of the
Reconstruction Amendments, I think. When Justice O'Connor
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discusses the 14th Amendment in Shaw v. Reno, she uses the phrase
"discrimination between." Generally, when we have thought of the
Fourteenth Amendment and other amendments in the Reconstruction Amendments previously, we have thought of "discrimination
against." And in some sense, most of the time in American history
since Reconstruction has been a story of racial discrimination in
which there hasn't been any distinction between discrimination
between and discrimination against.
Discrimination between black people and white people or black
people and Latinos, black people and Asians, white people and
Asians, anybody like that, has always been againstthe people of color
as well as between.
Here, she seems to finesse the issue of injury by talking about
discrimination between. And it seems to me that one way that we can
think about the conflict between Shaw v. Reno, at least in its initial
guise, in these opinions in their initial guise, and the trend of
minority vote dilution cases, is to distinguish between discrimination
between and discrimination against.
And it seems to me what the Supreme Court fundamentally has to
face in any consideration, further consideration of such issues, is
when you come to the question of when discrimination between and
discrimination against are not entirely compatible, then what do you
do?
In the Croson line of cases, and other sorts of things, you have
discrimination at least allegedly against, and not purely discrimination
between. There is allegedly injury there which is relatively concrete.
The company, in Croson, lost a contract to produce urinals for the City
of Richmond, and they were angry at this. And so there was some
injury.
In Shaw, the injury is not at all clear. One more fact indicates from
the depositions that the injury is not clear, and that is, Ruth Shaw, the
named plaintiff, voted for Mel Watt, she says, in the 1992 election. If
she was not represented, why did she vote for him?
MS. HAIR: I think this question of political apartheid is very
important, and I think it's important to go back and look at what
Justice O'Connor said about what the indicia are of this condition of
political apartheid or racial gerrymander.
When she tried to identify injuries, the types of injuries that she
identified were that the districts were likely to lead to the election of
congressional representatives who owed their election to only one
race and therefore were answerable only to constituents of one race.
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She also said that she thought that the creation of these districts
would stereotype African-Americans as all thinking alike and having
the same interests regardless of income level or age or basically
geographic location.
Then she threw around the word segregation and said this is
segregation.
I know in all the cases, and I will talk about the Texas case, records
have been made, evidence has been submitted and basically uncontradicted that these factual assumptions that Justice O'Connor was
making simply are not true, have not been true under the districts
that have been created under the Voting Rights Act for the last
several years.
In Texas, in North Carolina, we had white citizens file affidavits or
testify about the responsiveness of the African-American representatives to them.
One of the districts struck down in Texas is Houston Congressional
District 18, which was first held by Barbara Jordan. Race was taken
into account when that district was created.
Even the plaintiffs in this case, when we would say, "What did you
think about Barbara Jordan, did she respond to the white community?," they would say, "She was wonderful." Of course, everybody
knows that Barbara Jordan was wonderful, and Barbara Jordan, you
know, put Texas race relations ahead light years because she was such
a star when she got to Congress that it showed white citizens of Texas
that African-Americans could effectively represent them.
So there are massive amounts of evidence that, far from increasing
racial polarization, allowing African-Americans to become representatives, and allowing them to show how they can perform, decreases
feelings of racial hostility and prejudice.
With regard to the stereotypes that all African-Americans are alike,
what we did is we traced African-American communities and showed
that, in fact, the African-Americans that had migrated into certain
areas like north of Dallas came from South Dallas originally, had
family in South Dallas as the core of the African-American community, went back to church in South Dallas and, perhaps most importantly, was highly politically cohesive with the African-American community in South Dallas.
So it's not a stereotype. In fact, if you look at the African-Americans that were joined together in the congressional districts, they are
highly politically cohesive and have a high community of interest with
each other. And that doesn't mean necessarily that African-Americans
in Houston have a community of interest that would justift joining
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them with African-Americans in Dallas, but when you look at the
particular facts, you see that the districts are justified in terms of
community of interest.
Finally, this term segregation really irritates me the way it gets
thrown around. If you put African-Americans together in one district,
they say it's segregated. If you do what they did in Texas, which was
divide the African American community in Dallas between two white
Democrats and the new majority-black district, then they say that's
segregating, you're segregating them into the white districts even
though when they go into those districts they in fact integrate those
districts which would otherwise be all white, but you are also
segregating them into the African-American districts.
So, to me, it is just a perversion of the use of the word segregation,
which means what it meant in Brown v. Board of Education, which is:
intentional separation of the races. In these cases, no matter where
you put African-Americans, the courts say it's segregated.
The plaintiffs in Texas simply were not able to identify any injury.
They formed an organization called Coalition for a Color-Blind Texas,
and they testified they were offended by the use of race in the
districting process, and the court said that's enough injury for us.
PROFESSOR MILLER. I have a slightly different take on the
question of injury. Whatever the imagined injury that white voters
would suffer from being represented by a black representative, the
Court still is fixated on a notion of apartheid. And I think one of the
waves of the future of litigation on this issue is the kind of alternative
voting systems that Lani Guinier and Pam Karlan and others have
written about. Those kinds of systems don't residentially segregate
people in the way that districting systems do. Yet they still allow for
a great deal of minority representation; in fact, they can be completely tailored to allow for the same amount of minority representation
that a district could. And they don't raise the specter of Justice
O'Connor's concern in Shaw.
Especially at the local level and the state legislative level, those
kinds of answers to the question of injury are going to become really
important. Obviously, for congressional elections, these remedies
require an amendment to the Constitution; for state and local
elections they often require no legislative changes. For example,
within the last several months a Maryland federal court implemented
a cumulative voting remedy in Worcester County on the Eastern
Shore.
So, in a way, the irony of Shaw is that it may in fact create space for
the kinds of remedies that voting rights scholars and litigators have
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been proposing for years, and in many ways that might be a good
thing.
MR. JEROME: We have transparencies for some of the districts, we
don't have them for all of the districts. So we will go ahead and as I
talk about the districts, we will go ahead and see if we can at least
illustrate some of them.
Shaw v. Hunt, we have heard a lot about today. The decision came
down on August 1, and since that time both the plaintiffs and the
plaintiff intervenors, basically the representatives of the Republican
Party, have filed their notices of appeal and their jurisdictional
statements with the Supreme Court will be due in mid-October.
In Hays v. Louisiana, that one is on its way to the Supreme Court.
Both the Justice Department and the State of Louisiana filed notices
of appeal after the decision.
One of the interesting aspects of Hays is the court ruled that the
new plan-this transparency is the plan that was struck down initially,
and then in 1993 the State came back and drew a plan that was at a
much lower black percentage and also much less irregularly-shaped.
And one of the main arguments that we had in this second trial was
that the district that was drawn in fact is very similar and was modeled
on districts that were created in the 1970s that followed the Red River
along from Baton Rouge to Shreveport.
So, our argument in the second go-around in Hays was that this
district in fact does follow traditional districting principles and follows
the traditions of Louisiana. Unfortunately, the court didn't agree
with us on that and, when they struck down the second plan, ordered
into effect a court-drawn plan that the court drew in one day.
We filed a notice of appeal, and both the State and the Justice
Department sought a stay of the district court's order in the Supreme
Court that was granted.
The jurisdictional statements from both the State and the Justice
Department will be due at the end of September.
Vera v. Richardshad an interesting history after the decision as well.
The court determined that three of the districts out of the 30 districts
in Texas were unconstitutional, the 18th and 29th in Houston and the
30th in Dallas, but it did not at the time it ruled provide for relief.
The parties then were provided an opportunity to ask for relief.
The plaintiffs sought a new plan for the 1994 elections. But instead,
the court ruled that elections in 1994 will go forward using the State's
plan and the State will have the first opportunity in the 1995
legislature to come up with a remedy.
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The decision will likely be appealed, and that appeal will progress
as well to the Supreme Court.
MR. KENGLE: I would like to add one thing. This is a map, this
is one of the exhibits that was presented at trial showing District 30,
which is almost entirely in Dallas County. This is one of the districts
that was struck down by the court as unconstitutional.
The district as a whole is less than fifty percent black in voting-age
population. Nobody disputed that the boundaries of this district were
not convoluted.
But if you look at the composition of the convoluted parts of the
district, you will see that the various segments are 21% black, 38%
black, 26% black, 29% black, and at the very bottom, 20% black, 37%
black, 31% black. The irregular portions of this district were not
majority-black.
And what the court seems to be saying there, at least to me, is that
going out and picking up majority-white areas is somehow a racial
gerrymander. And I think that is a very interesting question that the
Supreme Court may confront if this case is presented before it.
MR. JEROME: One of the other cases that has not progressed
quite as far is Johnson v. Smith, and that is the Florida case which
challenges Corrine Brown's district, District 3. There, the court also
declined to enjoin the 1994 election. So, Florida will be held using
the State's plan, and just recently, on September 2, the court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this case is still
awaiting a decision. So it's likely that this case will not really proceed
very quickly, at least it seems that way, until the Supreme Court has
ruled on some of these other appeals.
Johnson v. Miller is the Georgia case which challenges Cynthia
McKinney's l1th District. In that case we are awaiting a decision by
the district court.
MODERATOR. We have to break now.
I want to thank all of our panelists for an extraordinary session.
III. THE VALUE OF MAJORITY-MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
MODERATOR: What is the practical political and social experience
of having majority-black, Hispanic, and Asian districts? We want to
examine several different points: What has been the effect on
partisanship and party competition and the political positions of the
parties? What have been the effects on race relations? What have
been the effects on the cohesiveness of different racial groups? And
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now what are the potential effects of Shaw v. Reno on the various
communities affected by them?
Let's start with the question about political parties. What have been
the partisan effects of having these minority districts? And I am
specifically interested in whether it benefits the Republican Party and
hurts the Democratic Party. And why does the Republican Party seem
to have changed its tune on these districts in the last few years?
The Republican Party has twice
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN:
changed its tune with respect to the formation of minority districts in
the United States.
The first change of tune came during the 1980s with what might be
called their majority-minority strategy; that is, the Republicans
decided, under the leadership of their general counsel, Benjamin
Ginsburg, that it would be highly beneficial to Republicans to form
majority-minority districts because you can concentrate minorities,
who are the most reliable of Democratic voters, in a few districts and
thereby weaken the ability of Democrats to get elected in all surrounding districts.
In other words, you might have one eighty percent Democratic
district, which results in a series of surrounding Republican districts.
This strategy, put into effect for the post-1990 round of redistricting, was viewed by the Republicans, I think, in a very cynical way, of
netting them a harvest of new Republican seats in the 1992 congressional elections.
For the most part, the strategy was a resounding failure. In a few
states, the Republicans did gain some benefits; for example, in the
state of Georgia. But overall, only a small handful of seats could be
attributed to this strategy.
Why did it fail? Because Democratically-controlled legislators
proved remarkably effective at both crafting majority-minority districts,
conforming to the Voting Rights Act, while crafting additional districts
that would elect Democrats.
As a result, the Republican Party again changed its tune. It now
decided to join the Shaw v. Reno bandwagon and challenge majorityminority districts. And indeed, the National Republican Party, under
a new general counsel, Mike Hess, was a party in the Shaw v. Reno
decision attacking the very majority-minority districts in North
Carolina that in their formation the Republican Party had been
instrumental in creating.
Why? What is going on politically? It's very simple. What the
Republican Party wants to do for the next round of districting-and
we have talked immensely this morning about the effects of Shaw v.
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Reno in the courts-the real effect is going to come in the actual
round of redistricting, and we can talk about that later.
What they want to do now is clamp restraints on the year 2000-plus
redistricting, force legislatures to create majority-minority districts, but
constrain the way they can draw districts in such a manner so that
finally the Republican strategy of putting minorities together and
weakening Democratic districts can work. That is what it is all about.
That is what is at stake politically here, and that is why the Republican
Party has been involved in Shaw v. Reno.
When you cut through the rhetoric, it is power politics.
PROFESSOR PARKER: This is the real world panel. We are going
to be talking about the real world.
First of all, I want to make the point that the creation of these
majority-black and majority-Hispanic districts is not overreaching. In
no sense can it be viewed as overreaching. The fact is that before
redistricting after the 1990 census, blacks and Hispanics were severely
underrepresented both in Congress and state legislatures. The
statistics were voting age population U.S.: 11% black, 7.3% Hispanic;
black people made up only 4.9% of Congress, 5.4% of state legislatures; Hispanics 2.5% of Congress, 1.7% of state legislatures.
As a result of redistricting after the 1990 Census, the number of
majority-minority districts was doubled from twenty-six to fifty-two.
This resulted in a fifty percent increase in black representation in the
House of Representatives and a thirty-eight percent increase in
Hispanic representation.
So, clearly the political fortunes of minorities in America are tied
to the creation of majority-black, majority-Hispanic, and majorityminority districts. Without those districts, minorities remain severely
underrepresented, and the remedy for curing that is to create
majority-minority districts.
Now,the question that Professor Raskin raised is the following
argument: Creating majority-minority districts does more harm than
good. That is the argument.
And the argument is that it operates against the best interests of
minorities because it results, by taking minorities out of the raciallymixed districts and creating majority-minority districts, in making the
adjoining districts whiter, yielding an increase in conservative
representation and Republican representation in Congress, which is
against the best interests of minorities in America. That is an
empirical question. Has it occurred?
Now, I was following very carefully the predictions of the Republican National Committee after the 1990 Census and the redistricting
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process. I completely agree with Professor Lichtman's analysis. The
first prediction was: Republicans will gain forty seats in the House of
Representatives, forty to fifty seats in the House of Representatives, as
a result of creating majority-minority districts.
Then it went down to thirty seats. Then it went down to twenty-five.
Do you know how many Republican seats Republicans gained in the
House as a result of the 1992 election? Ten. Net gain-correct me
if I am wrong-net gain, ten Republican seats.
Now, you still read in the newspapers, it's still in all the New York
Times articles, that Republicans will gain as a result of the creation of
majority-minority districts. Even articles this summer said that black
people and Hispanics are to blame if there is a Republican increase
in Congress in these elections.
Now, let's be reasonable about this. The creation of these majorityminority districts is not the political force operating in the South
today where the most significant gain in congressional seats occurred.
The South is going Republican. White people in the South are
And so if Republicans make
increasingly voting Republican.
additional gains in 1994, it will be the result of many factors, the
creation of majority-minority districts being probably one of the least
significant factors.
But to me, the argument that it will do more harm than good was
not proven in the 1992 elections and really should be put to rest.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: There has been a consequence, but it
doesn't play out in the number of Republicans who get elected as
opposed to how many would have been elected if we had had more
racially-mixed districts. Where it does play out is in a change in
American attitudes about race, and I think one of the most dangerous
things about Shaw and about the way in which the political parties
have cynically tried to manipulate the Voting Rights Act is that it has
changed the whole tenor of debate.
Civil rights used to be viewed as a kind of universal imperative. It
is now viewed as special-interest politics. And to the extent that the
Republican Party can make the Democratic Party look like the party
of black people and can fan the kind of racial polarization which Brad
Reynolds explicitly committed himself to when he was head of the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, that has an effect
on the way politics works that is not measured in the number of seats
gained or seats lost but is measured in the question of how responsive
to the particularized needs of racial minorities Congress or state
legislatures are after they are elected.
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Blaming the Voting Rights Act for that is, as Congress said in the
1982 amendments, like blaming the thermometer for the fever in a
patient.
But I think that the debate about voting rights and about raceconscious districting and the like has transformed, at least in part, the
whole way in which politics is argued about. And that is something
that we need to be concerned about, trying to develop a strategy that
can counter that.
MODERATOR: Well, there is an alternative hypothesis, and I
heard it expressed recently by former Congressman Stephen Solarz,
which is that through the creation of minority districts you create a
lock in those districts and then you get people elected to Congress
who very vociferously represent the interests of minority groups, but
by draining the minority votes from neighboring districts you make
those representatives much less accountable and much less responsive
to minority concerns.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I think you would have to look at a lot
more factors, and I don't believe that anyone on this panel really has
the information to address this particular issue. I don't. I can speak
only of what I see in South Carolina. And the creation of minority
districts has indeed resulted in the increase in Republicans. It hasn't
been as true in Congress. We only have six districts.
We did create a majority-black district, which incidentally, I was in
favor of creating, and it did indeed elect a very fine black representative, and we lost one Democrat. The two in fact were not connected
in South Carolina, but it is much more true, at the state legislative
level in the state Senate and the state House of Representatives. I
think if you were to look, you would see a direct correlation.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER. I actually have something to say about
this, and I have a handout.
You get to be a professor, you get to give out handouts.
This is from testimony that I gave in North Carolina, and I would
direct your attention particularly to the nice figures, figure 1 and
figure 2 (see page 61).
PROFESSOR BUTLER. May I say something before you get started
on this? This will be the second time that we have heard from a
witness in the case of North Carolina. You have also on these panels
lawyers who were involved on one side of this case in North Carolina.
And it seems to me that what we're getting is a conceivably very
skewed notion of what the facts might have been in North Carolina,
with no one on the other side of this issue to say, "Well, these were
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the facts that our witnesses presented, and these were the arguments
that our lawyers made."
You know, it seems to me that at least the audience ought to
recognize that this is a partisan panel and that this is a partisan
presentation by a partisan witness and indeed somebody else may look
at those facts-I am not sufficiently familiar with the North Carolina
case to comment-but I believe before Professor Kousser makes his
remarks, that it's important that you understand that perspective.
Okay. Professor Butler, thank you for that
MODERATOR:
intervention.
I would like to say that we have made an effort to have several
points of view represented here. There is no monolithic ideology
represented on this panel, and I think anyone who has participated
in these discussions has seen that there is a diversity of views about
the value of these districts, about alternatives to these districts, and
your presence here demonstrates a commitment to finding other
voices. But if you are unhappy with that, we'll just have to do better
next time.
Professor Kousser, please proceed.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: I would be happy to have anybody else
look at this same information, and you can come to whatever
conclusions you want. Figure 1 and figure 2 are drawn from the
Congressional Quarterly Conservative Coalition scores, which are
readily available in the Congressional Quarterly annual index to
anybody.
I have divided Congresspeople in North Carolina into three groups.
If you look at the Conservative Coalition scores, I divided the
Members of Congress into three groups. One is Republicans. I
looked at the Conservative Coalition indexes for 1973 to 1993.
Republicans are the ones up at the top. They are always around
ninety percent or ninety percent-plus Conservative Coalition scores.
If you look at the Democrats from the two districts that have the
largest proportion black, the 1st and 2nd Districts up through 1991,
those are white Democrats. Those are the squares. And those people
are about sixty to seventy percent, they started up even higher on the
Conservative Coalition index. Up through 1980, they looked just like
Republicans, despite the fact that these are what would be expected
to be minority-influenced districts.
PROFESSOR PARKER. These are the ones that are supposed to be
most responsive to minority interests.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: That's correct.
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Fig. 1: Do White and Black Congressmen
Differ in North Carolina?
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PROFESSOR PARKER: Because they are from districts that are
thirty to forty percent black?
PROFESSOR KOUSSER- That's correct.
The other Democrats from districts with smaller proportions of
minorities are the little crosses. They start at around eighty percent
conservative; they go down to perhaps seventy percent. They are
indistinguishable, basically. After 1980, they are basically indistinguishable from the other districts.
Obviously, the thing that should catch your eye is what happens in
1993. For the first time since 1898 you elect Members of Congress
who are black from North Carolina and their Conservative Coalition
scores average about ten.
Blacks had been excluded, in the views that black voters had before
1993, they had been excluded from representation in Congress.
Finally, they get included.
Now, you could choose another index. If you chose any of the rest
of the normal indexes that are used, the ADA index, the American
Conservative Action, the Chamber of Commerce index, you would
find roughly the same thing. The correlations between the Conservative Coalition scores and the others show that they are roughly the
same.
Was this something thatjust happened because of a time effect that
was because you've got a Clinton Administration and you suddenly got
people who would vote very liberally? Well, if you look at the rest of
the black Members of Congress from the South in figure 2, they are
on the lower part of the scale. They are approximately ten to twenty
percent conservative. Mel Watt and Eva Clayton come right in that
area.
So, it appears that they were not different from what would have
happened before if there had been majority-black districts, if blacks
would have gotten their policy views represented. Until you get blackmajority districts, in North Carolina at least, it certainly doesn't
happen.
So, if you ask the third empirical question that Justice O'Connor
asks, which is, "Do you get people who are responsive to only one
constituency, once you get black-majority districts or minorityopportunity districts drawn," the answer to the question is probably
"no," in general.
But if you flip the question over and you say, "Unless you have
black-majority or majority-opportunity districts-minority opportunity
districts, do you get representatives who are white, but who are
favorable to the minorities," then the answer for North Carolina is
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"no." You don't get people who are favorable to minority interests
until you get minority-opportunity districts drawn. There is exclusion.
There is segregation of white congressional opinion. Blacks are
segregated out, their influence is segregated out until you get
minority-opportunity districts drawn.
So it is an empirical question. Anybody can draw these sorts of
things. Anybody can critique these sorts of things. In this sense, this
is an extremely objective way to look at it. It is not simply a partisan
thing on the part of the voting rights lobby or anyone else. But this
is the fact of the matter. Blacks were excluded.
MS. KING: I think it would be a very interesting concept, Dr.
Kousser, and it's a very realistic concept. In the Johnson v. Miller case,
although I thought it was a very ridiculous theory, one of the harms
that was set forth by the moving party was that this was the precise
harm that they were alleging, that issues were being raised on the
congressional floor that were contrary to the interests of Republicans
and conservatives, such as the crime bill's Racial Justice Act, and the
fact that you were allowing minorities to be represented disallowed
the representation of the majority people in a particular district
because these issues were being raised on the floor and these issues
were being voted upon by minority Members of Congress.
I think that is the danger of Shaw v. Reno, and it goes far beyond
partisan politics, and it really gets down to issues that are being raised
and issues which certain individuals do not want to be discussed in
these political debates.
PROFESSOR PARKER: The data from Mississippi also support
Professor Kousser's conclusions. I was not involved-well, let me say,
first of all, I had nothing to do with the North Carolina case, I wasn't
a lawyer in the North Carolina case, I wasn't a witness in the North
Carolina case, so I can be an unbiased, impartial panelist here.
The same thing is true. Webb Franklin was elected in a Mississippi
congressional district, the 2nd Congressional District, which was fortyeight percent black in voting age population in 1992 and 1994. He
voted as high on the Conservative Coalition scale, voted against black
interests.
And also, Mike Parker, who represents a congressional district, a
white Representative in the congressional district in Mississippi that
is over thirty percent black, voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
MODERATOR:
So is the contrary hypothesis then that the
presence of a substantial minority but a distinct minority-say, twenty
to thirty percent of blacks in an overwhelmingly white district-encourages at least racially coded politics by conservative
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politicians who can capitalize on polarization to get elected? Is that
your theory?
PROFESSOR PARKER- In the South, it has been our experience
that the districts, very often the districts that are over forty percent
black are the most racially polarized districts. These are the districts
in which the white candidates make the most direct appeal and the
most racist appeal to the white folks because those are the votes that
they need to get elected, and we find, unfortunately-this is not a
terrific thing-but the pattern of coalition politics. We don't find
that in every one of these districts. But biracial coalitions are few and
far between. I am not saying they don't exist, but we find that many
of these districts are very polarized at over forty percent.
MODERATOR: So are you suggesting that the draining of minority
votes from neighboring districts may in fact have a moderating effect
on the politics in surrounding districts? Or are you saying it may not
change at all?
PROFESSOR PARKER No, I think it will have a moderating effect.
It increases black representation and could conceivably make the
majority-white districts, as the black percentage goes down, less
polarized.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: Well, I think that one way to look at
that question is to talk about draining black votes from the neighboring white district, and I do think there are a variety of interesting
things to say about that.
I want to reemphasize, though, that what we often are dealing with
is the option of drawing a majority-black district or a majority-minority
district or not, and this kind of information indicates once again that
when that option is there, it is better to draw the minority district.
And frankly, just one other comment about the politics of this
business: I don't think we should have ever understood the Voting
Rights Act and related policy as taking race essentially out of politics.
It is going to be there and communities of color recognize that. In
those districts where they are a minority of the population where
nothing else can be done by this method, barring other alternative
schemes that we might talk about later today, then they have their
politics to take care of.
MODERATOR Well, let me turn to the somewhat larger, macropolitical question that I think Professor Karlan touched on originally.
If you leave aside the political effects that follow from the specific
districts, what are the general political messages being sent to the
electorate by the existence of majority-black or Hispanic districts; or,
contrarily, what message is being sent by the Supreme Court's
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decision in Shaw v. Reno? Does Shaw v. Reno characterize those
districts in a particular way?
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: I do think that in one sense that is
the more important battleground. The language and the discourse
that has resulted from Shaw could very well serve to stigmatize men
and women elected from minority districts who are otherwise capable
elected officials and fine public servants. Some of them are not fine
public servants, but that certainly doesn't have anything to do with
districting, and it does not distinguish them significantly from their
white counterparts. So I think that there is a problem there, and I
think that problem very much gets us beyond the boundaries of the
courtroom and takes us out into the larger world of public discourse.
And I would be very concerned if that in fact were to happen.
I would just say, by way of one more comment, after the Shaw
decision came down, I was particularly distressed at two things. One
was the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest
court, essentially legitimated language, very targeted language, much
of which is driven by bigotry, which served to stigmatize these
particular elected officials. It brought it into the decision. I am
talking about balkanization. I am talking about the allusion that
when blacks are elected by persons of their own race, there is
something tainted about them. No mention of other people who are
elected by members, as it were, of their own race. I think that was a
problem.
But the second and most distressing problem was the reaction in
the popular press. A lot of people did not understand what was going
on and immediately bought into the language, serving, I think, to cast
this stigma that I am very much concerned about.
So, I believe that if that language is allowed to prevail, it will
certainly have a very negative consequence on how we see one
another as citizens.
MS. KING: Yes. I was about to say that I think the Shaw v. Reno
decision is a very dangerous decision. It uses very inflammatory
language that I think-for example, the term "political apartheid,"
which the Supreme Court has never used before, which really has
nothing to do with the creation of majority-minority districts in this
country, because we are not talking about total exclusion of any
population, we are talking about inclusion, we are talking about some
of the most integrated districts throughout this country. And I think
it is very dangerous.
The decision also dismisses the reality of black and Hispanic and
minority culture. Basically, it talks about the perpetuation of racial
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stereotypes without recognizing the fact that people who have similar
cultures and similar backgrounds do have things in common. And I
think as we talked about-you may have talked about this morning-on preemptive defense of these cases, we were able to present
some of the information that educated the Court about the fact that
people do have things in common, blacks have a similar culture.
De jure segregation was a reality in this country until very recently.
There was Jim Crowism. There was institutionalized racism. And
there still is the subtle discrimination that exists today. I think we
cannot deny that, and I think that Shaw v. Reno denies that reality that
we all need to be aware of.
It also disparages minority candidates because basically they are
saying that minority candidates cannot represent a diverse sector of
the population in a particular majority-minority district. And so I
think that too is very damaging.
MODERATOR: Has it turned out that there has been more
competition within minority communities since the creation of these
districts? I want to volunteer a mostly unfounded hypothesis, looking
at a few of these districts.
I live in a majority African-American district, the 4th District in
Maryland. As soon as the majority-black district was created there,
there were six or seven African-American candidates as well as a
couple of white candidates. Now, if blacks are thirty or thirty-five
percent of a district, isn't it more likely that you would get just one
black candidate on the theory that everyone has to get behind one
candidate?
In other words, do these districts in fact contribute to more political
diversity and dialogue within minority communities?
MS. KING: I think that in some localities people may galvanize
around one candidate. But I think it's a good thing because now
people who have talent, who believe they may be able to get elected,
will take the opportunity and make that effort to be elected, and you
may have four or five or six minority candidates whereas before none
of them may have taken that chance because of the reality that they
would not have been elected to office.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: I wanted to say something about the postelection process that I think you were getting at. And that is that I
don't think we can maintain in a multiracial society the legitimacy of
governmental institutions if people look at those institutions and
don't see anyone in there who is what Hannah Pitkin refers to as
"descriptively representative" of them.
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If you look back at the Clarence Thomas hearings, there were no
women sitting on the SenateJudiciary Committee, and there was a lot
of discussion following the Thomas nomination about the fact that
there were no women in the Senate. And I think a lot of the women
who were elected to the Senate were elected precisely because people
looked and they said, "There's something wrong in a country that is
half female with having so few female Senators."
Indeed, the reason Clarence Thomas is on the Supreme Court is
that even the Republicans understood that there would be something
illegitimate in a multiracial society in having an all-white Supreme
Court, and he was the only person around who they thought was
sufficiently politically reliable, and so there he sits.
The same thing is going to be true of legislatures and minorities.
To the extent that in most parts of the country white voters will not
vote for minority candidates, we can only have a racially integrated
legislature by having some majority nonwhite districts, because that is
where all but two or three of the thirty-seven black Representatives
come from. All the rest of them come from districts that are majority
nonwhite.
This is not just an American problem; it is a worldwide problem.
The only countries that seem to be able to maintain democratic
legitimacy are countries in which every recognizable group in society
has some people who represent that group sitting in the legislature.
And that is what is particularly dangerous about Shaw. If we retreat
so that suddenly half of the black or half of the Hispanic faces
disappear from Congress, that is going to send a very damaging
message about how representative Congress and state legislatures
really are.
PROFESSOR PARKER To follow up on what Professor Karlan says,
the other argument we heard a lot before the 1992 elections was that
it won't make any difference. Eleanor Clift, the Newsweek reporter
who was recently reassigned because she was viewed as being too proClinton by Newsweek magazine, said in a broadcast in January 1991,
Newsweek Magazine of the Air, that she had talked with House
Democratic leaders and they said that if the Black Caucus grows in
the House of Representatives as a result of redistricting, it won't make
any difference.
So that argument was made. And we don't hear that much
anymore because, obviously, with thirty-nine 'Members of the House
Black Caucus, they now have a key vote and have played a key role in
NAFTA, passage of the crime bill, and U.S.-Haiti policy. I mean this
group of legislators is very influential today because within the Clinton

68

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1

Administration so many of the votes are so close in passing legislation
supported by the Administration that they are playing a key role. And
so it does make a very significant difference in American politics that
we have thirty-nine blacks in the House.
Then we have to look at the issue, if the implementation of the
Shaw v. Reno decision is successful in reducing black representation in
Congress and for the first time since the post-Reconstruction period,
for the first time basically in more than one hundred years, there is
a reduction in black and Hispanic representation in Congress, what
will that say about the American political process and what will that
say about institutional fairness and institutional legitimacy in
American government?
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: I think we have got to give the critics
of the Voting Rights Act and black-majority districts maybe a tad more
credit for sophistication. I don't think they frontally attacked the
argument that society benefits from a diversity of representation in
the political system. Rather, the argument has become more subtle.
They say the way to get there is not by whatever pejorative term you
might want to use-balkanizing, separating, isolating majorities-but
rather by building and fostering coalition voting.
And their argument is that if you are going to depend on majorityminority districts, there is only a finite amount of representation that
minorities are ever going to achieve. For example, African-Americans
might well, they would argue, be bumping up against their maximum
degree of representation in Congress right now and it might be very
difficult, they would argue, to squeeze out more majority nonwhite
districts with a plurality of African-Americans.
The problem with this argument is it fundamentally lacks empirical
basis. If in fact there was the development of coalitional voting, then
the drawing of majority-minority districts would not be required under
the Voting Rights Act. What the critics don't tell you is that to invoke
the Voting Rights Act you have to prove that non-minorities-that
Anglos-vote as a bloc in such a way as to usually defeat the minority
candidate of choice. If that is not the case and coalitional voting is
flourishing, then the fact is there is no requirement to form
majority-minority districts.
The very formation of these districts is by itself demonstration that
this coalitional voting has somehow so far proved to be illusory. This
was brought home at recent hearings in the Congress when we heard
all these stereotypical arguments about we shouldn't form minoritymajority districts because it kills coalitional voting, blacks like
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everybody else can participate in the bargaining coalition process and
get elected.
Well, Mel Watt walked into the room and just looked these people
in the eye and said, "How long, how long, how long do you want me
to wait until white people become ready to elect an African-American
to Congress in North Carolina?" He says, "We have waited ninety-two
years. We have had no black representation throughout the twentieth
century. How long do you expect me to wait?"
The other pervasive myth is that somehow the creation of these
majority-minority districts itself promotes racially polarized voting and
undermines voter coalitions. The evidence is just to the contrary.
When minorities do get elected and serve in legislatures-and it turns
out they, like everybody else, participate in the bargaining, the giveand-take, the usual legislative process-it demystifies the election of
minorities. And in fact, minority representatives who have been
elected from majority-minority districts in the first round, usually
under conditions of polarized voting, have turned out in subsequent
elections that they have been able to produce black-white coalitions
and go on to become national political figures.
Mike Espy, elected from the 2nd Congressional District in Mississippi, almost entirely with black votes in the first round, got a majority
of the white vote the second time he was elected, and built a very
powerful interracial coalition. If they had never created the 2nd
District in Mississippi, you would never have had a black serving in
Congress, and you would never had have any opportunity of putting
a black person in the position to build an interracial coalition.
Doug Wilder in Virginia, cited as the epitomal example of coalition
voting, where did he get his start? How was he able to first build
coalitions? By getting elected to the legislature in a majority-minority
district and then being in a position to build coalitions.
So the argument goes you've got to wait for coalition building to
take place, and yet the critics deprive minorities of the very preconditions necessary for nurturing that coalition.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: There have been so many points that have
gone down, it's hard for me even to begin to think about where I
would start responding to this.
Let's start with the notion that coalitions are only coalitions if they
produce the particular result of electing a black person to Congress.
That is certainly not my view of things. I think that there are biracial
coalitions that have elected white candidates to Congress-candidates
who were the choice of black voters, but not of white voters in
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majority-white districts. So I am not convinced that the absence of
blacks in Congress means the absence of black representation.
I also will point out that no other group in America is assigned
districts on the basis of their race or ethnicity. The notion that
because districts are majority white, white people are represented as
white people is just nonsense. I mean all you have to do is look at this
panel. Of the white people on the panel alone, there is at least one
different point of view, and if we were to poll the audience, I think we
would find that the white people in this room don't think of their
political ideas as corresponding with being white. Most of the
candidates who run for office are white and white voters split all over
the lot in terms the candidates they support.
So there is an underlying assumption through all this that because
the districts are majority white, white people as whitepeople are represented. It simply isn't true.
Essentially what is being asked for by the creation of majority-black
districts (that are deliberately created for that purpose) is to have
districts set aside on the basis of race.
Now, I want to make absolutely clear that the problem is not
districts that happen to be majority-black. When standard districting
criteria are followed and even when standard districting criteria
include recognizing communities of interest, which to me certainly
include black communities, the results may be the production of
majority-black districts. I don't think that the political process is
harmed. Nor do I see this as an example of districts being created on
the basis of race, or people being assigned to districts on the basis of
race.
The injury to me, though, is the assumption that we ought to create
districts based on race and if we don't create those districts, that
people aren't represented, and that somehow blacks are being treated
differently because we don't create districts for black people.
MODERATOR: Let me ask you a question, and I hesitate to do it
because I don't want you to get mad at me. But is it your position
then that when majority-white districts have been created historically
by state legislatures, that race was not a factor in their creation? For
example, Professor Lichtman says until the forced creation of
majority-black districts in North Carolina through the Voting Rights
Act, there had never been a black elected to Congress since Reconstruction.
PROFESSOR BUTLER. I am certainly not going to contend that
there were blacks elected to Congress from North Carolina. I mean
that is an historical fact.
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Now, whether districts were intentionally created to be white,
certainly there were times in the past where districts were created so
that they would not be majority-black. Now, that to me is a different
proposition.
MODERATOR. Why?
PROFESSOR BUTLER It's a different proposition because there
may have been intentional efforts to avoid the creation of majorityblack districts. I don't deny that.
MODERATOR
Could you view the Voting Rights Act as an
intentional effort to avoid the artificial creation of majority-white
districts? Could you recharacterize the Voting Rights Act as an
attempt to prevent the deliberate creation of majority-white districts?
In other words, is the Act compensating for the fact that whites
historically, and presently, control the districting process?
PROFESSOR BUTLER: But, again, when whites as whites are in fact
controlling the districting process, and when they are in fact making
decisions on the basis of race to disadvantage black voters, then you
now indeed have a racial injury for which I think you have to
recognize a racial remedy.
But I don't think that's what's going on in the creation of most
districts. Districts are created for political purposes, and white folks,
at least today in the South, are all over the political spectrum. There
certainly was a time in the South when that was not true-a time
when race was indeed a unifying force for the white population.
Are some of those attitudes still there among some people? Sure
they are. But, you know, all you have to do is look at the spectrum
of political opinion now being expressed in the South to realize that
white people as white people are no longer represented in the legislatures.
The other thing that I want to say concerns the public's response
to what has been going on. There have been some concerns
expressed here that the public will get the impression that somehow
the blacks elected from these Shaw v. Reno-type districts are somehow
undeserving and unworthy. My impression is that that is not the
public's perception. The public's response is that it's outrageous for
districts to be created like this. They would think these districts were
outrageous regardless of the particular purpose for which they were
created.
In terms of whether race-based districts had an impact on realignment of politics let me offer an example of recent public perception.
Just last week, after the elections in South Carolina, there was an
interesting cartoon in the State newspaper, the local newspaper. It
had a picture of water fountains in 1945 with the labels "white" and
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"colored" over them. Then in 1994, it had two more water fountains,
and these had the labels over them "Democrats" and "Republicans."
I think that increasingly within the South, certainly in South Carolina
and, I think, in other parts of the South, there is a growing notion
that the Democratic Party is the black party. Now, I think some of
that perception follows from the intentional creation of black districts.
PROFESSOR PARKER: I would like to respond to some of the
points that Professor Butler has made because I think they do need
to be answered.
The first point is, in my opinion, Professor Butler's points represent
a complete distortion of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.
If white Members of Congress are indeed the first choice of black
voters of a particular district, then there can't possibly be a Voting
Rights Act violation, because a Voting Rights Act violation is predicated on the existence of racially polarized voting and the consistent
defeat of minority-preferred candidates, and if minority-preferred
candidates are elected, then there is no section 2 violation. And not
only could a section 2 lawsuit not be brought, but also, it seems to me
a legislature would be precluded from using compliance with the
Voting Rights Act as the justification for the creation of a majorityblack district under those circumstances.
So, in those circumstances that she postulated, where white
Members of Congress are the first choice of the black voters, there
would be no necessity to create a majority-black district, arid there
would be no Voting Rights Act violation. So, it seems to me, that that
is a false argument.
The second argument that she made is also patently untrue. It is
not true that there is no other group in the United States assigned
districts on the basis of ethnicity. Anyone who has been in politics
knows that in every state there are Irish districts, Polish districts,
Ukrainian districts, Jewish districts. A lot of ethnicity is used in the
political process.
I would like to refer back to the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights hearing that Professor Lichtman referred to just
a moment ago. Barney Frank, a Member of Congress from Massachusetts, was asking a defender of the Shaw v. Reno decision a series of
questions that went along the lines of, "Now everybody who is
involved in Massachusetts politics knows that every time the legislature
gets together, we create this Polish district, and this has been a
traditional Polish district in Massachusetts, been in effect for a long
period of time, and it's assumed that this Polish district will be created
every time the redistricting process occurs."
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PROFESSOR BUTLER Is it drawn down the interstate, Frank
Parker?
PROFESSOR PARKER I don't know what the boundary of the
Polish district is. Your claim was that no other group in the United
States is assigned districts on the basis of ethnicity. Barney Frank said
we always create a Polish district. If you doubt his word, ask him.
He said, "Now, are you telling me that we can create this Polish
district, there is no constitutional violation, it's prima facie constitutional, and there is no question raised and no lawsuits filed, but if we
create a majority-black district and we use race-consciousness to create
that majority-black district under Shaw v. Reno, it's prima facie
unconstitutional?"
The burden is on the State to justify it by strict scrutiny, the
heaviest burden of justification, and there is a great likelihood that
the Court will throw the district out. There is a double standard here
that ethnicity can be used for some purposes but not others. It makes
black people and minorities who are the intended beneficiaries of the
Voting Rights Act a disfavored group, if districts are drawn in their
favor, subject to the strict scrutiny standard and are prima facie
unconstitutional.
Now, the third point that Professor Butler made, and I am glad she
made this point because I think this issue needs to be brought on the
table too, is the question of following traditional redistricting criteria.
And I want to illustrate my point by referring not to compactness but
to following political subdivision boundaries.
If you have been following redistricting for the past ten or twenty
years, you know that political subdivision boundaries have pretty much
gone by the board a long time ago because in most instances you
cannot follow political subdivision boundaries and comply with "one
person, one vote." So towns are split, counties are split. Political
subdivision boundaries are departed from. Little pieces of counties,
little pieces of towns are put in other districts in the name of "one
person, one vote." And the newspapers are not editorializing against
this. There is no Supreme Court decision that says this is prima facie
unconstitutional. This is widely-accepted because everyone considers
compliance with "one person, one vote" fairness in redistricting.
Now, if you can do away with political subdivision boundaries in the
name of "one person, one vote," why is it so horrible and why is it so
unconstitutional to diminish the importance of political subdivision
boundaries if you are drawing lines to create majority-black, majorityHispanic districts to comply with the Voting Rights Act? I don't
understand the argument.
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PROFESSOR BUTLER: First of all, my position certainly would be,
if you draw a Polish district by running down the interstate and
adding Polish people at every crossroads of the interstate, then you've
got the same constitutional problem that you have if the district is
drawn for blacks, or for any other ethnic group on the basis of
ethnicity.
If you create districts that recognize communities of interest and
those communities of interest share a common racial characteristic,
well, that's standard. I don't find anything wrong with that at all.
That to me is an entirely different proposition.
And just to show you that somehow this is not just the position of
some right-wing Southerner, let me read to you what Drew Days had
to say when he was testifying before Congress on this very issue in
response to the notion that the Voting Rights Act, if it were amended,
was going to result in the kind of gerrymandering that we are fighting
today.
He is talking about circumstances in which the Justice Department
might object to a redistricting plan. He says, "Take the case of
redistricting plans in a community with a twenty-five percent minority
population. Let us assume that local officials can create a compact
and contiguous set of four city council districts where minorities are
likely to have a sizeable population advantage in one district. When
the jurisdiction submits instead, however, a plan that is not compact
or contiguous, reflects substantial population deviations from district
to district, or is otherwise drawn in a fashion that frustrates any
prospect minorities will gain control of one district, the Department
is likely to object.
On the other hand, we might assume another set of facts in which
it can be shown that no fairly drawn redistricting plan will result in
minority control of one district because of dispersed minority
residential patterns, for example. The Department's response is not
to demand that the jurisdiction adopt a crazy-quilt gerrymandered
districting plan to assure proportional minority representation."'"
Now, that was the representation that Drew Days, who was a very
important player in the extension of the Voting Rights Act, made to
Congress.
I can't imagine that if the kinds of districts that are being supported here today had been offered to Congress as something that was

31. Voting Rights Act: Hearingson S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, and S. 1992 and H.R. 3112 Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutionofthe SenateJud. Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1388 (1982) (statement
of Drew Days). Drew Days was Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights in the Carter
Administration. He currently serves as Solicitor General.
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going to come out of the Voting Rights Act Amendment in 1992, that
the Amendment would have passed.
And I think if you will go back and examine Mr. Days' testimony,
there certainly isn't any clue in his testimony that this is what he
thought was going to be the ultimate result of the Amendment of the
Voting Rights Act.
MS. KING: I just have to say that I think you are missing the point.
I think the point goes beyond race. I think we are talking about
communities of interest and we are talking about traditional redistricting criteria. And just as Professor Parker mentioned, you are talking
about putting together people who have things in common just as
that has been done historically throughout this country. And in those
situations, it is appropriate to allow people to get together and to
elect the candidate of their choice, someone who is going to bring
the issues that are relevant to those individuals to the table so those
issues can be discussed, debated, and voted upon.
As a representative of the Justice Department, I have to say that we
precleared many of the districts that are at issue in this litigation, and
Mr. Patrick is committed, and the Attorney General is committed, to
defending these districts to make sure that minorities have a voice
and they are enfranchised in this country.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: For all of the back and forth about the
facts, this is not really a debate about facts, this is a debate about
values. And what you get from the Supreme Court is an attempt to
make the rhetorical argument that this is a color-blind society. This
has never been a color-blind society. The Fourteenth Amendment
was not passed for color-blindness reasons. The Fifteenth Amendment certainly wasn't passed for color-blindness reasons.
There seem to me to be two separate questions. One is a question
of end-state: What do we think the proper end goal is? And the
other is a question of means: how do we reach the desired end-state?
People disagree profoundly today about both of these issues, so that
you end up with some people saying the ultimate end of America
should be color-blindness. And for those people, it would be
perfectly okay to have an all-white legislature because in a color-blind
society no one would notice a Representative's race. When I teach
these issues, this is what one of my students referred to as "the little
gray babies argument"-down the road somewhere race will become
irrelevant and we will all be exactly the same color. That's one
argument about what the end-state should be.
The other argument about what the end-state should be is that
America should not have a race-blind end-state. This is sometimes a
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"gorgeous mosaic" argument; sometimes it rests on the idea that
people in America have profoundly different attitudes and cultures
and the like that are, in part, a product of race and ethnicity and
there is no reason to try and dissolve those things; what we would like
to have is a society in which those don't lead to political or economic
or social disadvantages. But differences would still exist even in a
perfect American society.
The other is the question of means. Even if you believe that
ultimately we should have a color-blind society, how do you get there?
And the argument that the Supreme Court seems to be advancing is
that if only we stopped talking about race, it would go away, if only we
weren't confronted and slapped in the face by these 160-mile-long
districts that look like bugs splattered on windshields or Zorro or the
Jerry Duck or whatever, our problems would go away and we would
all be just what Martin Luther King promised us in the March on
Washington.
The other argument is that we are never going to get to the colorblind society unless we take race into account right now.
But really what this is about is values. It's not about facts. And that
is why both sides can argue until they're blue in the face about
whether the North Carolina district is really an urban district or a
black district. It's like the old advertisement: "Is it a breath mint or
is it a candy mint?" It's both things at the same time.
The real problem here, which was raised by Clarence Thomas'
concurrence in Holder v. Hall most clearly, is: Who makes the
decision about whether we should be race-conscious in our districting
or not? Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia take the position that
the Supreme Court should make that determination, and that they
should announce right here and right now, "No more racial vote
dilution cases, no more judicial intervention, no more federal
legislative intervention."
People on the other side take the position of saying that Congress
should make that determination. The Voting Rights Act is an
explicitly race-conscious statute. The statute is explicitly concerned
both with racial vote dilution and the election of minority group
members. Professor Butler is entirely correct that the statute singles
out particular groups. Polish Americans are not protected as a class
under the Voting Rights Act. Spanish-speaking Americans are. And
that is just something that we have to face. It's a race-conscious
statute.
PROFESSOR KOUSSER: Let me start out by agreeing with
Professor Butler on one of the things that she said, which is that we
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have got some white people who have divergent opinions here. And
let me then turn to my divergent opinion with Professor Karlan. Even
the civil rights lobby has divergent opinions.
I think that one of the main divisions here that has not been
recognized is between lawyers and other people, or perhaps lawyers
and people. And my view is that in fact this is about facts and not
about simply values.
I think in Shaw v. Reno, not only were there not facts on the table
as to what had happened in North Carolina, and what the history of
redistricting had been in North Carolina, and what actually happened
in 1991-92, but also there was a series of factual allegations essentially
that justice O'Connor used to justify her public policy position, the
public policy position being that there should not be funny-shaped
districts that were minority-opportunity districts.
There were three arguments that she used. Just as she would use
the same types of arguments that you would use if you were testifying
before a committee in Congress or the state legislature, she said these
districts form stereotypes about the voters which implicitly, at least,
she said are not true. That is a factual question: Are they true or
not? Are black voters and white voters different or not? Do they have
systematic opinion differences, or do they not? That is a factual
question.
The second question is does racially polarized voting go up or not?
She insisted that it did go up when you had minority opportunity
districts. I think it is demonstrable that that is not true in the
minority opportunity districts that were drawn in 1991-92, but it is a
factual question.
And the third question, the third thing that she implicitly said,
which this addresses, that the districts would make blacks or the
people who were elected think that they were only responsive to that
part of their constituency, and they were not.
The fourth thing, which is implicit in what she said, was that there
were a set of traditional districting principles which had been followed
traditionally by everybody all of the time which were essentially not
followed.
Well, gerrymandering is a word that came up in 1812, and probably
the practice of gerrymandering was old in 1812. If you want to look
at the traditional districting principles in the United States, partisan
gerrymandering, incumbent protection, et cetera, et cetera, are the
traditional districting principles. We have gotten a little better at it
because we have got a little more fine-grained data, but that is really
the only difference.
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So, there are a series of factual assertions which we don't have
terribly good evidence on systematically that were raised by Shaw v.
Reno. I think that those factual assertions are at the heart of the
persuasive argument that she makes, if not the legal argument that
she makes. I think they should be addressed. I think they should
have been addressed before now more systematically by social
scientists. And I think they should be addressed whenever this gets
up to the appeal.
If anybody out there has influence over this, I appeal to you to
make these and other factual assertions part of the evidence that is
presented to the Supreme Court.
MODERATOR: Well, we have five minutes now to resolve not only
the ambiguities of Shaw v. Reno but the fact-value distinction.
PROFESSOR PARKER: One question that hasn't been asked at this
symposium, which I think is an interesting question, is: What would
be the consequences of using exclusively traditional redistricting
principles? What would be the consequences of taking race completely out of the picture, completely out of the redistricting process and
using exclusively traditional redistricting principles?
It hasn't been done very much, needless to say. We did an
experiment. In 1975, in the Mississippi legislative redistricting case,
we were trying to figure out a way of how to convince a three-judge
district court to adopt our single-member district plan statewide for
the Mississippi House and the Mississippi Senate. And so we decided
that the most convincing plan would be a completely neutxal plan,
race-blind plan relying exclusively on traditional redistricting
principles.
So what we did was we used a random-numbers table to locate the
center of each possible state legislative district, and then we included,
by randomly locating the center, the nearest, most contiguous
territory to that center to create the district until we reached the
population norm. And we did that statewide for both the Mississippi
House of Representatives and the Mississippi Senate-complete use
of traditional redistricting principles, color-blind plan.
So what do you think the consequence was? Well, the consequence
was that discrimination was randomly distributed throughout the plan.
The plan was fifty percent discriminatory. Black people would only
have fifty percent of the representation to which they, under some
fairness principle, would otherwise get if the plan had been drawn in
a race-conscious way.
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MODERATOR: Frank Parker, let me just clarify that. You are
saying if you do it randomly, that you produce as many minority-black
districts as you would if you used race explicitly as a criterion?
PROFESSOR PARKER: No, you produce half as many.
MODERATOR: Half as many. Okay.
PROFESSOR PARKER. Half as many. Fifty percent of the majorityblack districts as if you had done it in a color-conscious way to create
the maximum number of minority black districts.
So from this we conclude-I haven't seen any published data on
this, and I don't know that anyone else has performed this experiment-from this we conclude that a randomly drawn plan without the
use of race at all, a color-blind plan using exclusively traditional
redistricting principles, will have a bias against minorities every time.
PROFESSOR LICHTMAN: I am going, of course, to finesse the
fact-value dilemma by saying it is a bit of both and, in closing remarks,
briefly address each one of them.
First, on values. The notion of a color-blind society is indeed
rhetorically persuasive and at some level appeals to our basic notions
of equality. But let me remind you that in the 1890s the notion of
separate-but-equal was also in many ways a very appealing idea that
appealed to people's sense of fairness. Of course, separate never
became equal.
So, too, the rhetorical invocation today of a color-blind society
simply means, in many aspects, you're freezing into place the
continued discrimination and inequality that exists in America.
Let me remind you who some of the strongest advocates of a colorblind society are: They are the very people who, back in the 1960s,
bitterly and most strongly opposed the basic federal legislation to end
segregation and end the most blatant forms of discrimination,
including the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1964. The very same
people who opposed the most important means of equality now talk
about a color-blind society. I think it is a subterfuge.
Secondly, with respect to facts. I think facts are important, and I
think we have heard today a lot of the same kind of rhetoric we heard
at the very beginning of the North Carolina case: 'You have drawn
this ridiculous-looking district. It runs down the interstate. These
people can't have anything in common. It violates all basic principles."
It is, again, appealing on its surface because it is easy to ridicule a
district that looks like the 12th District in North Carolina. When you
look at the facts, though, it turns out to be patently, totally untrue.
In fact, there are strong communities of interest reflected in that
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district, stronger than many of the more compact districts in the state
and elsewhere, and in no way are the basic ideas of democracy or
representation undermined by that. And those are the factual
findings reflected in the Shaw v. Reno decision.
So, facts are important. It is important to get beyond the rhetoric
and look at what is actually going on in these districts.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: I am going to finesse the fact-value
distinction by calling up a good old political science ter-m called
"perception," which means it's neither, and I want to drop the rest of
the other questions. And I don't want to dump on Professor Butler.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: Well, that's nice. Thanks.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: But I am a little unclear about-and
I don't want to give the impression that I have done a survey of
national minorities in this country-but I think a fair reading of the
Shaw opinion and Ms. O'Connor's opinion and editorial commentary
on that in a wide variety of sources, including many ostensibly liberal
newspapers, would suggest that there is more going on here than a
constitutional inquiry into these particular election districts, and that
there are enormous forces attempting to use excessive, unnecessary,
prejudicial language for more reasons than a narrow inquiry into
these particular congressional and other districts.
I think, and I very much feel this to be the case, that racial
minorities in this country ought to feel quite uncomfortable about
that situation. And I am a little confused as to precisely how one can
deny that reality.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: I think we tend, when we talk about these
issues, to stop history at a particular point. And what I would like to
do in my closing remarks is extend history back just a bit.
I think that most people will agree that one of the founding
principles of this country was that neither benefits nor burdens would
be assigned on the basis of nationality.
Now, needless to say, when the country was founded, we did have
a group of people that we didn't include in the category of citizens.
We did not include this group as people who would be free from
burdens assigned by nationality because we didn't quite consider them
to be people.
But an initial founding principle of this country was that we would
not benefit the English at the expense of the Germans. Certainly we
weren't going to let the State do it. Now, to be sure, individuals will
continue to be able to make such distinctions.
When we passed the Fourteenth Amendment, we extended that
principle to protect all of the people of the country. The purpose for
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the extension of that principle was to include black people as a part
of the citizenry to whom we will not assign benefits and burdens on
the basis of race.
Now, it is certainly beyond denial that that promise was not
fulfilled, and today has still not been completely fulfilled. But to say
that the Supreme Court's refusal to permit States to make decisions
on the basis of race is a drastic change in policy is absolutely not to
pay any attention to history.
The other thing that I would suggest to you is that you should look
beyond the history of this country to the history of the world. I have
been spending a fair amount of time in recent years in Central and
Eastern Europe. And if you think that assigning benefits and burdens
to the population on the basis of ethnicity is the solution to the
problems of multiracial societies, you need to take a closer look at
history.
I do not believe that there is a single minority group in the history
of the world that has been able to achieve parity by emphasizing its
minority status, except in those circumstances where the minority
group happened to be in control of everything.
MODERATOR: If you would permit me a substantive intervention,
I would like to recall the genesis of the expression "color-blindness."
It of course came from Justice Harlan's dissent in 1896 in P/essy v.
Ferguson,2 where he said that our Constitution is color-blind and we
know no caste here, which is very much the same rhetoric, I think,
that Professor Butler and other people who are critical of the Voting
Rights Act now invoke.
But what is often passed over is what he said after that. Justice
Harlan went on to say that the white race in this country is supreme
and superior and dominant when it comes to education and prestige
and wealth and success and achievements, and he had no doubt that
the white race would continue to be that way if it respected the
principle of color-blindness that he thought was enshrined in the
Constitution.
So, at its very inception, the doctrine of color-blindness was deemed
to be perfectly compatible with white supremacy. And so I think that
the controversy over Shaw v. Reno illuminates this struggle between a
formal doctrine of color-blindness, and then the reality of the struggle
to dismantle white supremacy in American history.
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IV. FUTURE CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGIES
AND ALTERNATIVE VOTING SYSTEMS

MODERATOR: Mr. Still, why don't we start with you. We spent
the day kicking around the various implications of Shaw v. Reno and
what it means. And at certain points people seemed to have come to
the conclusion that there really is no way to satisfy the competing
values that we have with the single-member district system.
Do you agree?
MR. STILL: Yes. I think what we have got to do is cut the Gordian
knot here by acknowledging, or at least taking at face value, the
criticisms that are made by people like Justice O'Connor of the shape
of a district, like that found in Shaw v. Reno, and say, "Well, look, is
there a way in which we can meet the values, to use Pam Karlan's
term, the values that one group wants to have black representation or
Hispanic representation in the legislature, in the Congress, while at
the same time accepting the values of Justice O'Connor that we
should not have these districts which are too bizarrely shaped and
appear to have aggregated people solely on the basis of their color?"
One way to do that is to adopt some method of modified at-large
voting where you use cumulative voting or the single transferrable
vote. Justice Thomas mentions both of those in his Holder v. Hall
concurrence, which is also his dissent in the Johnson v. DeGrandycase.
MODERATOR: Now, Mr. Still, let me stop you there because that
might make some people nervous. That is, Justice Thomas' speculations might make some people think that the advertisement of these
alternative strategies is really being used as a way to undermine the
majority-black and Hispanic districts. Is there a danger there?
MR. STILL: Well, I am not sure thatJustice Thomas was speaking
without his tongue in his cheek when he was advertising these, as you
say. It may be that because he goes on to say all that's necessary for
the Supreme Court to move to something like this is for them to
advance in their political thinking. And I think that that was an
ironic or sarcastic statement that was being made by him, and perhaps
he was saying, "And this is just the furthest out principle and see how
bad it is." He didn't explicitly say that. And on the other hand, he
didn't explicitly say, "And I think that proportional representation or
single transferrable vote or cumulative voting is a good idea."
But I think that what we can find is, if you look at democracies
around the world, you will find that we, the Canadians, the Australians, and the English are the ones who are left with single-member
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districts, and that even the New Zealanders have now adopted this
year, although they haven't yet put it into effect, a system like
Germany uses, which is proportional representation mixed with singlemember districts but eventually the proportionality rules overall by
using the extra seats as a make-up, you might say, so that everybody
gets their proportionate share of the votes. Now, that is between
political parties, but political parties could be formed on racial lines
or they could be formed with members of racial minorities liberally
mixed into their party list.
So, there is a world of things out there for us to look at, and we
should not be restricted only to looking at single-member districts
because the Supreme Court happened to say, I think at the urging of
Frank Parker-that single-member districts are to be preferred when
federal courts have to draw remedies.
So, federal courts are stuck in that rut, and that is who draws a lot
of districts or they get settled in federal court, and everybody wants to
look at single-member district plans because they generally have the
effect of tending toward proportionality more than at-large plans.
But you can get more proportionality and you can avoid having to,
in the words of Justice O'Connor, segregate people by race into
districts if you use these modified at-large plans.
MODERATOR: A lot of people at this conference are friends with
Lani Guinier, and I wonder if you could abstract yourself for a
moment as friends and try to reflect a little bit on her experience
when she was nominated an Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights.
Does the failure of her nomination sound the death knell for these
ideas? In fact, does it close the book on various proportional
representation strategies, or does her experience in fact herald things
to come? Is this the critical debate of the next century which we are
simply not mature enough to have yet?
MR. STILL: Well, let mejustjump in on that. The progression of
ideas is such that the first stage is where everybody says the idea is
crazy and eventually everybody says, well, it's just the thing that we use
all the time.
Single-member districts were like that twenty or thirty years ago.
They were used in a lot of places in the United States, but as long ago
as fifteen years ago I was still getting expert witnesses on the stand
who were having to be cross-examined because they were saying that
at-large elections were just the absolute best thing, and the singlemember districts had all these awful side effects to them. As it turns
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out, I now believe that they were probably right about many of the
side effects.
But the one that they kept predicting was that you wouldn't be able
to elect African Americans using single-member districts. They were
wrong.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I think any complex political event like the
Lani Guinier nomination is too complicated to reduce to one
particular variable. As to whether there is any message in it about
cumulative voting, for example, several months before she was
nominated, the New Republic ran a piece I submitted to them
advocating cumulative voting as a remedy for the Voting Rights
Act.33 And they were quite interested in the idea. And when they,
not very surprisingly, I think, took an extremely hostile position on
her nomination, the one thing they were very explicit about was to say
they thought cumulative voting was an interesting idea, a very
promising idea for these problems.
So, people could have been opposed to one idea or another in Lani
Guinier's writings, or one presentation of an idea or manipulation of
an idea in the media, without it necessarily having these sweeping
meanings for something like the future of cumulative voting.
In response to your initial question, I think one of the things that
we need to appreciate about territorial districting is that it is precisely
meant not to be a proportional representation system. The very idea
of territorial districting with majority rule is that a fifty-one percent
majority gets one hundred percent of the control. If fifty-one percent
of the voters vote Republican, a Republican controls the seat.
So, to evaluate territorial districting systems in terms of whether
they produce proportional representation is, in a sense, to fail to
understand the basic idea behind the very system.
And I think one of the problems that we face in the voting rights
area now is that we are trying to wedge into this territorial districting
system concerns for proportional representation or fair representation
of various interests, and the system is being stretched to the breaking
point because it simply isn't designed to accommodate that.
MODERATOR: When you wrote your piece for the New Republic,
were you throwing your weight behind various Lani Guinier strategies,
or were you simply trying to put an idea out there?
PROFESSOR PILDES: No, I think cumulative voting is an attractive
option for dealing with some of the issues that the Voting Rights Act
addresses.

33.

Richard Pildes, Gimme Five, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 16.
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I don't think it's a panacea. I do think it has potential costs that
have to be thought about and there are trade-offs here with either of
the two systems.
The traditional advantage that is offered for territorial districting is
that by blowing up majorities, taking fifty-one percent of the vote and
transforming it into one hundred percent of the political power, you
enable government to act more decisively, to be effective. It's not
stalemated and paralyzed. And the cost is that you have less
proportional, less fairly distributed representation.
The advantage of things like cumulative voting and other proportional representation systems is that you get fairer representation in
political bodies, and one of the costs that you have to think about is
does that make for potentially less effective government because
stalemate follows as a result?
I think on balance it's worth experimenting with these cumulative
voting options, particularly, I think, at the local governmental level,
where they are starting to be experimented with.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: I think that the Lani Guinier episode
does not seal the fate of alternative voting systems. And I think that
there are two issues that play into that.
The first is that if you look at the policy objectives or, in the
language of the day, the values expressed in Supreme Court opinions
dealing with voting over the last thirty years, you see a large number
of issues raised by the Court which have never been operationalized:
concepts of political fairness, concepts of individual autonomy both
in terms of being able to actually cast a ballot and also in not being
locked into a certain group or preexisting arrangement by the State.
In its clearest form that is Shar: questions of group representation,
of group fairness, of group entitlement to an active and equal
participation in the process.
And if you put all those together, and you gave them to a political
scientist to start designing a system of representation from scratch, it
is unlikely that anyone would turn to single-member districts with the
plurality getting all the representation as the system of choice. It
simply can't carry that much freight, particularly once you have any
kind of notion of a representative outcome or a fair outcome, because
single-member districts are notoriously unstable and if not gerrymandered, they will produce all kinds of results which will depart from
that conception of group fairness.
So that that is one impetus toward looking at other solutions,
particularly because if there is something always distasteful about the
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State telling you that you belong in this district because we want you
to vote for this person who we think is your proper representative.
The second issue has to do with this last point: anytime the State
starts to redistrict, the language used in its decisions is whether this
is a Polish district, this a black district, this a Democratic district, this
a Republican district, and the trick is to get it right in terms of the
mix. This means if you want to create a Polish district, you want
about sixty percent Polish, one hundred percent is packing, and that
means that you have to throw people in there that the State has said,
'You get in that district because we need you to fill out the numbers,
but we don't really want you to affect the outcome. This is not your
district."
You know, if we want to create a sixty percent black district, that
means we need forty percent white votes who aren't supposed to
affect the outcome of the election. If we want a Republican district,
the Democrats are there to fill out the numbers, but they're not
supposed to alter the outcome either.
With the computer, the manipulation of lines, the way that these
people are being forced-and I call them the filler people-the way
that they are being forced to fill out the numbers in these districts is
so much more apparent. It is because this is so much more transparent that I think that the level of distaste at the grass-roots response
level is much higher.
MODERATOR: So you're saying that what is being laid bare is the
fact that a lot of people's votes are sacrificed when you create a
permanent majority, whether it's for a party, for a racial group, or for
an incumbent. When you fashion a permanent majority, you are also
creating a permanent minority, an electoral minority which is going
to lose.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: That's right. You know, there is a
line from Tolstoy about once an illusion is exposed, it can never be
renewed. And it is the fact that we have laid bare these processes,
largely through Voting Rights Act litigation and somewhat through
the "one person, one vote" litigation, that means that everybody can
see what we're doing.
And with the computer, as Rick Pildes has shown, the lines are
more extreme than they used to be. And there is a sense of just
looking at it and saying, "I don't really want to be told that I should
be the person that fills out the numbers in a district that belongs to
another group as determined by the state districting authorities."
MODERATOR: And there is no going back to neutral districting
because it never existed in the first place.
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PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: It never existed in the first place.
Either you radically redirect the means by which districting is carried
out, or you move away from districted election systems.
PROFESSOR PARKER:
I am sympathetic with proportional
representation, or "PR," systems, and I think that most of us here are.
But I want to list some disadvantages of PR systems and some
problems I have. I don't think they're required by the Voting Rights
Act, but in many cases they are a good idea.
First of all, I think advocates of PR systems have to be very careful
not to base their arguments on criticisms of single-member districting.
I think this does a disservice to the civil rights community because it
does on some occasions provide ammunition to the other side. It
provides Clarence Thomas with ammunition; it provides other people
with ammunition to point to the criticisms of single-member
districting by advocates of PR systems, even people reading the
transcript of this afternoon's discussion would say, "See, here Ed Still
is embracing Justice O'Connor's arguments, and the voting rights
community is divided." Now, that is misreading, but I think there is
a danger there.
Face it, PR systems are a form of at-large voting. And so even
though they do provide for increased minority representation, there
is a down side. And I think as part of the discussion of PR systems we
do have to address the disadvantages.
First, generally, unless you had district residency requirements,
there is no neighborhood representation. In other words, everyone
elected under a PR system can live in the same apartment building
and represent a whole state or a whole county. So you do away with
the notion of neighborhood representation.
MODERATOR: Which is, perhaps, the principal virtue of the
current system.
PROFESSOR PARKER: Which is the principal virtue of the current
system. You have somebody living near you who represents your
interests.
Second, it is susceptible to the criticism that it does provide for
representation by committee. You don't know who your representative is. You don't know who is the person you're supposed to go to
if you have a problem with government, because you have at-large
elections and groups of people are elected.
Third, I think it does put a premium on slating. And Ed Still mentioned the formation of political parties, which is a form of slating.
And so, unless someone is included on a slate or has a kind of
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political party affiliation, it does make independent candidacies
problematic.
MODERATOR:
Tell me how that works, because that seems
counter-intuitive to me. If there are eight seats on the city council
and I only need one-eighth of the vote plus one to win, doesn't that
instead put a premium on my being able to organize my narrow bloc
of the vote?
PROFESSOR PARKER: Well, I am seeing it in terms of electing
larger groups, like a state legislature. It is an advantage. If you are
included on the slate or within a political party, the people will blocvote; then you have greater chances of getting elected than if you are
just running by yourself. I might be wrong on this, but people on the
panel can criticize me if this is not correct.
And the last one is that it does require a highly-disciplined
electorate. You have to vote the right way for a PR system to be
effective, particularly with cumulative voting and limited voting. And
if you make a mistake and you don't vote the right way-and this is
a particular problem, say, with black people or Hispanics in the South
or the Southwest-they have to understand that they have to vote
exactly the right way, they have to cast all eight of their votes for one
candidate, and if they split that and by mistake vote for another
candidate, the candidate favored by them, the chances of election are
decreased for that particular candidate. So it does require an
electorate that is highly disciplined.
I think the debate over PR highlights the public choices that are
available today. And Shaw v. Reno brings in great emphasis these are
the choices available. First of all, let's assume that you think that
minority representation is desirable, it's desirable to have black people
and Hispanics in Congress. And fairness in representation as a goal
as well.
So that means you have two choices: You can go with singlemember district plans, some of which may result in oddly shaped
districts, but this is a cost of having minority representation, having
fairness in the electoral process. If you don't like that, the other
choice available is PR voting systems. But it seems to me if we are
going to have fair levels of minority representation, it has to be one
or the other. And if we do away with both of them, then the goal of
fairness for minorities and representation is defeated.
MR. VERRILLI: I think Frank Parker has made many good points
there. One thing that has struck me about this debate is that either
way you go-single-member districting or some form of a proportion-
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al representation system-each approach to vindicating minority
voting rights has its own inexorable logic.
If you stay within geographic districting and you want to maximize
your efforts to ensure fairness to minorities in the electoral process,
you push the concept of geography further and further and further.
But if you go in the other direction and use proportional representation systems, particularly if you start conceiving of using them on a
national scale, well, are we going to stop electing Members of the
House of Representatives by state, for example, because why should
those territorial constraints matter anymore?
MODERATOR: Another thing, you could view election of Senators
from the states as a form of proportional representation.
MR. VERRILLI: Certainly with the Senate. But the experiment
that I use is the House of Representatives: Are we going to stop
electing them by state, because in order to achieve the logic of a
proportional representation system to its full extent, you would need
to do that.
MODERATOR: You would have to change the Constitution. You
would have to change Article I to accomplish it.
MR. VERRILLI: But, apart from the practical difficulties of doing
it, it seems at least to me that is a jarring thought that we would do
that.
So, the odds are that whichever way you go, you are going to be
making pragmatic compromises that take our objectives, which are
laudable objectives, and take our traditions, which embody certain
political theory values that are weighty and need to be considered,
and you have got to work them out. I don't think you solve that
problem by saying, '"ell, proportional representation versus singlemember districts." That is not to say there aren't times when
proportional representation schemes are very effective remedies for
particular problems.
MODERATOR: Let me press that point. To what extent do we
really have a single, monolithic theory of representation? The Senate
has a very different form of representation than the House. We have
all kinds of super-majority rules in terms of the constitutional
amendment process, in terms of ratification of treaties. We have
super-majority requirements all over the place, and single-member
districts themselves are an historically contingent innovation.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: I was going to say that this seems to me the
place to divide discussion about the House of Representatives level,
which Don Verrilli was referring to, from discussion about county or
municipal offices. Until the last ten or fifteen years, the dominant
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form of election on the local level was not single-member districts, it
was at-large elections of various kinds. In some places, those at-large
elections used various proportional systems. New York City has used
all sorts of proportional systems. Illinois used cumulative voting for
one hundred years. Cambridge has used a form of single transferable
vote. Cincinnati used proportional representation.
One of the interesting things about these was when you looked at
the justifications for them they were given in explicit terms of wanting
minority representatives. Interestingly enough, of course, that wasn't
in racial terms, it was in political terms. These systems were designed
to give representation to the minority political party.
When I was growing up in Connecticut, we used a form of
proportional representation for school boards called limited voting.
Not a single voter, probably, was aware of that because the system was
transparent to the voter. A voter would go into the voting booth and
be instructed to vote for any two candidates for school board.
Actually, three seats were being filled. Any group that was forty
percent of the electorate-and it always meant Republicans in
Democratic towns and Democrats in Republican towns-got represented. Voters did not view this as communistic, they didn't view it as
quotas. This was the way elections for school boards were done.
They viewed it as inefficient and corrupt, which was normal American
politics.
(Laughter)
What I think is promising about these systems in local elections is
that they allow us to elide the distinction of what it means to be a
minority group entitled to representation. And they allow us to do
something that Kay Butler was talking about on the last panel. She
said, "Look, all white people are not monolithic." And that is exactly
right. And so what you find when you have cumulative voting systems
is that what might otherwise be a monolithic white bloc if the choices
are posed in racial terms-"Are you white or are you
black?"-becomes more fluid.
In some of the cases that Ed Still and I have worked on that have
resulted in cumulative voting, what you see is the election of black
Democrats to a county commission, for example, and some white
Democrats to the county commission, and also white Republicans.
You may in some cases get some candidates who are elected on the
basis of neighbors joining together because the thing that is most
important to them in the election is a neighborhood issue, "Don't put
the county dump near our house, put it near somebody else's house."
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On other issues, though, you get cross-county coalitions. So, for
example, you will get all of the people who have kids in the public
schools wanting to vote for particular candidates.
And it allows voters to decide for themselves with which bloc they
want to vote, and to change that from election to election. So, I
don't worry as much as Frank Parker does about black voters in a
particular election not using the system exactly right, because even if
they don't use it exactly right in one election, they are free to do it
in the next election.
And what we have in fact seen is not that black voters do worse
than expected under these systems, but in general that black voters
do better than expected because the white community doesn't vote
as a bloc; it fragments into white liberals, white conservatives, and the
like.
MODERATOR: Well, we have an interesting local example of this.
Indeed, because in the District of Columbia the local is the federal,
Congress is implicated. Congress, in enacting the Home Rule Charter
for the District of Columbia in 1973, said that of the four at-large
council seats in the District of Columbia, two had to be set aside for
people who were not of the majority party. So the Democrats control
every ward council seat, two at-large seats, and then the other two
have gone either to independents, Republicans, or the D.C. Statehood
Party.
PROFESSOR PARKER: That is a true quota.
MODERATOR: That is a true quota, yes.
PROFESSOR MILLER: What this discussion demonstrates to me is
that all of us, lawyers included, have a real public education project
to educate people out in the world about how these modified at-large
systems work and what their benefits are. That is something that
certainly did not happen in the course of the Guinier nomination,
which was actually a fairly truncated debate.
One thing I have noticed in reading the same newspapers that beat
up on her so badly in the nomination process is that there now
actually is more information and more knowledge out there about the
value and benefits of some of these systems. There is a lot more
knowledge on the part of voters that they haven't always voted only
in single-member districts systems or at-large systems, but that other
systems have been around for years and years and they are as
traditional, in some ways more traditional, than single-member
districts.
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Education is an ongoing process. But education is really in some
ways more the key issue than what position lawyers take in their cases
on these issues because education creates real choices.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Let me start by qualifying what I'm about to
say. I think you have to evaluate each specific situation, particularly
when you're talking about relief under the Voting Rights Act. I don't
think there is one right answer to this. But perhaps there is a great
opportunity here.
First of all, our system is really peculiar. We are used to thinking
of it as normal; we are used to thinking that what we do is democracy.
But there are many forms of democracy. So you look around the
world, and as Ed Still just said, there are only two or three countries
left from the Old Commonwealth who still do it this way. And in
each one of those-except the U.S.-there is a very substantial mass
movement to throw it out and get proportional representation.
We are really stuck in this. We are used to these single-member
geographic districts where a representative can come without even
winning a majority, a plurality can win; and we are used to giving
them all the power.
What happens as a result of that? Some of the things that the
whole population is currently really aroused about: There is a twoparty monopoly; politicians don't listen; they don't do what they said
they were going to do; they ignore groups that weren't in the majority
that sent them there, including minorities of all types; the Government is immobilized, or gridlocked; they tend to think that they and
their parties have a hold on the position. The two parties have a hold
that is very detrimental, and I think maybe a majority of the people
agrees with this at this point.
Now, if I could say one other thing in terms of the context of this
that would just take a moment. Pam Karlan alluded to this. I think
we have to be realistic about the context right now. Civil rights is
viewed as a special interest issue, as something that helps minorities
and women at the expense of white men. That expense is viewed as
very costly. People who think this way believe it costs them opportunities that they deserve. They believe it's expensive in terms of taxes.
And they believe it is dangerous. Civil rights causes crime, if you
haven't heard yet, or watched prime-time TV.
This, of course, is utter nonsense. Maybe it's characteristic of a
period when short-term narrow self-interest has become our defining
principle. It is the guiding principle for individuals, for businesses,
and for society at large.
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We have lost a sense of compassion or connection to community or
to other individuals. We have no sense or understanding that
misfortune or prejudice could befall any of us; we seem to think that
that is just a problem for other people. We have no sense that
working together, things could be changed.
We have even lost the sense that our short-term self-interest might
demand civil rights and civil liberties, which the most vehement
opponent of civil rights immediately learns when they get charged
with a crime. Look at Oliver North. He is already condemning civil
rights again, the same civil rights that kept him out of a deserved
term in jail.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: I am glad there is some criminal you want
to prosecute.
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: There are many.
Now, I think this means that from the civil rights community or
from the progressive community, we have to be thinking about a
reconceptualization of civil rights.
The other part of this that I am not really going to get into is the
meaning of the collapse of what looked like the practical progressive
alternatives to our system in other parts of the world. Whether you
supported or cared about those systems, whether you were a great
opponent of those systems, that leaves progressive politics in this
period in extreme disarray.
So I think we need this reconceptualization. There are lots of
aspects of this we can talk about and there are lots of groups working
on really interesting parts of this, but central to it has got to be a
revitalization of democracy. That is what makes progressive politics
different than what is happening right now, and has the ability of
broadening the appeal of a new approach.
Now, what do I mean? I mean the two-party system really does
stink. It tends to depoliticize our social discourse; it tends to drive
people out of the political process. We have these terribly low voting
rates compared to the proportional systems. We don't have a choice
in candidates, and we could tick off many other consequences.
What this leads to, for me, is a need, in the voting context as well
as in the voting rights context, to emphasize this revitalization of
democracy. The issue is on the agenda across the political spectrum.
It has been effectively taken over or diverted by the term limit
question. We are in a very conservative period. There is a conservative agenda in this period that tends to swallow up and divert such
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vital issues. Discontent about the political process has so far been
effectively channeled into this term limit issue.
But there is a range of democratic reforms which we could be
working on, and we could coalesce with these voting rights issues:
proportional representation; elimination of the role of money in
elections; media access for every candidate in limited equal amounts;
elimination of the barriers to voting; elimination also of the barriers
to ballot access. For example, we are the only country in the world
that requires you to register to vote well in front of an election. In
most places, you show up on election day, and you vote.
So, those are the kind of issues and reforms we could coalesce with
the voting rights issues.
MODERATOR: In a pro-democracy movement?
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Yes.
MR. STILL: Let me answer a couple of the criticisms that Frank
Parker made about proportional systems, and maybe we ought to call
those inclusive systems rather than necessarily proportional systems,
because in some cases they don't result in proportionality but they
result in some minimum level of inclusion of minority groups of
various sorts within the political process.
PROFESSOR PARKER: Why don't you call it "good government"?
MR. STILL: Yes. Good government.
In case you didn't hear that, Pam Karlan suggests modified
capitalism. Well, as a matter of fact, think about this for a minute.
When you go buy something at the grocery store, you plunk down
your money and you say, "I want a can of Pepsi," and they say, "We
don't have any Pepsi. We are going to give you Coke instead." "No,
I would like my money back." "No, I'm sorry, we're going to give you
Coke instead." You see, that's the American system we have right now
with elections. I plunk down my money or my vote and I get
somebody I didn't vote for.
MODERATOR: Chosen by Coke and Pepsi.
MR. STILL: That's right. Chosen by Coke and Pepsi, in most
cases.
(Laughter)
MR. STILL: But the point is, right now I know who my Member of
Congress is. He's a guy I voted against last time. I am going to vote
against him this fall. He is going to get elected again this fall. Why?
Because I am in a "Republican district." See, I don't have as much of
a choice. I get to vote for whatever sheep for the slaughter the
Democrats put up against this guy at any particular time, so I know
who my Representative is, but he's not anybody I can go to.
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But Frank Parker criticizes this modified at-large system as being
government by committee, that I wouldn't know who my Representative is. I have got two Senators in my State. Frank Parker, who
doesn't have any representation in the Senate, doesn't even think
about this. But I have got two Senators, I have got two Senators from
my State, and I get to choose which one of them I want to go to:
Richard Shelby or Howell Heflin. See, I've got a lot of choice there.
(Laughter)
MR. STILL: So if one of them is going to be more favorable to me
on a particular issue, then I can go to that particular Member. In the
same way, if it's a modified at-large system or proportional system, I
will know who I voted for, I will know which one of those people I was
most in favor of, and that is the person I will go to first on a
particular thing. They don't have to know whether I voted for them
or not in order to respond to me, and most of the time they don't
know whether you voted for them or not.
I think Frank Parker is correct that at least cumulative voting and
limited voting do put a premium on slating. They do put a premium
on getting the vote divided up right or cumulated ight among the
minority group, and there can be a slip and you can end up with no
representation at all. For that reason I believe that the single
transferrable vote is a preferable system in the long run to cumulative
voting or limited voting.
I don't want to be understood to be criticizing single-member
districts. I was quotingJustice O'Connor andJustice Thomas to show
that I believe that their criticisms of single-member districts, of the
present method of single-member districting in this country, can be
met by going to these proportional systems.
And it is not necessary for you to believe that they are right, but it
is necessary for you to believe that you could undercut their arguments by arguing for something other than single-member districts.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: I just want to pick up on one point
that Ed Still just made. I think that Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Shaw is potentially quite destabilizing of the entire regime of singlemember districts. And I think that Shaw does this more than any
other opinion by trying to elevate an individual right in the political
marketplace to some kind of premier value.
Various members of this panel have written on this question and we
have referred to this problem as "stigmatic harms," "dignitary harms,"
or "essentializing harms." These harms arise when the State tells you
that you are primarily an X and you are expected to participate in the
political process as an X, act in this way, and take the representation
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that we, the State who has redistricted for you, have decided is what
best befits you.
O'Connor goes after this issue in terms of race with the inflammatory language of "apartheid" and "segregation." But the critique that
she launches is not, in my opinion, confined to race. The critique is
ultimately directed at state agencies assigning you your slot in the
political process. It perverts the concept of elections as being where
we choose rather than where others choose for us.
I believe that if this individual autonomy claim is really pursued, it
threatens to do the most damage to single-member districts. And I
think it flows right out of Shaw.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I was going to follow up on how to move
discussion over toward some of these alternative voting systems.
One means is pointing out the comparisons between our system
and other systems that people have already made, and one fact about
this that I think is telling is that there are only two countries in
Western Europe that use the system we use for elections. Obviously,
England is one of them, since we inherited our system from England.
But I doubt anyone in the audience could tell me the other country,
because it's the Vatican. And all the other countries, all the other
democracies in Western Europe use some form of one of these
alternative systems.
A second way you can open up discussion about these alternatives
is to point out the historical process by which we came to inherit this
system of territorial districting. I think people imagine that there was
some careful, deliberative choice among democratic alternatives, and
we got the system we have, and it's worked in some way or another,
at least, for some people, for a long time. So why think about
changing it?
In fact, these alternative voting systems simply weren't conceived of
at the time that we were making the choices underlying our system.
They were conceptualized in the 19th century and adopted by
virtually all the countries that created democratic systems since then.
So there was no deliberative choice. The options on the table were
the ones we inherited from England, and that is how we ended up
with a geographically-based districting system.
One way also to think about prompting discussion about these
issues would be to consider efforts to amend the Voting Rights Act to
make clear that alternative voting systems are a legitimate remedial
option for federal courts to employ in these cases. I think one can
argue both ways about whether the Voting Rights Act now should
already be understood to permit this as an option. But I suspect
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many federal judges will be reluctant to at least impose these
alternative voting systems over the objections of governments. It has
been done once now in Worcester County, Maryland.
And that case is up on appeal. All the other contexts in which
these alternative voting systems have been developed under the
Voting Rights Act are ones in which consent decrees have been used
to employ alternative voting systems.
One of the advantages of moving toward amending the Voting
Rights Act simply to permit this as one option is that it might open
up a real public debate about these alternative systems versus the
territorial districting system that we have.
MODERATOR: Would it be possible, outside of the judicial
context, to mobilize powerful political interests, i.e., the major
political parties when they are in the minority to get behind proportional representation? Say you are in a state where the Republican
Party is always in the minority, would they not have an interest
perhaps in moving to a PR system?
PROFESSOR KARLAN: Well, in the places where it's to their
interest, they have already done it. There are a tremendous number
of state and local offices for which there are so-called limited slate
laws, so that neither political party can nominate a full slate for all of
the offices. That is what Connecticut did, that is what Illinois did,
that is what New York has done.
Bipartisan gerrymanders are done all the time. These are a form
of proportional representation for minorities, the minority being the
minority political party. That is what Gaffney v. Cumminge 4 is about,
for example.
The plain fact is that if you are an incumbent legislator of any kind,
an incumbent elected political official, you don't have a great
incentive to change the system because, of course, you got elected
under this system and you don't know what would happen under
another system. The likelihood that anybody who has already been
elected would want to change the system dramatically is quite low.
And this is true even for people who are going to be perpetually in
the minority within an elected body. And that, I think, means that
the place this is most likely to come from is not from the members of
the two major political parties as they sit in legislatures.
Where it is more likely to come from-and this is why local
elections are more likely to have this-is in places where, at least
formally, the system is nonpartisan. A lot of municipal elections are

34.
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nonpartisan. You don't run as a member of a political party. And
there it is easier for groups to coalesce around pushing for some form
of alternative to single-member districts than it is when you have the
two political parties, because no matter how partisan a legislator is,
that legislator prefers retaining his own seat and having his party in
the minority to giving up his seat in order for his party to increase its
share.
PROFESSOR MILLER: Although I don't know the empirical
evidence on this question, I would suspect that in some respects the
Republican Party would probably have the least to gain from modified
at-large systems in most places, even where they are a minority and
could ostensibly gain from such systems.
Republicans have already gained so much, I think, under the singlemember district system. They are so often on the side of implementation of those districts, especially where those districts have additional
black voters who would otherwise vote Democratic moving black
voters into majority-minority districts creates other districts where it
is possible for Republicans to be elected.
And I am not sure what position the Democratic Party would take,
but I agree with Pam Karlan that the biggest push for those systems
will be either in nonpartisan situations or situations where you have
progressive voters, whether they call themselves Democrats or
Republicans, who see themselves as allies of minority voters.
I think that could be women voters on a lot of issues. It could be
gay and lesbian voters. It could be a wide variety of voters. But it
would really transcend party affiliation.
MODERATOR: You could create a coalition of either minority
parties like the Libertarian Party or a coalition of minority interests.
PROFESSOR MILLER Sure. And we have seen that happen in
some elections. The recent New York City school board elections
provide some nice examples of some extremely progressive candidates
getting elected through somewhat unusual multiracial, multiethnic,
multisexual orientation kinds of linkages. These kinds of elections
are where you see the most push.
If you're looking for a progressive agenda, which, of course, the
Voting Rights Act does not mandate, but if that is your political view,
then in some ways modified at-large voting may get you closer to that
than a single-member district system, although single-member districts
have certain advantages.
MR. STILL: Republicans complain that they are gerrymandered
out of their fair share of congressional seats by Democratically
controlled legislatures. Again, don't understand me as buying that
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argument. But if they believe that, then they would be likely to
believe that a proportional system would be more favorable to them
than the present, what they consider to be gerrymandered system of
single-member districts.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: Let me introduce two caveats in this
discussion. One is that the objective of a proportional representation
system is to move closer to what the electors, more specifically the
voters, actually want. And one immediate effect would be that, in
Louisiana, probably the largest party in the State legislature today
would be David Duke's party. So you have to be willing to face that
consequence directly.
In Texas, in 1990, we had 14 contested congressional elections.
Over two million votes were cast. The Democrats obtained 3,000
more votes total than the Republicans, yet they took 10 of 14 seats.
That outcome is going to change as well.
The other effect, because it is more closely aligned with what the
voters want, is that there is a risk addressed by Professor Rodolfo de
la Garza at the University of Texas, that Hispanics will be quite
adversely affected by any kind of proportional representation scheme.
So long as you have single-member districts that are based upon the
one person, one vote allocation system, then a district that has a large
Hispanic community, which may be heavily immigrant, heavily under
18, and have extraordinarily low numbers of actual votes cast, will
nonetheless control one Representative.
MODERATOR: That is, unless you have noncitizen voting.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: Unless you have noncitizen voting,
which you have raised. But then you have the question of state versus
local versus federal elections and at what point do you allow noncitizen voting?
But the direct impact may very well be on Hispanic political power,
particularly in the Southwest United States.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I think the last concerns are very serious,
but they pose a basic choice. And that is, do we believe in democracy? There are people out there for David Duke. Right now our
political system suppresses any views other than the rather watereddown views of the Republicans and the Democrats.
I don't think that is a good thing. Those people are still out there;
the David Duke view is there. It does get reflected in many ways. We
like to think it's not visible. I would just as soon have David Duke or
right wing-identified representatives.
MODERATOR: Well, but he's already an elected Republican from
a single-member district.
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PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Yes.
MODERATOR: In the Louisiana legislature.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: But at the same time that I feel very strongly
about how beneficial this might be, practically we have to realize that
the Republicans and the Democrats are going to have very serious
institutional and individual reasons to be entirely hostile to this.
First of all, whole sections of the Democrats and Republicans are
likely to move into other parties that actually stand for something.
The two parties may dissolve, or new coalitions may form. We would
have an array of parties. There would be a choice. There might even
be some real debate.
MODERATOR: Does anyone believe that the question of campaign
finance is a voting rights-civil rights issue? This is something that I
have tried to raise, and I was happy to hear Professor Willingham
raise it this morning where he said one reason why the majority-black
and Hispanic districts are so important is because in them the amount
of money raised and given is much less but there is a level playing
field, whereas if minority candidates try to run in majority-white
districts, they have a much smaller financial base to draw upon.
PROFESSOR WILLINGHAM: Well, apropos of that, I hadn't really
thought of it until you just mentioned that, but Bobby Agee, who is
the black county commissioner in Chilton County, Alabama, which
uses cumulative voting, told us just a few days ago that he manages to
run his campaign on about $500, whereas some of the whites who are
running are spending thousands of dollars campaigning for county
commission seats.
But he is able to do it because he is essentially targeting his voters.
He is doing what you ordinarily associate with what merchants do:
They're going to go to a direct mail campaign, they're going to target
the people they want to get to who are going to buy their product.
He does that because he knows the voters who are likely to vote for
him are black voters. He is able to get to them in an efficient way
and doesn't waste his money.
So, in that sense, even when you abandon single-member districts
and go to a modified at-large system, you can still sometimes be able
to run very efficient, low-cost campaigns.
MODERATOR: Well, our panel finally seems to have run out of
ideas. I thought it would never happen.
Why don't we give everyone a chance to make one or two closing
remarks. It has been a long and very fruitful day.
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MR. STILL: Let me respond to a point that David Kairys has raised
just a couple of times here and I meant to say something about it
each time.
He has talked about the two-party system. As it happens, right now
I am reading again the 1984 book, "Democracies,"3 5 by Arend
Lijphart, in which he is comparing twenty-one democratic regimes
around the world, including the United States. Just as I was on the
plane coming here yesterday, I was reading the chapter on how many
political parties are present in a particular system.
It is dependent, he says, not upon the political system that you
have, but upon the issue splits that you have within the community.
Now, perhaps you could say the issue splits are a reflection of various
other factors. Perhaps they are.
But in the United States, for instance, we have a moderate split on
the socioeconomic axis between the left and the right, the Newt
Gingrich type and the Ted Kennedy-type, if we can use them as the
archetypes, we might say, whereas there are other countries that have
cleavages not only along that-that is found in every one of the
democracies he studied-but they will also have an urban-rural split.
One or two countries have what he calls a post-modernist split, postmodernist versus modernist split. Other places have a religious
dimension to their politics.
So, those are reflected in the number of political parties, and if you
have three issue dimensions, you are generally not going to have two
political parties, you are generally going to have four, five, or six
political parties.
In the United States, we have one predominant issue dimension:
the socioeconomic dimension. And to a moderate extent we have a
cultural divide, a cultural-ethnic divide with most blacks being in the
Democratic Party but they're not being an explicitly racial party like
you will have in some countries.
So, those two issue dimensions are the only ones we have in the
United States, and they are reflected in two political parties. Now,
perhaps if we change electoral systems, more issue dimensions will
develop and more political parties will develop, but it is not necessarily a given that if you go to a proportional system, what Arend Lijphart
calls the consensual method of government, that you necessarily have
to develop additional political parties.

35. AREND LIJPHART, DEMocRAcIES:
IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984).
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PROFESSOR KAIRYS: Well, I am just going to briefly respond to
that rather than sum up.
First of all, there are two aspects of our system that make us rather
peculiar. One is the lack of proportional representation. The other
is the nonparliamentary nature' of our political system.
There are lots of issues that are just suppressed. We have divisions
along all the lines you listed. They are very deep. But most of our
differences are suppressed.
The nonparliamentary aspect of our system would obviously take a
constitutional amendment to change. Many scholars feel you could
shift to a proportional system for Congress by just a statute, and I
think there is a very good argument for that.
But the parliamentary system was available at the time the Framers
were around and was the norm in almost every other democratic
country.
In a parliamentary system, the elections of legislators and the chief
executive are connected. The legislative candidate or the party you
vote for gets some ongoing power based on the votes they get. If a
Clinton were elected based on support from certain constituencies or
a coalition of parties, in a parliamentary system those constituencies
would have their proportion of Congress and would therefore vote on
every issue, every bill that comes before Congress. They cannot be
ignored after the election.
In those systems you are encouraged to vote your beliefs. You get
some ongoing influence based on your vote, and the parties have
ongoing power in that proportion. They make their compromises to
assemble a ruling majority coalition among various parties after the
election. We have to make our compromises before because whoever
gets the most votes in the electoral college or in the election-which
is usually the same; it doesn't have to be-is going to be President,
and every other vote has no ongoing significance at all. Therefore,
you have to narrow and you have to appeal to as mushy a middle as
we are used to seeing them appeal to in advance of the election. You
can't stand for much of anything because the only goal is to get that
winning vote rather than saying what you believe in and making the
compromise later.
I think that the nonparliamentary aspect of our system has a lot
more to do with the two-party monopoly in the United States than
anything else; but I also think, in a proportional system, if we only
made that step, we would see, at least in certain areas, a breakdown
of the two-party system and more debate and more choice.
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PROFESSOR PARKER: The advocates of PR, in order to sell the
system in America, are going to have to find their country. The
opponents of PR have the Fourth French Republic and Israeli politics
and a large number of other examples of what they consider to be
disadvantageous politics under PR systems.
So, the advocates of PR really are going to have to find their
country that they want the United States to emulate and that will show
the advantages of adopting a PR system. It might be Italy.
MR. STILL: I will take the Republic of Ireland.
PROFESSOR PARKER: Italy abandoned PR. Italy thought that PR
was the reason for the corruption in Italian politics of the past ten or
fifteen years. And so they abandoned PR for a modified district
system. And what did they get? Forza Italia, the Northern League,
and Mussolini's granddaughter.
PROFESSOR KARLAN: I am not sure that-and this is a point that
a lot of the academic criticism has made-I am not sure that there is
any political system that solves all of these problems because I think
that America has, at least among Western democracies, a unique
racial history that is different from a lot of the other countries whose
systems we are looking at. And I think that the same point that
W.E.B. du Bois made at the beginning of the twentieth century is still
true: the problem in America is the problem of the color line. We
have managed to do a pretty good job of solving a lot of the other
problems of democratic theory, at least to the extent that most
Americans find the system legitimate, but we haven't yet found a way
of dealing with continued racial exclusion. And nothing the Supreme
Court has done in the last five years has advanced the ball very much
on that issue, and nothing that the legislative system has done over
the last five years has advanced the ball much on that issue.
I think what we really have to do is go back and regain all the
ground that was lost during the Reagan Administration in which the
general public commitment to the idea of racial equality was just lost
and the public sentiment became "Enough's enough. We've had
affirmative action now for twenty-five years. Enough's enough. Let's
go back to a system of individualism." And I think that that individualist perspective is the hardest thing for us to deal with, and until we
confront the fact that politics has always been about groups, it's not
really about individual voters voting for individual candidates, we are
not going to really move very far beyond where we now find ourselves.
PROFESSOR MILLER: I would just add that the verdict is still a bit
out about the real impact of alternative systems, in part because as a
country we don't have very much experience with the kind of
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multiracial or multiethnic coalitions that those kinds of systems would
at least in theory make possible. There was really no incentive for
them under at-large systems, and probably not a great deal of
incentive for them under the single-member district systems.
So, coalition-building is one of the biggest promises that alternative
systems hold out, but it remains to be seen how much of that really
plays out. We actually know very little about those kinds of coalitions,
and there aren't many examples of those kinds of coalitions being
formed.
There are isolated candidates who have certainly won election
where there was no significant racial bloc voting, but I think that is
something different than having a real commitment to voting across
traditional lines or an understanding of what those coalitions would
mean over a long period of time. Without this understanding,
coalitions would simply be a number of different competing factions,
none of them really joining together to deal with crossing the racial
divide or any of the other divides that we face.
PROFESSOR PILDES: I wanted to go back to Shaw v. Reno and
make a comment about civil rights debates over the last ten or fifteen
years.
I think that one of the unfortunate developments has been how
polemical and confrontational a lot of discussion about these sorts of
issues has become, and I think that that is certainly something that is
a product of conservative argument, in part, over the last ten or
fifteen years, but also something that liberals have participated in to
a considerable extent as well.
Some of the things that you read about Shaw v. Reno-in fact, I will
cite an op-ed piece 6 that Jamin Raskin, our moderator, just published last week or so-refer to Shaw v. Reno as another Dred Scott or
another Plessy v. Ferguson.
I think that whatever you ultimately think about Shaw v. Reno, it
does seem to me that the question of these kind of highly contorted
districts is a troubling, difficult question. It is a hard question. You
can come out, I think, with different views about the question, but to
ignore it, to dismiss it, as a difficult, troubling problem, seems to me
complacent and really not listening to the sorts of debates that are
taking place.
So I guess I have been happy by the discussion today because I
think it has been very productive. And I agree with Allan Lichtman

36. Jamin Raskin & Thomas Goldstein, Turning the Voting Rights Act on Its Head, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1994.
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and Morgan Kousser that there are a lot of factual things we can pin
down about some of these issues and we need to pay attention to facts
where they are available.
MR. VERRILLI: I think that one real problem that confronts us in
thinking about and imagining alternatives is that what we need more
than coalitions in our society now, I think, are communities. And I
think the real challenge for those who are imagining alternatives is to
answer the question, "Do they build communities or do they prevent
the building of communities?"
From my admittedly untutored view on this, the fear I would have
of moving away from geography, and especially moving away radically
from geography, is that where we live does matter and who we live
with does matter. And the need to factor that in to whatever we are
imagining for the future I think is quite important.
PROFESSOR ISSACHAROFF: I would like to return to a point that
Don Verrilli made at the end of one of the morning panels, which is
that we must not lose sight of how much we have changed the
political process in the last thirty years, largely through either
legislation or judicial action in the voting arena. It is a far more
open, participatory process than we have ever had before in this
country. And with the openness and the greater participation in the
political process, comes a new set of problems that is revealed only as
a product of the newly open process. Only when apportionment is
reasonably fair and minorities are permitted to vote can we observe
limitations on political change and political involvement of the
citizenry that weren't apparent before.
I agree with Rick Pildes that Shaw v. Reno is not Plessy. I think that
Shaw v. Reno is a confrontation with an extraordinarily difficult
question of how do we license the use of racial classifications by the
State in a context where the Supreme Court wants to say both we
don't want to live with racial exclusion anymore and we don't like
racial classifications in general.
The message comes out somewhat incoherent, somewhat inconsistent, but it is a reflection of the fact that we now have a polity where
minority political power is expressed, is felt, and actually makes a
difference in how we allocate electoral opportunity. Shaw shows the
unresolved tensions, or new limitations, of our system in terms of
both minority integration and respect for individual autonomy. That,
in turn, creates the discussion about alternative voting systems as an
attempt to resolve the very difficult discussions that are engendered
by Shaw.
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MR. STILL: I wanted to thank you very much for having this panel
discussion this afternoon because I think that it is important that we
begin to have a debate about these kind of issues.
We have thousands ofjurisdictions in the United States. Not all of
them will adopt the same system at any particular time. But if a good
number of jurisdictions adopt a variety of systems, we will be able to
get some of this empirical study that people are raising these
questions about: Will cumulative voting or will proportional representation hurt Hispanics, will it hurt blacks, will it hurt the sense of
community that people have? Will it hurt the representation? Will
it do something better for people's sense of not having anybody in
politics or in government who is representing their particular point
of view? I think these are all important questions, and I thank you for
starting the debate today, and I hope that it gets carried on.
For any of you who are interested, I have got a factsheet up here,
just a one-sheet thing that will give you some background information
on these various alternative systems that we have been talking about
up here, and you can sign up and get some more information and I
will send it to you as well courtesy of the Center for Voting and
Democracy.
PROFESSOR KAIRYS: I think the central feature of Shaw v. Reno,
which is after all our focus, is really the moral repudiation of the goals
of the Voting Rights Act and the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
And in service of that Justice O'Connor's opinion very effectively
appropriates the language and symbols of the progressive civil rights
struggle in support of a role reversal. The role reversal is that now
the presumed victims of racism are white people, and the presumed
racists are black people. And this is a moral shell game, if you will,
that the media has either gone along with or not seen what was going
on.
When you get to whether we should urge these alternative
remedies, I think you have to evaluate each jurisdiction in terms of
the history of each state, what is possible, what can be done, what
furthers the basic goal of diversity and inclusion in the political
process. But I think we should start being more open to these
alternatives and perhaps start educating ourselves about them.37
MODERATOR: Thank you.
I was not planning to raise my Los Angeles Times op-ed because I
thought it would have been self-serving. But since it has been

37. A good place to start is DOUGLAS AMY, REAL CHOIcES, NEW VoicEs, THE CASE FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
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brought up at the last minute here, this op-ed piece-which I am
proud to have coauthored with Tom Goldstein, the editor-in-chief of
the Law Review-is available here to all of you.
If I could just say one word about it. Nowhere do I think we say
that Shaw, "is another P/essy" or "another Dred Scott." The first
sentence, if I am able to recall it, is, "Like the Dred Scott decision,
Plessy v. Ferguson and Korematsu cases, the 1993 decision in Shaw v.
Reno is proving to be another landmark holding about race in
American life that the Supreme Court got all wrong."
So I think it is perfectly fair and right to locate it in the context of
those decisions. Indeed, it seems to me that this conference has
shown that Shaw v. Reno is another landmark case about race in
American life that the Court got all wrong. But maybe we can have
another conference and debate that op-ed.
Perhaps above all, I want to thank all of the participants who did
such a brilliantjob in elucidating the issues and elevating the debate
perhaps to the highest level I have witnessed it. And even without
prepared texts, you did a remarkable and polished job of presenting
your views in a respectful and mutually supportive way.
So thank you for coming to the Washington College of Law. I
hope you come back, and we look forward to sending you your
remarks, which you should feel free to edit-a little bit.
Professor Raskin concluded the Conference by offering thanks to
key individuals who helped in bringing the event to its fruition. Most
notably, Professor Raskin thanked: Sarah Miller, Assistant to the
Deans, for her work in making arrangements and publicizing the
Conference; the people of the Kay Spiritual Life Center; Tom
Goldstein and the American University Law Review; Professor Raskin's
research assistants who are with the Program on Law and Government; and the audience, who "showed a lot of fortitude by sticking
through a long day."
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V. LUNCHEON ADDRESS BYJULIAN BOND

I want to talk about the Voting Rights Act,' not so much in the
sense that many of you know it, but as someone who has been its
beneficiary. As you know, it's called the "most effective civil rights
legislation ever passed."2 It protects what President Ronald Reagan
called "the crown jewel of our democracy," 3 and that is the right to
vote.
Before it became law, blacks in the South were victims of a centuryold system of legally sanctioned white supremacy enforced by private
and State terror in all but a few isolated instances, and excluded from
voting without any influence in the conduct of public affairs.
The years since the Act passed in 1965 have seen a dramatic, if
slow, reversal of this exclusion. Within the first two years after it was
passed, the percentage of blacks registered to vote in my home state
of Georgia doubled from 27% to 52.6%.' Today, almost three
decades after the Act was passed, blacks have begun to participate in
electoral politics at levels nearly equal to those of whites.
That's why the threat embodied in the Supreme Court's decision
in Shaw v. Reno5 is so serious. What follows is an account of my
experiences with voting rights litigation and the Voting Rights Act as
an intervenor, as a plaintiff, and as one of many of who benefitted
from the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
I tell these stories in the hope that when we gather for the
numerous celebrations planned next year for the 30th anniversary of
the Act that we will also be celebrating the demise of Shaw v. Reno.
From 1960 until the fall of 1965 I worked for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.6 This is the organization that played
an important and sometimes overlooked role in pre-Selma Southern
voter registration, organizing and increasing public consciousness of
the South's denials of the right to vote and the terror used to enforce
white supremacy at the ballot box.

1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988)).
2. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.G.C.A.N. 774, 777.
3. Voting Rights Act Amendments, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 846 (June 29, 1982).
4.

POLMCAL PARTICIPATION: A REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CVL RIGHTS 238, 239

(1968).
5. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
6.

(1981).

See CLAYBORNE CARSON, in STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s
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We sent field secretaries to Selma in 1963, two years before Martin
Luther King, Jr. arrived. With the NAACP outlawed in Alabama, with
Medgar Evers as the only full-time civil rights worker in Mississippi,
SNCC field secretaries were often the only professional organizers
seen in many rural southern communities between 1961 and 1964.
In Selma, as elsewhere, SNCC helped to bolster indigenous leadership
and local organizations like Selma's Dallas County Voters League.
By 1965, SNCC's organizers had conducted dangerous voter
registration drives in parts of the Black Belt in Mississippi, Alabama,
Arkansas, and Georgia, had forced a reluctant Department ofJustice
to take its first tentative steps toward protecting voter registration
workers7 and, building on work done by generations before them,
had hastened the momentum of the political revolution that soon
would sweep the South.
Those generations before, whose stories tell the origin of the
southern rights movement, can probably be traced back to slavery.
There is no recounting of the modem movement which can afford to
ignore the heroic and often unheralded work of the South's black
citizens and the organizers who assisted them.'
The year following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, I was the
plaintiff in a case which reached the United States Supreme Court,
and which strongly reinforced the right to vote. The case was called
Bond v. Floyd,9 and it grew from my first election in 1965 to the
Georgia House of Representatives. Federal lawsuits had reapportioned the Georgia General Assembly, overturning legislation where
cows and horses were better represented than human beings. The
Court ordered new equal districts created in urban Fulton County and
ordered elections for a one-year term. 10
As a successful candidate for one of those seats, I was to take the
oath of office on January 10th, 1966. Seven days before I was to be
sworn in, Samuel Younge, Jr., a Tuskegee Institute student and SNCC
worker, was shot and killed while trying to use the segregated

7.

United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).

8.

See, e.g.,JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI

(1994); STEPHEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS INTHE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976);
FRANKP. PARKERJR., BLACKVOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT INMISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965
(1990).
9. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
10. See Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965) (indicating court decree enjoining state
officials from placing issue of state Constitution on November 3, 1964 ballot should be reviewed
by district court); Cray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding Georgia's use of county-unit
voting system violated Equal Protection Clause). The previous disposition of Toombs determined
that the State's General Assembly was malapportioned and required the injunction. Toombs
v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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bathroom at a Tuskegee service station. He was a Navy veteran. The
irony of losing the life he had offered his country over a segregated
toilet prompted the release of an anti-war statement by SNCC's
Executive Committee.
On January 6th, SNCC became the first national civil rights
organization to link the prosecution of the Vietnam War with the
persecution of blacks at home. The statement we issued accused the
United States of deception in its claims for concern for the freedom
of colored people in such countries as the Dominican Republic, the
Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, and in the United States itself. "The
United States," the statement said, "is no respecter of persons or laws
when such persons or laws run counter to its needs and desires."
Well, it created a sensation. In the civil rights community, it
marked a break in the relationship between the more militant civil
rights organizations and the administration of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, and further widened the gap between SNCC and the civil
rights mainstream. The reaction in the white South was even more
severe including harsh criticism from Southern white liberals, such as
Ralph McGill and Lillian Smith, whose anti-communism competed
with their commitment to equal rights for blacks.
I was the SNCC Communications Director, and when I appeared to
take the oath of office on January 10th of 1966, hostility from white
legislators was nearly absolute. They prevented me from taking the
oath. They declared my seat vacant, and they ordered another
election to fill that vacancy. I won that election and was expelled
again. By the time I approached a third election, this time for a twoyear term, I had filed suit in Federal Court.
FederalJudge Griffin Bell wrote the majority decision for the threejudge court which refused to overturn the Georgia Legislature's
decision to deny me the seat I had already won twice. His decision
was in turn overruled by a unanimous Supreme Court, and a year
after my first attempt I became a Member of the Georgia House of
Representatives.
Before the three-judge court, I was represented by Charles Morgan,
Jr. of the Southern Regional Office of the American Civil Liberties
Union, and Howard Moore. For the appeal to the Supreme Court I
secured the services of Moore, Victor Rabinowitz and Leonard
Boudin.
Now, I had never been to the Supreme Court. As I sat and listened
to the arguments of Georgia's Attorney General, Arthur Bolton, who
argued that Georgia had a right to refuse to seat me, I found myself
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hypnotically nodding in agreement. Rabinowitz elbowed me and
whispered, "Stop that!"
Further on during Bolton's argument, the Justices asked a few
questions. When Justice Byron White asked, "Is that all you have?
You've come all this way and that's all you have?" I turned to
Rabinowitz and I said, "We're winning, aren't we?" And he said, 'Yes,
we are." The decision from ChiefJustice Earl Warren in Bond v. Floyd
was larger than a victory for the First Amendment. It was a reaffirmation of my constituents' rights to free choice in casting their votes.
I ran afoul ofJudge Bell again in 1971. Once more the unfettered
right to vote was at issue, and once again Judge Bell ruled against me.
In a case called Bond v. Fortson," Andrew Young and I challenged
Georgia's runoff primary vote provision for Members of Congress.
Judge Bell granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
grounds that the issue was not ripe for review because neither Young
nor I knew if we would ever run for Congress.
Finally, I was party to a suit in 1981 in which the Voting Rights Act's
protections were invoked to help create a majority-black congressional
district in Georgia. This case, Busbee v. Smith,12 stands as an important landmark in voting rights litigation. In Busbee, a federal court
found impermissible racial intent in a voting rights case requiring
creation of a majority-black district.
Busbee grew from my unsuccessful legislative attempts to create a
majority-black congressional district in Georgia. Georgia's 5th District,
then encompassing Fulton County and most of the City of Atlanta,
was 50.33 percent black according to the 1980 census.
Andrew Young had been elected to the United States Congress
from Georgia's Fifth in what voting rights attorney Laughlin McDonald called the biracial afterflow of the civil rights movement. Young
was elected in 1972, and he served there until he was appointed U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. by President Carter in 1977.
The 5th District from which he had been elected was drawn only
after the Attorney General had imposed a Section 5 objection to
preclearance of the 1970 reapportionment plan drawn by the Georgia
General Assembly. That plan had fragmented concentrations of black
persons, and had placed the residences of potential black Congressional candidates outside the 5th District and the residences of potential
white candidates inside the 5th District. For example, the homes of

11. 334 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
12. 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge panel).
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Andrew Young and Maynard Jackson were placed one block outside
the boundary of the Fifth.
In a special 1981 session of the Georgia General Assembly called to
consider reapportionment of state and congressional districts, I made
several attempts to introduce and pass a plan which would have
created a majority-black congressional district. My white colleagues
in the Senate and the House also introduced a variety of plans. In
each one, the 5th District was drawn basically in the same fashion. In
almost all the plans submitted by the white legislators, the 5th District
followed the plan drawn in 1971. It stretched from north to south
with part of East Fulton County lying in the 4th Congressional
District. In three plans, the county was divided between Congressional Districts Five and Six. In each plan submitted by white legislators,
the black percentage of the population in the 5th District remained
between fifty-one and fifty-two percent.
In early August, the State House Reapportionment Committee
adopted a plan that gave the district a black population of fifty-one
percent. Five days later, I introduced in the Senate Reapportionment
Committee a plan which would have created a seventy-three percent
Black Congressional District encompassing the black communities of
Fulton and DeKab Counties. I had waited until the disputes
involving eight of Georgia's ten congressional districts were resolved.
The eight districts surrounded Fulton and DeKalb Counties, creating
a predominantly white doughnut around two heavily black counties.
The hole in the doughnut would be my playground, and my
battlefield.
The rationale of my plan, I told my colleagues, was to put together
a large, harmonious, homogeneous black community living in
Southern Fulton and DeKalb Counties that shared a common income,
the value of their housing stock is the same, their educational level is
generally the same, and, most important, their race is almost
absolutely the same. Now, my plan did not affect the eight districts
and the doughnut surrounding these two counties and those districts
covering the rest of the state.
After it was introduced, the Chairman of the Committee adjourned
the meeting without seeking a vote. On the next day, they adopted
a reapportionment plan which included my plan. The Chairman cast
the sole vote against the plan in violation of the Senate rules, which
permitted his vote only to break a tie. On the Senate floor, the
Chairman of the Reapportionment Committee, at the urging of the
Lt. Governor, Zell Miller, introduced an amendment to the Committee plan. His amendment accomplished two tasks. It split prosperous
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Gwinnett County between two districts so the county would not
overshadow the 9th or the Mountain District where the Lt. Governor
lived, and it drew a 5th District with a fifty-five percent black
population.
I moved to amend the Chairman's plan creating a 5th District that
was sixty-nine percent black. My amendment was adopted. The
Senate adopted a final plan encompassing my amendment, and the
entire plan was sent to the House for consideration. The House
rejected the Senate plan and adopted one of its own. That plan was
rejected by the Senate, and Conference Committees were appointed.
After failing to adopt five Conference Committee Reports, the
General Assembly agreed to a plan with a fifty-seven percent black
population 5th District.
Now, I knew that population majority meant only a forty-six percent
voting minority because blacks are on the whole younger than whites,
and equal population numbers will not produce equal numbers in
both races old enough to vote. I knew, too, and subsequently proved
in court, that voting in Atlanta had become more, not less, racially
polarized in the years since Andrew Young had been elected to
Congress. The election of a black Mayor in Atlanta in 1972 had
decreased the possibility that white voters would cross the color line.
Atlanta's first taste of black power had reinforced the tribal tendencies
of many white voters, solidifying their tendency to bloc vote.
With the assistance of Georgia's then-Republican Senator Mack
Mattingly, a former IBM salesman, I sought a meeting with William
Bradford Reynolds, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.
When Senator Mattingly was unable to arrange such a meeting, I
turned to State Senator Paul Coverdell, the Minority Leader of the
Senate. He secured a meeting with Reynolds, and he and I flew to
Washington.
Reynolds received us graciously, heard our arguments, and imposed
a Section 5 objection against the Georgia plan. Georgia sought a
judgment against his decision in the federal court here in Washington. With a number of other legislators, I intervened, and Busbee v.
Smith was joined.
During the legislative debate and the court fight which followed,
the proponents of a majority-black 5th District were abused and
scorned in the media. The Atlanta Constitution accused me of
creating a ghetto district whose representative would be ineffective.
Senator Coverdell was shown in an editorial cartoon in a graveyard
unearthing the coffin of segregation. Coverdell and the Republicans
were accused in the media of trying to move blacks from the Fourth
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to the Fifth, solidifying the already Democratic strength of the Fifth,
while increasing Republican hopes in the Fourth. Of course,
Republicans, then and now, were willing to help black legislators, all
of us Democrats, create a "blacker" Fifth. We blacks were eager to
accept whatever assistance was offered, and little was forthcoming
from members of our own party.
After trial, the District Court concluded that the 5th Congressional
13
District was drawn to suppress black voting strength in Georgia.
The arguments against my plan in the Legislature and the trial
testimony in Busbee are richly illustrative of the congressional
arguments which would rage over amending Section 2 a year later in
1982.
The Busbee arguments are predictive as well of arguments used
today to discredit the Act, and to limit its effectiveness in enfranchising and empowering minority voters. Those arguments lost in Busbee,
and of course they deserve to lose today.
The Busbee plaintiffs, including the Governor, George Busbee, Lt.
Governor Miller, Speaker Tom Murphy and the leadership of the
House and Senate made several arguments. First, that creating blackmajority voting districts perpetuates racial polarization in voting
behavior. Next, that relying on the courts supplants the normal
methods of the political process, coalition building, voter registration,
and voting.
Using race-conscious remedies, they argued, is alien to the
American political process, and they argued that the Voting Rights Act
demanded no more than a level playing field-that creating an
opportunity to elect a black candidate was not required. In fact,
nothing more than racial prejudice and racial prejudice alone
motivated the defenders of the final plan.
The court found that the Lt. Governor believed keeping white rural
mountain voters in a cohesive district was crucial. Keeping black
urban voters in a cohesive district was not. They found that the
legislative leadership abandoned its standard for proper reapportionment when considering districts other than the Fifth. The goals of
maintaining historical borders, of preserving county and city lines,
and of avoiding a Republican 4th District, all of these were pretexts
for discrimination.
The House found that the Chairman of the House Reapportionment Committee, Joe Mack Wilson, was in their words, a racist and

13.

Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 515 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge panel).
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opposed drawing what he called a "Nigger District." Wilson had said,
"I'm not for drawing no Nigger District." Pretty good proof.
Lt. Governor Miller's stated opposition to my plan for allegedly
creating a Republican 4th District, the court said, was suspect.
Neither Miller, nor any other Senator, expressed any fear of Republican domination of the Fourth. Miller had, in fact, approved a plan
that preserved the 6th District, represented by Representative Newt
Gingrich, and supported a plan placing heavily Republican Gwinnett
County in that district. Because the evidence was overwhelming, the
court denied Georgia the preclearance that it sought.
Since 1980, the standard for challenging discriminatory election
procedures was set by White v. Register.14 The court held then that
the 14th Amendment prohibits methods for election that deny
minority voters an equal opportunity "to participate in the political
process and to elect legislators of their choice." 5
Today, the Act faces similar attacks to those raised in Busbee twentythree years ago. 6 Today's neosegregationists argue that majorityblack districts set impermissible quotas for minority office-holders, and
guarantee proportional representation despite a prohibition against
quotas in the amended Act. They argue that majority-black districts
resegregate, creating racial polarization in the electorate, a criticism
majority-white districts have never engendered. They argue that race
has vanished as a consideration in American political life despite all
evidence to the contrary. These neo-Bourbons say they are colorblind. They are blind, but only to the consequences of color
consciousness in American life.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act has begun to level the playing field for
America's racial minorities and politics. It would be foolish to
imagine that the passage of just three decades has lifted the heavy
hand of white supremacy from any aspect of American life.

14. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15. White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973). The White decision was later undermined
by City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 65 (1980), which placed a discriminatory motivation
requirement in instances of possible Fifteenth Amendment violations. In particular, the majority
opinion noted that the Equal Protection Clause "does not protect any 'political group,' however
defined, from electoral defeat." Id. at 77.
16.

SeeABIGAILM. THERMSTROM, WHOSEVOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVEACTION AND MINORITY

VOTING RIGHTS (1987) (attacking Voting Rights Act as instrument of discrimination against
whites). But see Pamela S.Karlan & Peyton McCrary, Without Fear& Without Research: Abigail
Thermstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 VA. J. L. & POLITIcS 751 (1988) (book review) (critiquing
Thermstrom's assertion as constituting flawed legal analysis and serving a conservative political
agenda); Laughlin McDonald, The Law, SOUTHERN CHANGES, Nov. 1989; Alex Willingham,
Beginning With Voting, NATION, Feb. 20, 1989, at 239 (book review) (arguing that Thermstrom
ignores inherent "limits of single-member districts as a remedy for discrimination").
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Georgia subsequently passed a reapportionment plan that the
Justice Department found met their standards. In an election in the
4th and 5th Districts, Wyche Fowler was elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives, and Representative Elliott Levitas was re-elected from
the new Fourth. Levitas would later lose his seat to Republican
Patrick Swindall. Embroiled in a scandal, Swindall lost in 1988 to
Representative Ben Jones, returning the Fourth to the Democrats
once again. Fowler, of course, was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1986,
defeating Mack Mattingly.
I become the first candidate in 1986 to announce for the 5th
District race, but lost in a primary run-off, to Atlanta City Council
memberJohn Lewis. Judge Bell, of course, became Attorney General
in the Carter Administration. I had the happy opportunity to testify
against his nomination, and he took that occasion to apologize for
writing the decision which kept me out of office for a year.
Maynard Jackson, who had seen the 1970 Georgia Legislature set
the Congressional District line one block past his house, served as
Mayor of Atlanta from 1972 to 1980. In November of 1989, he was
elected Mayor again. He succeeded Andrew Young, who served from
1981 until 1990, and who was a candidate for Governor in Georgia's
1990 Democratic Primary. One of his opponents then was Lt.
Governor Zell Miller, who won that election and is Georgia's
Governor today.
State Senator Coverdell was named Director of the Peace Corps by
President George Bush, and was elected to the U.S. Senate after
defeating Wyche Fowler in 1992, and I have become a teacher.
Now, today's racists, however sophisticated their tools or their
arguments, will use the same methods to divide and delude black
voters tomorrow that they have used for years and years before.
There are lessons to be drawn from this Georgia experience and the
experiences of countless thousands of others who have tried to make
equal rights a reality in modem America.
One lesson is that racists, whether they are wool-hat boys from
below Georgia's gnat line, sophisticates at elite colleges who use their
scholarship and service to a conservative agenda, or the black faced
right-wing accomplices to social genocide, will all employ any
argument to oppose racial progress. They may be as crude as Joe
Mack Wilson in his opposition to "Nigger Districts." They may be as
clever as an academic in her manipulation of facts and misquotation
of the record. They may be as self-hating and shameless as AfricanAmerican apologists for domestic apartheid who favor race-neutral
laws in a race-conscious society. Their intent and result are the same.
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Black Americans fought and died to force their way into the
political process and to erect an effective federal apparatus to protect
their continued participation in it. No American, black, brown, or
white, can afford to have that right destroyed or its protections
relaxed.
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VI. APPENDIX I: PARTICIPANTS

KATHARINE INGLIS BUTLER is a Professor of Law at the University
of South Carolina. Prior to joining the South Carolina Law Faculty
in 1978, Professor Butler was an attorney with the Voting Section of
the Department of Justice. She has written and spoken extensively
about the Voting Rights Act and about representation of racial and
ethnic minorities. She has represented numerous states and political
subdivisions in voting rights litigation, and advised others concerning
administrative compliance with the Act. She represented the Florida
Senate in the lower court in Johnson v. DeGrandy. Her interests also
include the impact of electoral laws and representational systems on
ethnic minorities in other countries. She has been a member of preelection observer teams for national elections in Bulgaria and former
Soviet Georgia.
PENDA HAIR is Director of the Fair Housing Program of the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. She specializes in fair
housing and voting rights litigation and advocacy. She currently
serves as lead counsel for intervenors defending African American
opportunity districts in Texas. She has extensive civil rights and
voting rights experience, including representation of African
American voters in Arkansas in a statewide districting case won under
the Voting Rights Act. Ms. Hair is a 1978 graduate of Harvard Law
School, where she was Supreme Court Notes Editor of the Law
Review. She served as a Law Clerk to Supreme CourtJustice Harry A.
Blackmun and Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
ANITA S. HODGKISS is a partner with Ferguson, Stein, Wallas,
Adkins, Gresham & Sumter in Charlotte, North Carolina where she
handles civil rights litigation and criminal defense work. Her practice
focuses on voting rights, police misconduct, and employment
discrimination cases. Together with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
she represents the Gingles defendant-intervenors in the Shaw v. Reno
case on remand. Anita is a graduate of Yale Law School, where she
was a Senior Editor for the Yale Law Journaland published a student
note entitled "Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice."
She is a member of North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, and
currently serves on the Board of Directors of the ACLU of North
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Carolina, and the Board of Directors of Legal Services of the
Southern Piedmont.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF is the Charles Tilford McCormick Professor
of Law at The University of Texas School of Law. He teaches and
writes in the fields of voting rights, employment law, and civil
procedure. He received his J.D. in 1983 from Yale Law School. He
served as law clerk to the Honorable Arlin M. Adams of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit before becoming an
active federal litigator. He has been a member of the Texas faculty
since 1989.
RICHARD JEROME is one of six trial attorneys on the Justice
Department's Voting Rights Protection Task Force, formed to respond
to Shaw v. Reno claims. He has been the Department's lead trial
attorney in Hays v. Louisiana and Shaw v. Hunt, and he was also a
member of the trial team in Vera v. Richards, the Texas congressional
challenge.
Mr. Jerome has been a key participant in the
Department's review of redistrictings after the 1990 Census. He
served as an Attorney Reviewer in 1991 and 1992, supervising the
review of redistrictings and other voting changes submitted to the
Attorney General for preclearance under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Mr. Jerome has received the Department's Special
Achievement Award in 1991, 1992 and 1993. After he graduated cum
laude from Harvard Law School in 1984, Mr. Jerome worked for
Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, Liipfert & Hand, a private law firm in
Washington, D.C. In 1987, he moved to the office of Senator Brock
Adams of Washington (D-WA) as a Legislative Assistant for judiciary,
commerce, and transportation issues. In 1989, he joined the Voting
Section of the Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department.
DAVID KAIRYS, professor of law at the Temple University School of
Law, has litigated some of the leading civil rights cases over the past
two decades. His most recent book is With Liberty andJusticefor Some,
A Critique of the Conservative Supreme Court (1993).
PAMELA S. KARLAN is the Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia and a Visiting Professor
of Law at Harvard Law School. She is the author of numerous articles
on voting rights, and served as assistant counsel at the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., where she litigated voting rights
cases.
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ROBERT A. KENGLE graduated in 1984 from Antioch School of Law
in Washington, D.C. As a third-year law student, he worked with the
Civil Rights Division as an intern from July to December 1983 on the
trial of the school and housing desegregation case United States v. City
of Yonkers. He joined the Justice Department in September 1984 as
Honor Law Graduate and has worked in the Voting Section since
then. He has engaged in substantial section 2 litigation, served as a
section 5 attorney-reviewer from March 1992 to August 1993 and has
conducted staff training sessions on racially polarized voting and
section 2 investigations. He recently defended a section 5 declaratory
judgment action in Castro County, Texas v. United States (county
commissioners' court redistricting) and Vera v. Richards. He is
presently defending a section 5 declaratory judgment action in State
of Texas v. United States (concerning judicial positions).
LORETTA KING is the career Deputy Assistant Attorney General of
the Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice. Her
primary responsibilities include the supervision of the Voting Rights,
Special Litigation and Coordination and Review Sections. She is also
Chairperson of the Voting Rights Protection Task Force. Ms. King
began working at the Department of Justice as a law clerk in 1979,
and was hired as an Honor Law Graduate in 1980. From 1980 to
1990, she worked in the Employment Litigation Section of the Civil
Rights Division, enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, and Executive Order 11246. While there, she brought and
settled the Department's first sexual harassment and paternity leave
cases. In 1990, Ms. King transferred to the Civil Division, Torts
Branch, where she defended the government in multi-million dollar
medical malpractice and other personal liability cases which were
usually brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. In 1992,
Ms. King returned to the Civil Rights Division as Deputy Chief of the
Voting Section. After graduating cum laude from Duke University in
1977 with majors in Public Policy Studies and Black Studies, Ms. King
attended the American University, Washington College of Law, where
she received herJ.D. degree in 1980.
J. MORGAN KOUSSER is a professor of History and Social Science at
the California Institute of Technology, and the author of The Shaping
of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the OneParty South, 1880-1910, as well as nearly 90 articles and book reviews,
most on legal and political aspects of race relations in nineteenth and
twentieth century America. He has testified as an expert witness on
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the intent issue in Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
(1990), U.S. v. Memphis (1991), Shaw v. Hunt, and Vera v. Richards. He
was educated at Princeton and Yale, and has taught at Michigan,
Harvard, Oxford, and Claremont Graduate School, in addition to
Caltech.
ALLAN J. LICHTMAN received his Ph.D. in history from Harvard
University, specializing in American political history and the quantitative analysis of historical data. He is Professor of History and formerly
Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at The American
University. Dr. Lichtman is the co-author of The Thirteen Keys to the
Presidency, among five other books and more than one hundred
scholarly and popular articles. He has served as a consultant or
expert witness in more than 50 voting rights and redistricting cases,
and is a regular commentator on public affairs for television networks.
He has worked as an expert witness for defendants in Shaw v. Reno in
addition to several other cases challenging minority congressional
districts under the Shaw doctrine.
BINNY MILLER is an associate professor of law at the Washington
College of Law at the American University, where she teaches the
Criminal Justice Clinic and other lawyering courses. After graduating
from the University of Chicago Law School, she clerked for Judge
Barrington D. Parker of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, and then litigated voting rights cases as a trial attorney with
the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice. She has published an academic article about
the voting rights implications of local legislative delegations in the
South, and a popular piece about voting rights issues for lesbian and
gay voters.
FRANK R. PARKER is Professor of Law at the District of Columbia
School of Law. Previously, Professor Parker was Director of the
Voting Rights Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, where he helped lead the effort to persuade Congress to
extend the Voting Rights Act in 1982, and litigated numerous voting
rights cases. From 1968 to 1981 he was staff attorney and chief
counsel of the Lawyers' Committee's Mississippi Office, where he
litigated many of the major Mississippi civil rights cases of the 1970's.
He is the author of an award-winning book, BLACK VOTES COUNT:
POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 (UNC Press,

1990), and has written numerous book chapters and law review
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articles on voting rights issues. Professor Parker received his A.B.
degree from Oberlin College and his law degree from Harvard Law
School.
RICHARD H. PILDES teaches constitutional law, voting rights,
legislation and public policy, and legal theory courses at the University
of Michigan Law School. He has published academic articles on Shaw
v. Reno, constitutional law, democratic theory, and regulatory policy.
In addition, he has written on voting rights in more popular forms
like The New Republic. Professor Pildes is a co-author, along with
Professors Issacharoff and Karlan, of a forthcoming casebook on the
Law of Political Participation (to be published by Foundation Press).
After graduating Harvard Law School magna cum laude, he clerked for
Judge AbnerJ. Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court.
JAMIN B. RASIUN is an Associate Professor of Law and Associate
Dean at the Washington College of Law at the American University,
where he also serves as Co-Director of the Law and Government
Program. A graduate of Harvard College and Law School, he has
served as an Editor of the Harvard Law Review, an Assistant Attorney
General of Massachusetts, and General Counsel of the National
Rainbow Coalition. He has litigated and written widely in the field of
voting rights, publishing articles on non-citizen voting in local
elections, the suffrage rights of citizens in the District of Columbia,
workplace democracy, and federal campaign finance and the "wealth
primary."
EDWARD STILL is a lawyer in solo practice in Birmingham, Alabama
and a board member of the Center for Voting and Democracy,
Washington, D.C. He has argued three cases before the U.S.
Supreme Court: Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60
(1978); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); and Presley v.
Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (1992). He was also one
of the counsel for the plaintiffs in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980), and in 185 related cases seeking an end to at-large
elections in Alabama counties, school boards, and municipalities,
Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 649 F. Supp. 289
(M.D. Ala. 1986). He is the author of several articles and bookchapters concerning the right to vote.
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DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. is a partner in the D.C. office of the law
firm of Jenner & Block, where he specializes in Supreme Court
practice, constitutional law, and voting rights issues. He represented
the State of Florida in Johnson v. DeGrandy. After receiving his J.D. in
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